From IF to BI: a tale of dependence and separation

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Vaananen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges' semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O'Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural role, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural r\^ole.Comment: 28 pages, journal versio

A Fragment of Dependence Logic Capturing Polynomial Time

In this paper we study the expressive power of Horn-formulae in dependence logic and show that they can express NP-complete problems. Therefore we define an even smaller fragment D-Horn* and show that over finite successor structures it captures the complexity class P of all sets decidable in polynomial time. Furthermore we study the question which of our results can ge generalized to the case of open formulae of D-Horn* and so-called downwards monotone polynomial time properties of teams

The Doxastic Interpretation of Team Semantics

We advance a doxastic interpretation for many of the logical connectives considered in Dependence Logic and in its extensions, and we argue that Team Semantics is a natural framework for reasoning about beliefs and belief updates

The Expressive Power of k-ary Exclusion Logic

In this paper we study the expressive power of k-ary exclusion logic, EXC[k], that is obtained by extending first order logic with k-ary exclusion atoms. It is known that without arity bounds exclusion logic is equivalent with dependence logic. By observing the translations, we see that the expressive power of EXC[k] lies in between k-ary and (k+1)-ary dependence logics. We will show that, at least in the case of k=1, the both of these inclusions are proper. In a recent work by the author it was shown that k-ary inclusion-exclusion logic is equivalent with k-ary existential second order logic, ESO[k]. We will show that, on the level of sentences, it is possible to simulate inclusion atoms with exclusion atoms, and this way express ESO[k]-sentences by using only k-ary exclusion atoms. For this translation we also need to introduce a novel method for "unifying" the values of certain variables in a team. As a consequence, EXC[k] captures ESO[k] on the level of sentences, and we get a strict arity hierarchy for exclusion logic. It also follows that k-ary inclusion logic is strictly weaker than EXC[k]. Finally we will use similar techniques to formulate a translation from ESO[k] to k-ary inclusion logic with strict semantics. Consequently, for any arity fragment of inclusion logic, strict semantics is more expressive than lax semantics.Comment: Preprint of a paper in the special issue of WoLLIC2016 in Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 170(9):1070-1099, 201

Characterizing Quantifier Extensions of Dependence Logic

We characterize the expressive power of extensions of Dependence Logic and Independence Logic by monotone generalized quantifiers in terms of quantifier extensions of existential second-order logic.Comment: 9 page

A Topos Foundation for Theories of Physics: I. Formal Languages for Physics

This paper is the first in a series whose goal is to develop a fundamentally new way of constructing theories of physics. The motivation comes from a desire to address certain deep issues that arise when contemplating quantum theories of space and time. Our basic contention is that constructing a theory of physics is equivalent to finding a representation in a topos of a certain formal language that is attached to the system. Classical physics arises when the topos is the category of sets. Other types of theory employ a different topos. In this paper we discuss two different types of language that can be attached to a system, S. The first is a propositional language, PL(S); the second is a higher-order, typed language L(S). Both languages provide deductive systems with an intuitionistic logic. The reason for introducing PL(S) is that, as shown in paper II of the series, it is the easiest way of understanding, and expanding on, the earlier work on topos theory and quantum physics. However, the main thrust of our programme utilises the more powerful language L(S) and its representation in an appropriate topos.Comment: 36 pages, no figure

Inferentialism

This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits of logical inferentialism, chiefly with regards to the epistemology of logic, and consider a number of objections. §3 introduces and critically examines the most influential and most fully developed form of global inferentialism: Robert Brandom’s inferentialism about linguistic and conceptual content in general. Finally, in §4 we consider a number of general objections to IRS and consider possible responses on the inferentialist’s behalf