Building on Progress - Expanding the Research Infrastructure for the Social, Economic, and Behavioral Sciences. Vol. 1

The publication provides a comprehensive compendium of the current state of Germany's research infrastructure in the social, economic, and behavioural sciences. In addition, the book presents detailed discussions of the current needs of empirical researchers in these fields and opportunities for future development. The book contains 68 advisory reports by more than 100 internationally recognized authors from a wide range of fields and recommendations by the German Data Forum (RatSWD) on how to improve the research infrastructure so as to create conditions ideal for making Germany's social, economic, and behavioral sciences more innovative and internationally competitive. The German Data Forum (RatSWD) has discussed the broad spectrum of issues covered by these advisory reports extensively, and has developed general recommendations on how to expand the research infrastructure to meet the needs of scholars in the social and economic sciences

Divided Diasporas: Southern Africans in Canada

The protracted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration). Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing employment for South Africans. Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status. From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia. Against this backdrop, this report first discusses the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its connections with large-scale out-migration, particularly to South Africa. The South African response to crisis-driven migration is reviewed showing how the government shifted from a predominantly coercive and control-oriented policy towards a more realistic assessment of the need to accommodate migrants through an immigration amnesty and the right to work in the formal and informal sector. One of the major challenges facing migrants and all stakeholders in South Africa is xenophobic violence. Nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 and 2015 have been interspersed with ongoing lower-level episodes of violence. These attacks have increasingly targeted migrants and refugees, including many Zimbabweans, seeking to make a living in the country’s urban informal economy. The research for this report focused on the business activities and responses to xenophobic violence of Zimbabweans in the informal economy. Amongst the key findings were the following: Between 20-30% of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities are involved in the informal economy and the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over time. Zimbabweans operating enterprises in the informal economy are predominantly young (50- 75% under the age of 35) and male (60-70%). Nearly two-thirds of the migrant entrepreneurs arrived in South Africa in the peak years of the Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2010 (42%). Another 32% migrated after 2010. Less than 2% migrated to South Africa before the end of apartheid. Economic hardship, unemployment and political persecution are the main push drivers of migration to South Africa. Pull drivers include the assistance of relatives already in South Africa and the prospect of employment. The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises are in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Around three-quarters of the migrants relied on their personal savings to start their businesses and many worked in the formal economy first. Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to support family still in Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels. Over one-third remit funds at least once per month and only 12% never send remittances. A significant number of the entrepreneurs had been victims of or knew other who had been victims of crime such as looting and robbery, xenophobic abuse and police misconduct abuse. The report then presents the results of in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean business-owners who had experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 or at other times. The narratives of the migrants provide insights into the unpredictable nature of the violence, their vulnerability to attack, the loss of business goods and property during mob violence and the need to restart from scratch, and the various strategies that they adopt to reduce risk. These strategies include operating in safer areas (not feasible for all), avoiding areas where corrupt police tend to operate, paying for protection and flight when xenophobic violence erupts. Return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of the economic conditions there. The interviews also provide insights into the migrants’ perceptions of government and stakeholder responses to the xenophobic violence. Almost without exception, the migrants felt that neither government (the Zimbabwean or South African) had done anything to protect or assist them during and after the violence. This perception of inaction also extended to international and non-governmental organisations. The migrants were particularly harsh in their comments about the police who were widely seen as either conniving in the violence or uninterested in protecting migrants. The perceptions of the migrants that nothing is done may simply be a function of who was interviewed and does not necessarily reflect the actual reality. The report therefore evaluates the response of the South African government to the ongoing crisis of xenophobia and concludes that some actions – such as sending in the army – are taken during episodes of nationwide violence but that ongoing daily and weekly attacks are generally ignored. There is a strong official line that these attacks are not motivated by xenophobia and. Indeed, that xenophobia does not even exist. This is clearly contradicted by the migrants who view the attacks as motivated by xenophobia. A second element of the official response is that the migrants are partially to blame for what happens to them as their business success builds resentment amongst South Africans. Government has yet to acknowledge that migrant-owned informal enterprises make a valuable contribution to the economy of the country, including through job creation for South Africans. The primary response to the violence of 2015 was the launching of a military-style Operation Fiela which was justified as a crime-fighting initiative but appears to have targeted migrant enterprises. The final sections of the report examine the responses and programmes of various non-governmental and international organisations to the crisis of xenophobia. During large-scale xenophobic violence there is considerable mobilisation of anti-xenophobia civil society organisations to offer protection and protest. Their effectiveness and impact tends to dissipate when the violence is more scattered and random. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has played a major role in the past in holding government to account and articulating extensive recommendations for remedial action, most of which have not been taken up and many of which are still highly relevant. International organisations have tended to target integration and education programming at the community level but there has only been one systematic evaluation (of the UNHCR’s response) which was highly critical of the organisation. These organisations and other governments are considerably hamstrung by xenophobia denialism at the highest level because it means that government will avoid the kinds of partnership that are urgently needed to address this endemic crisis

National-Louis University Undergraduate Catalog, 2002-04

Undergraduate catalog for the 2002-04 school year. Contains campus information as well as program information and course descriptions.https://digitalcommons.nl.edu/coursecatalogs/1014/thumbnail.jp

Foreign direct investment location and tax incentive policy in Indonesia

PhD ThesisForeign Direct Investment (FDI) has become a ‘mantra’ for developing countries, as not only is it a source of capital to boost economic development, but an important source of employment and technology. Many developing countries provide incentives to attract foreign investors, such as preferential taxes, but the evidence for these is mixed. Some find they are important, but others that they do not affect FDI location. Indonesia is of interest, since it is a large and rapidly developing Asian economy, which has pursued a policy of ‘openness’ towards FDI. This is supported by a programme of taxes and other incentives, but despite using these measures for more than fifty years their effect is uncertain, and they remain controversial. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the characteristics of FDI location in Indonesia and to explore the role of tax and other incentives. Overall, the thesis makes three main contributions. First, it provides an up-to-date analysis of FDI location in Indonesia using an original dataset and covering the ‘New Order’ period from the mid-1990s. Second, it undertakes a large-scale questionnaire survey of foreign-owned plants in Indonesia to establish their nature and motive for location. Third, the thesis carries out face-to-face interviews with Indonesian policymakers at a high-level to explore the rationale for inward investment and tax incentive policies. Inward FDI to Indonesia has grown steadily over the last decade, and it is now about US$20 billion per annum. This represents about 2.1% of Indonesian GDP, while comparable domestic investment is about two-thirds smaller, indicating its importance. Making use of realization data provided by the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board, the thesis shows that the vast majority of FDI in Indonesia is located on Java, the most populous region, and reflects market and labour resource-seeking. Regions outside Java are important more recently and are a target for FDI in mining and agriculture, especially from Europe and America. However, most FDI is from Asia, especially Singapore and Japan. The manufacturing share of FDI has increased over time, although the mean project size is smaller. The thesis finds a sharp division between the Special Areas, in which the incentives are applied intensively, as FDI seeks labour resources and exports, whereas outside these areas it supplies the domestic market. The survey shows that tax incentives are not the main factor for influencing investors’ decisions to locate in Indonesia. Thus, while investors include these incentives in their appraisal, they tend not to be the critical factor for investment in Indonesia. This seems to be well-perceived xvi by policymakers, so that political economy considerations are important for the continuance of these incentives. Other developing countries offer these incentives, so that the expectation of investors and policymakers is that these subsidies will also be available in Indonesia. Further, the tax incentives have largely evaded scrutiny, and the location of FDI has been attributed to other factors. Finally, by being seen to ‘do something’ to attract FDI in a fairly minimal way, the tax incentives are a means by which the government garners political support.The government of Indonesia, which sponsored my PhD study through the Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP

National-Louis University Undergraduate catalog, 1992-94

Undergraduate catalog for the 1992-94 school year. Contains campus information as well as program information and course descriptions.https://digitalcommons.nl.edu/coursecatalogs/1036/thumbnail.jp

National-Louis University Undergraduate Catalog, 1998-2000

Undergraduate catalog for the 1998-2000 school year. Contains campus information, as well as program information and course descriptions.https://digitalcommons.nl.edu/coursecatalogs/1017/thumbnail.jp