403 research outputs found
Constructions of Pure Asymmetric Quantum Alternant Codes Based on Subclasses of Alternant Codes
In this paper, we construct asymmetric quantum error-correcting codes(AQCs)
based on subclasses of Alternant codes. Firstly, We propose a new subclass of
Alternant codes which can attain the classical Gilbert-Varshamov bound to
construct AQCs. It is shown that when , -parts of the AQCs can attain
the classical Gilbert-Varshamov bound. Then we construct AQCs based on a famous
subclass of Alternant codes called Goppa codes. As an illustrative example, we
get three AQCs from the well
known binary Goppa code. At last, we get asymptotically good
binary expansions of asymmetric quantum GRS codes, which are quantum
generalizations of Retter's classical results. All the AQCs constructed in this
paper are pure
New Identities Relating Wild Goppa Codes
For a given support and a polynomial with no roots in , we prove equality
between the -ary Goppa codes where
denotes the norm of , that is In
particular, for , that is, for a quadratic extension, we get
. If has roots in
, then we do not necessarily have equality and we prove that
the difference of the dimensions of the two codes is bounded above by the
number of distinct roots of in . These identities provide
numerous code equivalences and improved designed parameters for some families
of classical Goppa codes.Comment: 14 page
Coding Solutions for the Secure Biometric Storage Problem
The paper studies the problem of securely storing biometric passwords, such
as fingerprints and irises. With the help of coding theory Juels and Wattenberg
derived in 1999 a scheme where similar input strings will be accepted as the
same biometric. In the same time nothing could be learned from the stored data.
They called their scheme a "fuzzy commitment scheme". In this paper we will
revisit the solution of Juels and Wattenberg and we will provide answers to two
important questions: What type of error-correcting codes should be used and
what happens if biometric templates are not uniformly distributed, i.e. the
biometric data come with redundancy. Answering the first question will lead us
to the search for low-rate large-minimum distance error-correcting codes which
come with efficient decoding algorithms up to the designed distance. In order
to answer the second question we relate the rate required with a quantity
connected to the "entropy" of the string, trying to estimate a sort of
"capacity", if we want to see a flavor of the converse of Shannon's noisy
coding theorem. Finally we deal with side-problems arising in a practical
implementation and we propose a possible solution to the main one that seems to
have so far prevented real life applications of the fuzzy scheme, as far as we
know.Comment: the final version appeared in Proceedings Information Theory Workshop
(ITW) 2010, IEEE copyrigh
Quantum Fourier sampling, Code Equivalence, and the quantum security of the McEliece and Sidelnikov cryptosystems
The Code Equivalence problem is that of determining whether two given linear
codes are equivalent to each other up to a permutation of the coordinates. This
problem has a direct reduction to a nonabelian hidden subgroup problem (HSP),
suggesting a possible quantum algorithm analogous to Shor's algorithms for
factoring or discrete log. However, we recently showed that in many cases of
interest---including Goppa codes---solving this case of the HSP requires rich,
entangled measurements. Thus, solving these cases of Code Equivalence via
Fourier sampling appears to be out of reach of current families of quantum
algorithms.
Code equivalence is directly related to the security of McEliece-type
cryptosystems in the case where the private code is known to the adversary.
However, for many codes the support splitting algorithm of Sendrier provides a
classical attack in this case. We revisit the claims of our previous article in
the light of these classical attacks, and discuss the particular case of the
Sidelnikov cryptosystem, which is based on Reed-Muller codes
Folding Alternant and Goppa Codes with Non-Trivial Automorphism Groups
The main practical limitation of the McEliece public-key encryption scheme is
probably the size of its key. A famous trend to overcome this issue is to focus
on subclasses of alternant/Goppa codes with a non trivial automorphism group.
Such codes display then symmetries allowing compact parity-check or generator
matrices. For instance, a key-reduction is obtained by taking quasi-cyclic (QC)
or quasi-dyadic (QD) alternant/Goppa codes. We show that the use of such
symmetric alternant/Goppa codes in cryptography introduces a fundamental
weakness. It is indeed possible to reduce the key-recovery on the original
symmetric public-code to the key-recovery on a (much) smaller code that has not
anymore symmetries. This result is obtained thanks to a new operation on codes
called folding that exploits the knowledge of the automorphism group. This
operation consists in adding the coordinates of codewords which belong to the
same orbit under the action of the automorphism group. The advantage is
twofold: the reduction factor can be as large as the size of the orbits, and it
preserves a fundamental property: folding the dual of an alternant (resp.
Goppa) code provides the dual of an alternant (resp. Goppa) code. A key point
is to show that all the existing constructions of alternant/Goppa codes with
symmetries follow a common principal of taking codes whose support is globally
invariant under the action of affine transformations (by building upon prior
works of T. Berger and A. D{\"{u}}r). This enables not only to present a
unified view but also to generalize the construction of QC, QD and even
quasi-monoidic (QM) Goppa codes. All in all, our results can be harnessed to
boost up any key-recovery attack on McEliece systems based on symmetric
alternant or Goppa codes, and in particular algebraic attacks.Comment: 19 page
Variations of the McEliece Cryptosystem
Two variations of the McEliece cryptosystem are presented. The first one is
based on a relaxation of the column permutation in the classical McEliece
scrambling process. This is done in such a way that the Hamming weight of the
error, added in the encryption process, can be controlled so that efficient
decryption remains possible. The second variation is based on the use of
spatially coupled moderate-density parity-check codes as secret codes. These
codes are known for their excellent error-correction performance and allow for
a relatively low key size in the cryptosystem. For both variants the security
with respect to known attacks is discussed
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