An Evolutionary Learning Approach for Adaptive Negotiation Agents

Developing effective and efficient negotiation mechanisms for real-world applications such as e-Business is challenging since negotiations in such a context are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough deadlines, very limited information about the opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Accordingly, practical negotiation systems should be empowered by effective learning mechanisms to acquire dynamic domain knowledge from the possibly changing negotiation contexts. This paper illustrates our adaptive negotiation agents which are underpinned by robust evolutionary learning mechanisms to deal with complex and dynamic negotiation contexts. Our experimental results show that GA-based adaptive negotiation agents outperform a theoretically optimal negotiation mechanism which guarantees Pareto optimal. Our research work opens the door to the development of practical negotiation systems for real-world applications

Search Committees

A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative, or to continue costly search. Alternatives are described by several distinct attributes. Each committee member privately assesses the quality of one attribute (her \Committee, Search, Specialization, Interdependent Values, Voting, Partisanship

Updating beliefs with incomplete observations

Currently, there is renewed interest in the problem, raised by Shafer in 1985, of updating probabilities when observations are incomplete. This is a fundamental problem in general, and of particular interest for Bayesian networks. Recently, Grunwald and Halpern have shown that commonly used updating strategies fail in this case, except under very special assumptions. In this paper we propose a new method for updating probabilities with incomplete observations. Our approach is deliberately conservative: we make no assumptions about the so-called incompleteness mechanism that associates complete with incomplete observations. We model our ignorance about this mechanism by a vacuous lower prevision, a tool from the theory of imprecise probabilities, and we use only coherence arguments to turn prior into posterior probabilities. In general, this new approach to updating produces lower and upper posterior probabilities and expectations, as well as partially determinate decisions. This is a logical consequence of the existing ignorance about the incompleteness mechanism. We apply the new approach to the problem of classification of new evidence in probabilistic expert systems, where it leads to a new, so-called conservative updating rule. In the special case of Bayesian networks constructed using expert knowledge, we provide an exact algorithm for classification based on our updating rule, which has linear-time complexity for a class of networks wider than polytrees. This result is then extended to the more general framework of credal networks, where computations are often much harder than with Bayesian nets. Using an example, we show that our rule appears to provide a solid basis for reliable updating with incomplete observations, when no strong assumptions about the incompleteness mechanism are justified.Comment: Replaced with extended versio

An overview of economic applications of David Schmeidler`s models of decision making under uncertainty

This paper surveys some economic applications of the decision theoretic framework pioneered by David Schmeidler to model effects of ambiguity. We have organized the discussion principally around three themes: financial markets, contractual arrangements and game theory. The first section discusses papers that have contributed to a better understanding of financial market outcomes based on ambiguity aversion. The second section focusses on contractual arrangements and is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section reports research on optimal risk sharing arrangements, while in the second sub-section, discusses research on incentive contracts. The third section concentrates on strategic interaction and reviews several papers that have extended different game theoretic solution concepts to settings with ambiguity averse players. A final section deals with several contributions which while not dealing with ambiguity per se, are linked at a formal level, in terms of the pure mathematical structures involved, with Schmeidler`s models of decision making under ambiguity. These contributions involve issues such as, inequality measurement, intertemporal decision making and multi-attribute choice.Ellsberg Paradox, Ambiguity aversion, Uncertainty aversion

Modelling and optimizing multiple attribute decisions by using fuzzy sets

The purpose of this paper is to present a coherent perspective of modeling and optimizing multiple attribute decisions by using fuzzy sets. In management practice we face most of the time the situation in which a problem have several possible solutions and each solution can be analyzed using multiple criteria models. In the same time, in real life decision making process there is a given level of uncertainty which makes difficult a clear cut analytical analysis. The object of this article is to build a model approach for making multiple criteria decision using fuzzy sets of objects. Elaborating multiple attribute decisions involves performing an assessment and selecting from a given and finite set of possible alternative courses of action in the presence of a given and finite, and usually conflicting set of attributes and criteria.decision making, fuzzy sets, modeling, multiple criteria optimization.