Argumentation-Based Contract Monitoring in Uncertain Domains

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Subjective Logic and Arguing with Evidence

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Empowering the Poor: Turning De Facto Rights into Collateralized Credit

The shrinking middle class and the widening gap between the rich and the poor constitute significant threats to social and financial stability. One of the main impediments to upward mobility is the inability of economically disadvantaged people to use their property — in which they sometimes hold only de facto, not de jure, rights — as collateral to obtain credit. This Article argues that commercial law should recognize those de facto rights, enabling the poor to borrow to start businesses or otherwise create wealth. Recognition not only would provide benefits that exceed its costs; it also would be consistent with, if not compelled by, the innovative trend of commercial law to disentangle commercial and property law to reflect important commercial realities, rather than the arbitrary shifting of rights based on property

Empowering the Poor: Turning De Facto Rights into Collateralized Credit

The shrinking middle class and the widening gap between the rich and the poor constitute significant threats to social and financial stability. One of the main impediments to upward mobility is the inability of economically disadvantaged people to use their property — in which they sometimes hold only de facto, not de jure, rights — as collateral to obtain credit. This Article argues that commercial law should recognize those de facto rights, enabling the poor to borrow to start businesses or otherwise create wealth. Recognition not only would provide benefits that exceed its costs; it also would be consistent with, if not compelled by, the innovative trend of commercial law to disentangle commercial and property law to reflect important commercial realities, rather than the arbitrary shifting of rights based on property

DipGame: A challenging negotiation testbed

There is a chronic lack of shared application domains to test advanced research models and agent negotiation architectures in Multiagent Systems. In this paper we introduce a friendly testbed for that purpose. The testbed is based on The Diplomacy Game where negotiation and the relationships between players play an essential role. The testbed profits from the existence of a large community of human players that know the game and can easily provide data for experiments. We explain the infrastructure in the paper and make it freely available to the AI community. © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Research supported by the Agreement Technologies CONSOLIDER project under contract CSD2007-0022 and INGENIO 2010, by the Agreement Technologies COST Action, IC0801, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya under the grant 2009-SGR-1434.Peer Reviewe

The Supremacy Clause as Structural Safeguard of Federalism: State Judges and International Law in the Post-Erie Era

Against a backdrop of state constitutional and legislative initiatives aimed at limiting judicial use of international law, this Article argues that state judges have, by and large, interpreted treaties and customary international law so as to narrow their effect on state law-making prerogatives. Where state judges have used international law more liberally, they have done so to give effect to state executive and legislative objectives. Not only does this thesis suggest that the trend among state legislatures to limit state judges\u27 use of international law is self-defeating, it also gives substance to a relatively unexplored structural safeguard of federalism: state judges\u27 authority under the Supremacy Clause to harmonize treaties and customary international law with state constitutional, legislative, and common law, and to influence federal jurisprudence on the scope and effect of binding international law. The Supremacy Clause empowers state judges to adapt international law to maximize benefits for--and minimize disruptions to--state policy objectives. As more areas of traditional state authority are displaced by international law, state judicial management of international law may be the strongest structural protection for state interests

What is Meant by Freedom?

In 1955, in a neglected article in the Harvard Law Review entitled Freedom—A Suggested Analysis, Lon L. Fuller provided a framework for the basic definition of freedom. More importantly, he tendered a question about the conditions of a free society: “How can the freedom of human beings be affected or advanced by social arrangements, that is, by laws, customs, institutions, or other forms of social order that can be changed or preserved by purposive human actions?” This is the critical question this Article addresses through constructing a comprehensive definition by first, considering etymology and then establishing the various modalities in which freedom operates. These modalities include the space defined by the rule of law and various antithetical non-rule-of-law states, the role of democracy and representative government in disparate levels of society, the importance of rights as trumps on power, and the challenges posed by social justice. Finally, Fuller’s question raises the issue of “laws, customs, institutions [and] other forms of social order,” all of which luminaries such as John Stuart Mill saw as unfortunate, but necessary, evils when considering freedom. Rather than necessary evils, this article will consider the productive role ascribed to law and institutions by Scott Shapiro, who views law as a form of social planning that effectuates choices, thus enhancing freedom