10,394 research outputs found
Connectionist Inference Models
The performance of symbolic inference tasks has long been a challenge to connectionists. In this paper, we present an extended survey of this area. Existing connectionist inference systems are reviewed, with particular reference to how they perform variable binding and rule-based reasoning, and whether they involve distributed or localist representations. The benefits and disadvantages of different representations and systems are outlined, and conclusions drawn regarding the capabilities of connectionist inference systems when compared with symbolic inference systems or when used for cognitive modeling
An overview of parallel distributed processing
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP), or Connectionism, is a frontier cognitive theory that is currently garnering considerable attention from a variety of fields. Briefly summarized herein are the theoretical foundations of the theory, the key elements observed in creating simulation computer programs, examples of its applications, and some comparisons with other models of cognition. A majority of the information is culled from Rumelhart and McClelland\u27s (1986) two volume introduction to the theory, while some concerns from the field and the theorists\u27 accompanying responses are taken from a 1990 article by Hanson and Burr
MATHEMATICAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING: DEEP LEARNING REPRESENTATIONS AND INFERENCE OVER MATHEMATICAL TEXT
An Introduction to Ontology
Analytical philosophy of the last one hundred years has been heavily influenced by a doctrine to the effect that one can arrive at a correct ontology by paying attention to certain superficial (syntactic) features of first-order predicate logic as conceived by Frege and Russell. More specifically, it is a doctrine to the effect that the key to the ontological structure of reality is captured syntactically in the ‘Fa’ (or, in more sophisticated versions, in the ‘Rab’) of first-order logic, where ‘F’ stands for what is general in reality and ‘a’ for what is individual. Hence “f(a)ntology”. Because predicate logic has exactly two syntactically different kinds of referring expressions—‘F’, ‘G’, ‘R’, etc., and ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, etc.—so reality must consist of exactly two correspondingly different kinds of entity: the general (properties, concepts) and the particular (things, objects), the relation between these two kinds of entity being revealed in the predicate-argument structure of atomic formulas in first-order logic
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