Fairness in an Unfair World: Fair Multiparty Computation from public Bulletin Boards

Secure multiparty computation allows mutually distrusting parties to compute a function on their private inputs such that nothing but the function output is revealed. Achieving fairness --- that all parties learn the output or no one does -- is a long studied problem with known impossibility results in the standard model if a majority of parties are dishonest. We present a new model for achieving fairness in MPC against dishonest majority by using public bulletin boards implemented via existing infrastructure such as blockchains or Google\u27s certificate transparency logs. We present both theoretical and practical constructions using either witness encryption or trusted hardware (such as Intel SGX). Unlike previous works that either penalize an aborting party or achieve weaker notions such as $\Delta$-fairness, we achieve complete fairness using existing infrastructure

New Applications Of Public Ledgers

The last decade and a half has seen the rise of a new class of systems loosely categorized as public ledgers. Public ledgers guarantee that all posted information is permanently available to the entire public. Common realizations of public ledgers include public blockchains and centralized logs. In this work we investigate novel applications of public ledgers. We begin by describing enclave ledger interaction, a computational method that allows the execution of trusted execution environments or cryptographically obfuscated programs to be conditioned on the contents of the ledger. We then show how this conditional execution paradigm can be used to achieve fairness in dishonest majority secure multiparty computation, which is impossible in the plain model. Finally, we show how conditional execution can be used to build systems that facilitate law enforcement access to ciphertext while ensuring robust transparency and accountability mechanisms

How to use bitcoin to incentivize correct computations.

ABSTRACT We study a model of incentivizing correct computations in a variety of cryptographic tasks. For each of these tasks we propose a formal model and design protocols satisfying our model's constraints in a hybrid model where parties have access to special ideal functionalities that enable monetary transactions. We summarize our results: • Verifiable computation. We consider a setting where a delegator outsources computation to a worker who expects to get paid in return for delivering correct outputs. We design protocols that compile both public and private verification schemes to support incentivizations described above. • Secure computation with restricted leakage. Building on the recent work of Huang et al. (Security and Privacy 2012), we show an efficient secure computation protocol that monetarily penalizes an adversary that attempts to learn one bit of information but gets detected in the process. • Fair secure computation. Inspired by recent work, we consider a model of secure computation where a party that aborts after learning the output is monetarily penalized. We then propose an ideal transaction functionality F ML and show a constant-round realization on the Bitcoin network. Then, in the F ML -hybrid world we design a constant round protocol for secure computation in this model. • Noninteractive bounties. We provide formal definitions and candidate realizations of noninteractive bounty mechanisms on the Bitcoin network which (1) allow a bounty maker to place a bounty for the solution of a hard problem by sending a single message, and (2) allow a bounty collector (unknown at the time of bounty creation) with the solution to claim the bounty, while (3) ensuring that the bounty maker can learn the solution whenever its bounty is collected, and (4) preventing malicious eavesdropping parties from both claiming the bounty as well as learning the solution. All our protocol realizations (except those realizing fair secure computation) rely on a special ideal functionality that is not curPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]. rently supported in Bitcoin due to limitations imposed on Bitcoin scripts. Motivated by this, we propose validation complexity of a protocol, a formal complexity measure that captures the amount of computational effort required to validate Bitcoin transactions required to implement it in Bitcoin. Our protocols are also designed to take advantage of optimistic scenarios where participating parties behave honestly

Keeping Time-Release Secrets through Smart Contracts

A time-release protocol enables one to send secrets into a future release time. The main technical challenge lies in incorporating timing control into the protocol, especially in the absence of a central trusted party. To leverage on the regular heartbeats emitted from decen- tralized blockchains, in this paper, we advocate an incentive-based approach that combines threshold secret sharing and blockchain based smart contract. In particular, the secret is split into shares and distributed to a set of incentivized participants, with the payment settlement contractualized and enforced by the autonomous smart contract. We highlight that such ap- proach needs to achieve two goals: to reward honest participants who release their shares honestly after the release date (the “carrots”), and to punish premature leakage of the shares (the “sticks”). While it is not difficult to contractualize a carrot mechanism for punctual releases, it is not clear how to realise the stick. In the first place, it is not clear how to identify premature leakage. Our main idea is to encourage public vigilantism by incorporating an informer-bounty mechanism that pays bounty to any informer who can provide evidence of the leakage. The possibility of being punished constitute a deterrent to the misbehaviour of premature releases. Since various entities, including the owner, participants and the in- formers, might act maliciously for their own interests, there are many security requirements. In particular, to prevent a malicious owner from acting as the informer, the protocol must ensure that the owner does not know the distributed shares, which is counter-intuitive and not addressed by known techniques. We investigate various attack scenarios, and propose a secure and efficient protocol based on a combination of cryptographic primitives. Our technique could be of independent interest to other applications of threshold secret sharing in deterring sharing

Practical Witness Encryption for Algebraic Languages Or How to Encrypt Under Groth-Sahai Proofs

Witness encryption (WE) is a recent powerful encryption paradigm, which allows to encrypt a message using the description of a hard problem (a word in an NP-language) and someone who knows a solution to this problem (a witness) is able to efficiently decrypt the ciphertext. Recent work thereby focuses on constructing WE for NP complete languages (and thus NP). While this rich expressiveness allows flexibility w.r.t. applications, it makes existing instantiations impractical. Thus, it is interesting to study practical variants of WE schemes for subsets of NP that are still expressive enough for many cryptographic applications. We show that such WE schemes can be generically constructed from smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs). In terms of concrete instantiations of SPHFs (and thus WE), we target languages of statements proven in the popular Groth-Sahai (GS) non-interactive witness-indistinguishable/zero-knowledge proof framework. This allows us to provide a novel way to encrypt. In particular, encryption is with respect to a GS proof and efficient decryption can only be done by the respective prover. The so obtained constructions are entirely practical. To illustrate our techniques, we apply them in context of privacy-preserving exchange of information

Overcoming Cryptographic Impossibility Results using Blockchains

Blockchain technology has the potential to disrupt how cryptography is done. In this work, we propose to view blockchains as an enabler , much like indistinguishability obfuscation (Barak et al., CRYPTO 2001, Garg et al., FOCS 2013, and Sahai and Waters, STOC 2014) or one-way functions, for building a variety of cryptographic systems. Our contributions in this work are as follows: 1. A Framework for Proof-of-Stake based Blockchains: We provide an abstract framework for formally analyzing and defining useful security properties for Proof-of-Stake (POS) based blockchain protocols. Interestingly, for some of our applications, POS based protocols are more suitable. We believe our framework and assumptions would be useful in building applications on top of POS based blockchain protocols even in the future. 2. Blockchains as an Alternative to Trusted Setup Assumptions in Cryptography: A trusted setup, such as a common reference string (CRS) has been used to realize numerous systems in cryptography. The paragon example of a primitive requiring trusted setup is a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) system. We show that already existing blockchains systems including Bitcoin, Ethereum etc. can be used as a foundation (instead of a CRS) to realize NIZK systems. The novel aspect of our work is that it allows for utilizing an already existing (and widely trusted) setup rather than proposing a new one. Our construction does not require any additional functionality from the miners over the already existing ones, nor do we need to modify the underlying blockchain protocol. If an adversary can violate the security of our NIZK, it could potentially also take over billions of dollars worth of coins in the Bitcoin, Ethereum or any such cryptocurrency! We believe that such a trusted setup represents significant progress over using CRS published by a central trusted party. Indeed, NIZKs could further serve as a foundation for a variety of other cryptographic applications such as round efficient secure computation (Katz and Ostrovsky, CRYPTO 2004 and Horvitz and Katz, CRYPTO 2007). 3. One-time programs and pay-per use programs: Goldwasser et al. (CRYPTO 2008) introduced the notion of one time program and presented a construction using tamper-proof hardware. As noted by Goldwasser et al., clearly a one-time program cannot be solely software based, as software can always be copied and run again. While there have been a number of follow up works (Goyal et al., TCC 2010, Bellare et al., ASIACRYPT 2012, and Applebaum et al., SIAM Journal on Computing 2015), there are indeed no known constructions of one-time programs which do not rely on self destructing tamper-proof hardware (even if one uses trusted setup or random oracles). Somewhat surprisingly, we show that it is possible to base one-time programs on POS based blockchain systems without relying on trusted hardware. Our ideas do not seem to translate over to Proof-of-Work (POW) based blockchains. We also introduce the notion of pay-per-use programs which is simply a contract between two parties --- service provider and customer. A service provider supplies a program such that if the customer transfers a specific amount of coins to the provider, it can evaluate the program on any input of its choice once, even if the provider is offline. This is naturally useful in a subscription based model where your payment is based on your usage

Cassiopeia: Practical On-Chain Witness Encryption

Witness Encryption is a holy grail of cryptography that remains elusive. It asks that a secret is only revealed when a particular computational problem is solved. Modern smart contracts and blockchains make assumptions of “honest majority”, which allow for a social implementation of Witness Encryption. The core idea is to make use of a partially trusted committee to carry out the responsibilities mandated by these functionalities – such as keeping the secret private, and then releasing it publicly after a solution to the computational puzzle is presented. We implement Witness Encryption (with public witness security) in the form of an open source smart contract that can be utilized as an oracle by others within the broader DeFi ecosystem. We devise a cryptoeconomic scheme to incentivize honest participation, and analyze its security under the honest majority and rational majority settings. We conclude by measuring and optimizing gas costs and illustrating the practicality of our scheme

Multi-instance publicly verifiable time-lock puzzle and its applications

Time-lock puzzles are elegant protocols that enable a party to lock a message such that no one else can unlock it until a certain time elapses. Nevertheless, existing schemes are not suitable for the case where a server is given multiple instances of a puzzle scheme at once and it must unlock them at different points in time. If the schemes are naively used in this setting, then the server has to start solving all puzzles as soon as it receives them, that ultimately imposes significant computation cost and demands a high level of parallelisation. We put forth and formally define a primitive called “multi-instance time-lock puzzle” which allows composing a puzzle’s instances. We propose a candidate construction: “chained time-lock puzzle” (C-TLP). It allows the server, given instances’ composition, to solve puzzles sequentially, without having to run parallel computations on them. C-TLP makes black-box use of a standard time-lock puzzle scheme and is accompanied by a lightweight publicly verifiable algorithm. It is the first time-lock puzzle that offers a combination of the above features. We use C-TLP to build the first “outsourced proofs of retrievability” that can support real-time detection and fair payment while having lower overhead than the state of the art. As another application of C-TLP, we illustrate in certain cases, one can substitute a “verifiabledelay function” with C-TLP, to gain much better efficiency

tlock: Practical Timelock Encryption from Threshold BLS

We present a practical construction and implementation of timelock encryption, in which a ciphertext is guaranteed to be decryptable only after some specified time has passed. We employ an existing threshold network, the League of Entropy, implementing threshold BLS [BLS01, B03] in the context of Boneh and Franklin\u27s identity-based encryption (IBE) [BF01]. At present this threshold network broadcasts BLS signatures over each round number, equivalent to the current time interval, and as such can be considered a decentralised key holder periodically publishing private keys for the IBE where identities are the round numbers. A noticeable advantage of this scheme is that only the encryptors and decryptors are required to perform any additional cryptographic operations; the threshold network can remain unaware of the TLE and does not have to change to support the scheme. We also release an open-source implementation of our scheme and a live web page that can be used in production now relying on the existing League of Entropy network acting as a distributed public randomness beacon service using threshold BLS signatures