Doctor of Philosophy

dissertationIn this dissertation, I argue that democracy is a human right. In order to support this claim, my argument will proceed from a foundational moral grounding (Indirect Utilitarianism), through analyses of the concepts involved (human rights and democracy), to my conclusion. I begin by specifying the definition of democracy I find superior; proceed to an explication of the normative theory to which I appeal for my claims; then to a discussion of the justification of rights in general; followed by a discussion of human rights, and finally to my case for the human right to democracy. I follow this with a survey of the literature representing the opposing position, in order to catalogue the concerns my positive account will need to address. I then proceed to my own justificatory account. Having presented my positive account, I address the various criticisms of the minority position, using arguments that either blunt such criticism or demonstrate how the criticisms do not address my own position

Moral underdetermination and a new skeptical challenge

In this paper, I introduce a new challenge to moral realism: the skeptical argument from moral underdetermination. The challenge arises as a consequence of two recent projects in normative ethics. Both Parfit (On what matters, vol 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011a) and a group called consequentializers have independently claimed that the main traditions of normative theories can agree on the set of correct particular deontic verdicts. Nonetheless, as Dietrich and List (Philos Rev 126(4):421-479, 2017) and myself (Baumann in J Ethics Soc Philos 13(3):191-221, 2018;Australas J Philos 97(3):511-527, 2019;Ethical Theory Moral Pract 24(4):999-1018, 2021a) have argued, the traditions still disagree about why these are the correct verdicts. This means that we can understand the situation in terms of an idea from the philosophy of science, the underdetermination of theory by the evidence. Yet underdetermination figures in one of the most important skeptical challenges to scientific realism. I show how an analogous skeptical argument can be construed for the moral realm. I propose a standard form for that argument. I then defend it against three possible objections, arguing that it is at least as plausible as, if not more plausible than, its counterpart in the philosophy of science

Goldman's ‘Level-2’ act descriptions and utilitarian generalization

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43383/1/11098_2004_Article_BF00355284.pd

Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth

This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in Philosophical Studies, 112, 1: 47-67, 2003. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com. Link active at time of submission. DOI: 10.1023/A:1022542710305Deflationist theories of truth, some critics have argued, fail to account for the normativity of truth. This is one of the more promising, if also more elusive, objections to deflationism. Here I will consider and answer a recent version of this objection offered by Huw Price (1998), which builds upon a version offered by Crispin Wright (1992)

Where do preferences come from?

Rational choice theory analyzes how an agent can rationally act, given his or her preferences, but says little about where those preferences come from. Instead, pref- erences are usually assumed to be �xed and exogenously given. Building on related work on reasons and rational choice (Dietrich and List forthcoming), we describe a framework for conceptualizing preference formation and preference change. In our model, an agent's preferences are based on certain motivationally salientproperties of the alternatives over which the preferences are held. Preferences may change as new properties of the alternatives become salient or previously salient ones cease to be so. We suggest that our approach captures endogenous preferences in various contexts, and helps to illuminate the distinction between formal and substantive concepts of rationality, as well as the role of perception in rational choice.preference formation, preference change, properties, motivations, reasons, endogenous preferences, formal versus substantive rationality, perception

The theory of rational decision and the foundations of ethics

The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice

Toward a Systemic Ethic: In search of an Ethical Basis for Sustainability and Precaution

Environmental issues and questions of sustainability and precaution have come into focus in agriculture, and in society in general, in recent decades. There are, however, many different meanings of sustainability and precaution, and there is no evident connection between these new normative concepts and the traditional moral theories. This paper seeks an ethical basis for sustainability and precaution – a common framework that can serve as a means of resolving the conceptual ambiguities of the new normative concepts and as a means of resolving conflicts between new and traditional moral concepts and theories. The method employed is to analyse the past and possible future extension of ethics and establish an inclusive framework of ethical extension. The extension of ethics is driven by the increased awareness of several, not unrelated aspects, such as the similarities between man and other living beings and their common ecological relations, the increasing human influence on natural systems and processes, and the limits of human knowledge and control. In accordance, the analysis is characterised by a systemic approach, and the established framework forms the basis for what we call a systemic ethic