Definite Formulae, Negation-as-Failure, and the Base-extension Semantics of Intuitionistic Propositional Logic

Proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) is the paradigm of semantics in which meaning in logic is based on proof (as opposed to truth). A particular instance of P-tS for intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) is its base-extension semantics (B-eS). This semantics is given by a relation called support, explaining the meaning of the logical constants, which is parameterized by systems of rules called bases that provide the semantics of atomic propositions. In this paper, we interpret bases as collections of definite formulae and use the operational view of the latter as provided by uniform proof-search -- the proof-theoretic foundation of logic programming (LP) -- to establish the completeness of IPL for the B-eS. This perspective allows negation, a subtle issue in P-tS, to be understood in terms of the negation-as-failure protocol in LP. Specifically, while the denial of a proposition is traditionally understood as the assertion of its negation, in B-eS we may understand the denial of a proposition as the failure to find a proof of it. In this way, assertion and denial are both prime concepts in P-tS.Comment: submitte

Negation-as-Failure in the Base-extension Semantics for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic

Proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) is the paradigm of semantics in which meaning in logic is based on proof (as opposed to truth). A particular instance of P-tS for intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) is its base-extension semantics (B-eS). This semantics is given by a relation called support, explaining the meaning of the logical constants, which is parameterized by systems of rules called bases that provide the semantics of atomic propositions. In this paper, we interpret bases as collections of definite formulae and use the operational view of them as provided by uniform proof-search—the proof-theoretic foundation of logic programming (LP)—to establish the completeness of IPL for the B-eS. This perspective allows negation, a subtle issue in P-tS, to be understood in terms of the negation-as-failure protocol in LP. Specifically, while the denial of a proposition is traditionally understood as the assertion of its negation, in B-eS we may understand the denial of a proposition as the failure to find a proof of it. In this way, assertion and denial are both prime concepts in P-tS

Operational Semantics of Resolution and Productivity in Horn Clause Logic

This paper presents a study of operational and type-theoretic properties of different resolution strategies in Horn clause logic. We distinguish four different kinds of resolution: resolution by unification (SLD-resolution), resolution by term-matching, the recently introduced structural resolution, and partial (or lazy) resolution. We express them all uniformly as abstract reduction systems, which allows us to undertake a thorough comparative analysis of their properties. To match this small-step semantics, we propose to take Howard's System H as a type-theoretic semantic counterpart. Using System H, we interpret Horn formulas as types, and a derivation for a given formula as the proof term inhabiting the type given by the formula. We prove soundness of these abstract reduction systems relative to System H, and we show completeness of SLD-resolution and structural resolution relative to System H. We identify conditions under which structural resolution is operationally equivalent to SLD-resolution. We show correspondence between term-matching resolution for Horn clause programs without existential variables and term rewriting.Comment: Journal Formal Aspect of Computing, 201

Metalogic and the Overgeneration Argument

A prominent objection against the logicality of second-order logic is the so-called Overgeneration Argument. However, it is far from clear how this argument is to be understood. In the first part of the article, we examine the argument and locate its main source, namely, the alleged entanglement of second-order logic and mathematics. We then identify various reasons why the entanglement may be thought to be problematic. In the second part of the article, we take a metatheoretic perspective on the matter. We prove a number of results establishing that the entanglement is sensitive to the kind of semantics used for second-order logic. These results provide evidence that by moving from the standard set-theoretic semantics for second-order logic to a semantics which makes use of higher-order resources, the entanglement either disappears or may no longer be in conflict with the logicality of second-order logic

Logic Programming as Constructivism

The features of logic programming that seem unconventional from the viewpoint of classical logic can be explained in terms of constructivistic logic. We motivate and propose a constructivistic proof theory of non-Horn logic programming. Then, we apply this formalization for establishing results of practical interest. First, we show that 'stratification can be motivated in a simple and intuitive way. Relying on similar motivations, we introduce the larger classes of 'loosely stratified' and 'constructively consistent' programs. Second, we give a formal basis for introducing quantifiers into queries and logic programs by defining 'constructively domain independent* formulas. Third, we extend the Generalized Magic Sets procedure to loosely stratified and constructively consistent programs, by relying on a 'conditional fixpoini procedure

Logic of Negation-Complete Interactive Proofs (Formal Theory of Epistemic Deciders)

We produce a decidable classical normal modal logic of internalised negation-complete and thus disjunctive non-monotonic interactive proofs (LDiiP) from an existing logical counterpart of non-monotonic or instant interactive proofs (LiiP). LDiiP internalises agent-centric proof theories that are negation-complete (maximal) and consistent (and hence strictly weaker than, for example, Peano Arithmetic) and enjoy the disjunction property (like Intuitionistic Logic). In other words, internalised proof theories are ultrafilters and all internalised proof goals are definite in the sense of being either provable or disprovable to an agent by means of disjunctive internalised proofs (thus also called epistemic deciders). Still, LDiiP itself is classical (monotonic, non-constructive), negation-incomplete, and does not have the disjunction property. The price to pay for the negation completeness of our interactive proofs is their non-monotonicity and non-communality (for singleton agent communities only). As a normal modal logic, LDiiP enjoys a standard Kripke-semantics, which we justify by invoking the Axiom of Choice on LiiP's and then construct in terms of a concrete oracle-computable function. LDiiP's agent-centric internalised notion of proof can also be viewed as a negation-complete disjunctive explicit refinement of standard KD45-belief, and yields a disjunctive but negation-incomplete explicit refinement of S4-provability.Comment: Expanded Introduction. Added Footnote 4. Corrected Corollary 3 and 4. Continuation of arXiv:1208.184