Fair Bandwidth Sharing Algorithms Based on Game Theory Frameworks for Wireless Ad-hoc Networks

This paper examines the theoretical aspects of bandwidth sharing in wireless, possibly mobile, ad-hoc networks (MANETs) through a game theoretic framework. It presents some applications to show how such a framework can be invoked to design efficient media access control protocols in a noncooperative, self-organized, topology-blind environment as well as in environments where the competing nodes share some basic information to guide their choice of channel access policies. For this purpose, contentions between concurrent links in a MANET are represented by a conflict graph, and each maximal clique in the graph defines a contention context which in turn imposes a constraint on the share of bandwidth that the links in the clique can obtain. Using this approach the fair bandwidth allocation problem is modeled as a general utility based constrained maximization problem, called the system problem, which is shown to admit a unique solution that can only be obtained when global coordination between all links is possible. By using Lagrange relaxation and duality theory, both a non-cooperative and a cooperative game formulation of the problem are derived. The corresponding mathematical algorithms to solve the two games are also provided where there is no need for global information. Implementation issues of the algorithms are also considered. Finally, simulation results are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the algorithms

Managing Shared Access to a Spectrum Commons

The open access, unlicensed or spectrum commons approach to managing shared access to RF spectrum offers many attractive benefits, especially when implemented in conjunction with and as a complement to a regime of marketbased, flexible use, tradable licensed spectrum ([Benkler02], [Lehr04], [Werbach03]). However, as a number of critics have pointed out, implementing the unlicensed model poses difficult challenges that have not been well-addressed yet by commons advocates ([Benjam03], [Faulhab05], [Goodman04], [Hazlett01]). A successful spectrum commons will not be unregulated, but it also need not be command & control by another name. This paper seeks to address some of the implementation challenges associated with managing a spectrum commons. We focus on the minimal set of features that we believe a suitable management protocol, etiquette, or framework for a spectrum commons will need to incorporate. This includes: (1) No transmit only devices; (2) Power restrictions; (3) Common channel signaling; (4) Mechanism for handling congestion and allocating resources among users/uses in times of congestion; (5) Mechanism to support enforcement (e.g., established procedures to verify protocol is in conformance); (6) Mechanism to support reversibility of policy; and (7) Protection for privacy and security. We explain why each is necessary, examine their implications for current policy, and suggest ways in which they might be implemented. We present a framework that suggests a set of design principles for the protocols that will govern a successful commons management regime. Our design rules lead us to conclude that the appropriate Protocols for a Commons will need to be more liquid ([Reed05]) than in the past: (1) Marketbased instead of C&C; (2) Decentralized/distributed; and, (3) Adaptive and flexible (Anonymous, distributed, decentralized, and locally responsive)