facts that matter

n/

Are facts about matter primitive?

Recently scholars have been claiming that Aristotle’s biological explanations treat “facts about matter”—facts such as the degree of heat or amount of fluidity in an organism’s material constitution—as explanatorily basic or “primitive.” That is, these facts about matter are taken to be unexplained, brute facts about organisms, rather than ones that are explained by the organism’s form or essence, as we would have expected from Aristotle’s general commitment to the causal and explanatory priority of form over matter. In this paper, I present three considerations for rejecting the view that facts about matter are primitive. First, there is evidence that those putative unexplained facts about degrees of heat, dryness, fluidity, etc. are, in fact, explained. Second, there are certain cases, such as human intelligence, where it would be quite implausible to consider the explanation in terms of degrees of heat to be starting from what Aristotle considers primitive facts. Third, the idea that facts about matter are as explanatorily primitive as facts about form requires a particular conception of the causal processes that the explanations mirror. But this conception of the causal processes conflicts with the way Aristotle characterizes them in Generation of Animals. There, heat is not treated as a causal factor that works “independently” of soul. In my view, these three considerations provide compelling reason to reject the claim that Aristotle’s biology treats facts about matter as primitive

Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance

A natural view in distributive ethics is that everyone's interests matter, but the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off. I provide a new argument for this view. The argument takes as its starting point the proposal, due to Harsanyi and Rawls, that facts about distributive ethics are discerned from individual preferences in the "original position." I draw on recent work in decision theory, along with an intuitive principle about risk-taking, to derive the view

Does Belief in Ethical Subjectivism Pose a Challenge to Classical Liberalism?

Classical liberalism stresses the desirability of free markets, limited government and the rule of law. As such, it builds on some moral judgments. According to ethical objectivism, such judgments (in themselves always personal and subjective) can be true or false since objective moral facts exist against which the judgments can be assessed. Ethical subjectivism denies the existence of objective moral facts. This paper asks: Does it matter whether people believe that objective moral facts exist – in general and for a defense of classical liberalism? It is argued that the answer is in the negative. The implication for classical liberal strategy is that attempts to argue that a certain metaethical foundation is needed should be abandoned.metaethics; liberalism; values

Epistemic Non-Factualism and Methodology

I discuss methodology in epistemology. I argue that settling the facts, even the epistemic facts, fails to settle the questions of intellectual policy at the center of our epistemic lives. An upshot is that the standard methodology of analyzing concepts like knowledge, justification, rationality, and so on is misconceived. More generally, any epistemic method that seeks to issue in intellectual policy by settling the facts, whether by way of abductive theorizing or empirical investigation, no matter how reliable, is inapt. The argument is a radicalization of Moore’s Open Question Argument. I conclude by considering the ramifications of this conclusion for the debate surrounding “Modal Security”, a proposed necessary condition on undermining defeat

Illusionism and the Epistemological Problems Facing Phenomenal Realism

Illusionism about phenomenal properties has the potential to leave us with all the benefit of taking consciousness seriously and far fewer problems than those accompanying phenomenal realism. The particular problem I explore here is an epistemological puzzle that leaves the phenomenal realist with a dilemma but causes no trouble for the illusionist: how can we account for false beliefs about our own phenomenal properties? If realism is true, facts about our phenomenal properties must hold independent of our beliefs about those properties, so mistaken phenomenal beliefs must always remain an open possibility. But there is no way to identify the phenomenal facts that make these beliefs false other than by mere stipulation. If illusionism is true, then the state of affairs regarding what a subject's experience seems like is just the illusion itself; there are no further facts of the matter about which the subject might have mistaken beliefs, so the problem does not arise

Alfadda v. Fenn: Shifting the Standard for Applying U.S. Statutes to Predominantly Non-U.S. Transactions

This Comment argues that the Second Circuit, in Alfadda v. Fenn, properly held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy involving few U.S. activities and actors because the actors engaged in significant conduct in the United States. Part I examines the principles and pertinent case law governing the extraterritorial application of the civil RICO statute. Part II describes the facts and procedural his- tory of Alfadda v. Fenn, detailing the district court\u27s denial of subject matter jurisdiction and the Second Circuit\u27s subse- quent reversal. Part III argues that the Second Circuit cor- rectly applied the existing legal precedents by granting federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case and examines the im- plications of the decision. It also argues that, given the com- peting interests at stake, U.S. courts should grant jurisdiction over predominantly non-U.S. transactions only where, as here, the evidence demonstrates substantial conduct or a substantial effect within the United States. This Comment concludes that Congress should amend RICO and clearly delineate its extra- territorial application so that courts need no longer speculate about congressional intent. This Comment argues that the Second Circuit, in Alfadda v. Fenn, properly held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy involving few U.S. activities and actors because the actors engaged in significant conduct in the United States. Part I examines the principles and pertinent case law governing the extraterritorial application of the civil RICO statute. Part II describes the facts and procedural his- tory of Alfadda v. Fenn, detailing the district court\u27s denial of subject matter jurisdiction and the Second Circuit\u27s subse- quent reversal. Part III argues that the Second Circuit cor- rectly applied the existing legal precedents by granting federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case and examines the im- plications of the decision. It also argues that, given the com- peting interests at stake, U.S. courts should grant jurisdiction over predominantly non-U.S. transactions only where, as here, the evidence demonstrates substantial conduct or a substantial effect within the United States. This Comment concludes that Congress should amend RICO and clearly delineate its extra- territorial application so that courts need no longer speculate about congressional intent

Stability and Instability of Relativistic Electrons in Classical Electro magnetic Fields

The stability of matter composed of electrons and static nuclei is investigated for a relativistic dynamics for the electrons given by a suitably projected Dirac operator and with Coulomb interactions. In addition there is an arbitrary classical magnetic field of finite energy. Despite the previously known facts that ordinary nonrelativistic matter with magnetic fields, or relativistic matter without magnetic fields is already unstable when the fine structure constant, is too large it is noteworthy that the combination of the two is still stable provided the projection onto the positive energy states of the Dirac operator, which defines the electron, is chosen properly. A good choice is to include the magnetic field in the definition. A bad choice, which always leads to instability, is the usual one in which the positive energy states are defined by the free Dirac operator. Both assertions are proved here.Comment: LaTeX fil