75,160 research outputs found
Does search boost efficiency?
Poaching externality, arising from job-to-job turnovers, implies that a planner should allocate fewer resources to costly job creations. However, these search efforts increase competition among employers, and this could in turn internalize the externality, whereas the congestion externality requires a unit-elastic matching function
Knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights
We study a model in which an inventor discloses knowledge about its innovation and
then a rival chooses the probability of attaining a competing invention. Disclosures, by
creating prior art, diminish the probability that the rival has of receiving a patent for its
invention (legal externality), but, by revealing knowledge, they decrease the marginal
cost of R&D (knowledge externality). We stress the following result. If the knowledge
externality is large compared to the legal externality, decreasing the patentability
standards leads to fewer disclosures and may hinder R&D. We also determine the
impact of changes in market payoffs on the equilibrium level of disclosures and R&D
Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities
We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene
fit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis
es an homogeneity condition then platforms’ pro
ts and price structure have some speci
fic properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the specifi
c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platform’s pro
t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are affected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers.
A Note on Endogenous Timing with Strategic Delegation: Unilateral Externality Case
We investigated the endogenous choice of roles by managerial firms in the presence of unilateral externality. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by owners. It is shown that (i) the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would have achieved by specifying the timing in the delegation contract; and (ii) firms move simultaneously if the degree of unilateral externality is small, while sequentially if the degree of unilateral externality is large, with the firm generating unilateral externality as a follower; the owner of the follower firm delegates to restrict output, while his/her counterpart does not delegate it.Managerial Delegation, Externality, Stackelberg, Endogenous Timing
Irrelevant externality angst.
Due to the high transaction cost that would be necessary for large numbers of people to negotiate with each other, even those who are usually sanguine about private markets become reserved when externalities affect large populations. The distinction between private and societal interest is well understood for pecuniary externalities, but neglect of Buchanan and Stubblebine’s article Externality has left the same distinction widely unrecognized for non-pecuniary ones. If only a few parties on either side experience a relevant externality private interactions can appropriately internalize costs and benefits across the entire population. Regardless of the perceptiveness of legal and cultural institutions in placing entitlements, and regardless of the level of transaction cost among the universe of the affected, a surprising number of externalities will readily fix themselves. The desirability of corrective intervention is much too easily conceded.
Inflation Taxation and Welfare with Externalities and Leisure
This paper examines how inflation taxation a ects resource allocation and welfare in a neoclassical growth model with leisure, a production externality and money in the utility function. Switching from consumption taxation to inflation taxation to finance government spending reduces real money balances relative to income, but increases consumption, labor, capital and output. The net welfare effect of this switch depends crucially on the strength of the externality and on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution: While it is always negative without the externality, it is likely to be positive with a strong externality and elastic intertemporal substitution.
GENERALIZED EXTERNALITY GAMES
Externality games are studied in Grafe et al. (1998). We define a generalization of this class of games and show, using the methodology in Izquierdo and Rafels (1996 and 2001), some properties of the new class of generalized externality games. They include, among others, the algebraic structure of the game, convexity, and their implication for the study of cooperative solutions. Also the proportional rule is characterized for this class of games.
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Reputational Externality and Self-Regulation
Professional associations and other producer groups often complain that their reputation is damaged by other groups providing a similar but lower-quality service and that the latter should be regulated. We examine the conditions under which a common regulatory regime can induce Pareto-improvements by creating a common reputation for quality among heterogeneous producers, when the regulator cannot commit to a given quality. A common reputation can be created only if the groups are not too different and if marginal cost is declining. High cost groups and small groups benefit most from forming a common regime
Comparative Statics with Consumption Externalities
We consider the comparative statics of consumer demand when there are consumption externalities in one commodity between two individuals. We show that the externality can switch goods which would naturally be normal into inferior goods and as a result th e externality can also lead to Giffen goods. In addition the externality can transform complementarity relations between goods. Thus substitutes can become complements or vice versa once the feedback effects of the externality are taken into account. Next we consider the effect of externalities on Slutsky symmetry and negativity restrictions With consumption externalities there are generalised forms of such restrictions. We derive these both for the two individual case and for cases in which either there are two individuals but all goods may cause externalities or there is a single externality good but H individuals. We relate the generalised symmetry restrictions to the rank conditions of Browning and Chiappori. Finally we consider the effects of consumption externalities on consumer surplus analysis.
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