233,152 research outputs found
School Choice with Transferable Student Characteristics
We consider school choice problems where school priorities depend on transferable student characteristics. Fair Pareto improvements can alleviate the trade-off between efficiency and stability in this framework. A group of students may improve their outcomes by exchanging their seats and transferable characteristics at the schools they are initially assigned without generating justified envy among the remaining students. We define the student exchange with transferable characteristics (SETC) class of algorithms. Every algorithm in the SETC class starts from an initial matching of students to schools and an initial allocation of transferable characteristics. The algorithms then propose a sequence of fair Pareto improvements until the point at which any additional efficiency gain implies a violation of the school priorities that cannot be solved with a reallocation of the transferable characteristics.Instituto Complutense de Análisis EconómicoFac. de Ciencias Económicas y EmpresarialesTRUEpu
Elastic Multi-resource Network Slicing: Can Protection Lead to Improved Performance?
In order to meet the performance/privacy requirements of future
data-intensive mobile applications, e.g., self-driving cars, mobile data
analytics, and AR/VR, service providers are expected to draw on shared
storage/computation/connectivity resources at the network "edge". To be
cost-effective, a key functional requirement for such infrastructure is
enabling the sharing of heterogeneous resources amongst tenants/service
providers supporting spatially varying and dynamic user demands. This paper
proposes a resource allocation criterion, namely, Share Constrained Slicing
(SCS), for slices allocated predefined shares of the network's resources, which
extends the traditional alpha-fairness criterion, by striking a balance among
inter- and intra-slice fairness vs. overall efficiency. We show that SCS has
several desirable properties including slice-level protection, envyfreeness,
and load driven elasticity. In practice, mobile users' dynamics could make the
cost of implementing SCS high, so we discuss the feasibility of using a simpler
(dynamically) weighted max-min as a surrogate resource allocation scheme. For a
setting with stochastic loads and elastic user requirements, we establish a
sufficient condition for the stability of the associated coupled network
system. Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we show via extensive simulations
that while SCS (and/or the surrogate weighted max-min allocation) provides
inter-slice protection, they can achieve improved job delay and/or perceived
throughput, as compared to other weighted max-min based allocation schemes
whose intra-slice weight allocation is not share-constrained, e.g., traditional
max-min or discriminatory processor sharing
Multi-Path Alpha-Fair Resource Allocation at Scale in Distributed Software Defined Networks
The performance of computer networks relies on how bandwidth is shared among
different flows. Fair resource allocation is a challenging problem particularly
when the flows evolve over time. To address this issue, bandwidth sharing
techniques that quickly react to the traffic fluctuations are of interest,
especially in large scale settings with hundreds of nodes and thousands of
flows. In this context, we propose a distributed algorithm based on the
Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) that tackles the multi-path
fair resource allocation problem in a distributed SDN control architecture. Our
ADMM-based algorithm continuously generates a sequence of resource allocation
solutions converging to the fair allocation while always remaining feasible, a
property that standard primal-dual decomposition methods often lack. Thanks to
the distribution of all computer intensive operations, we demonstrate that we
can handle large instances at scale
Equity and economic theory: reflections on methodology and scope
This paper provides an introduction to the recent literature on ordinal distributive justice. Its objetive is to explain the process of the mathematical analysis of fairness and to consider its potential for solving real allocative problems by means of several illustrative examples
Incentive compatibility and pricing under moral hazard
We study a simple insurance economy with moral hazard, in which random contracts overcome the non-convexities generated by the incentive-compatibility constraints. The novelty is that we use linear programming and duality theory to study the relation between incentive compatibility and pricing. Using linear programming has the advantage that we can impose the incentive-compatibility constraints on the agents that are uninformed (the insurance firms). In contrast, most of the general equilibrium literature imposes them on the informed agents (the consumers). We derive the two welfare theorems, establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium, and characterize the equilibrium prices and allocations. Our competitive equilibrium has two key properties: (i) the equilibrium prices reflect all the relevant information, including the welfare costs arising from the incentive-compatibility constraints; (ii) the equilibrium allocations are the same as when the incentive-compatibility constraints are imposed on the consumers
Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values
We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many types of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present a reasonable counterexample for interdependent values auctions that shows that sometimes all equilibria are trivial, that is, they have zero probability of trade. Nevertheless, we give sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibrium existence
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