38 research outputs found
Current and Future Challenges in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning is a central, longstanding, and active
area of Artificial Intelligence. Over the years it has evolved significantly;
more recently it has been challenged and complemented by research in areas such
as machine learning and reasoning under uncertainty. In July 2022 a Dagstuhl
Perspectives workshop was held on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. The
goal of the workshop was to describe the state of the art in the field,
including its relation with other areas, its shortcomings and strengths,
together with recommendations for future progress. We developed this manifesto
based on the presentations, panels, working groups, and discussions that took
place at the Dagstuhl Workshop. It is a declaration of our views on Knowledge
Representation: its origins, goals, milestones, and current foci; its relation
to other disciplines, especially to Artificial Intelligence; and on its
challenges, along with key priorities for the next decade
Logics of Responsibility
The study of responsibility is a complicated matter. The term is used in different ways in different fields, and it is easy to engage in everyday discussions as to why someone should be considered responsible for something. Typically, the backdrop of these discussions involves social, legal, moral, or philosophical problems. A clear pattern in all these spheres is the intent of issuing standards for when---and to what extent---an agent should be held responsible for a state of affairs. This is where Logic lends a hand. The development of expressive logics---to reason about agents' decisions in situations with moral consequences---involves devising unequivocal representations of components of behavior that are highly relevant to systematic responsibility attribution and to systematic blame-or-praise assignment. To put it plainly, expressive syntactic-and-semantic frameworks help us analyze responsibility-related problems in a methodical way. This thesis builds a formal theory of responsibility. The main tool used toward this aim is modal logic and, more specifically, a class of modal logics of action known as stit theory. The underlying motivation is to provide theoretical foundations for using symbolic techniques in the construction of ethical AI. Thus, this work means a contribution to formal philosophy and symbolic AI. The thesis's methodology consists in the development of stit-theoretic models and languages to explore the interplay between the following components of responsibility: agency, knowledge, beliefs, intentions, and obligations. Said models are integrated into a framework that is rich enough to provide logic-based characterizations for three categories of responsibility: causal, informational, and motivational responsibility. The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses at length stit theory, a logic that formalizes the notion of agency in the world over an indeterministic conception of time known as branching time. The idea is that agents act by constraining possible futures to definite subsets. On the road to formalizing informational responsibility, Chapter 3 extends stit theory with traditional epistemic notions (knowledge and belief). Thus, the chapter formalizes important aspects of agents' reasoning in the choice and performance of actions. In a context of responsibility attribution and excusability, Chapter 4 extends epistemic stit theory with measures of optimality of actions that underlie obligations. In essence, this chapter formalizes the interplay between agents' knowledge and what they ought to do. On the road to formalizing motivational responsibility, Chapter 5 adds intentions and intentional actions to epistemic stit theory and reasons about the interplay between knowledge and intentionality. Finally, Chapter 6 merges the previous chapters' formalisms into a rich logic that is able to express and model different modes of the aforementioned categories of responsibility. Technically, the most important contributions of this thesis lie in the axiomatizations of all the introduced logics. In particular, the proofs of soundness & completeness results involve long, step-by-step procedures that make use of novel techniques
Proof-theoretic Semantics for Intuitionistic Multiplicative Linear Logic
This work is the first exploration of proof-theoretic semantics for a substructural logic. It focuses on the base-extension semantics (B-eS) for intuitionistic multiplicative linear logic (IMLL). The starting point is a review of Sandqvist’s B-eS for intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL), for which we propose an alternative treatment of conjunction that takes the form of the generalized elimination rule for the connective. The resulting semantics is shown to be sound and complete. This motivates our main contribution, a B-eS for IMLL
, in which the definitions of the logical constants all take the form of their elimination rule and for which soundness and completeness are established
Arguments to believe and beliefs to argue. Epistemic logics for argumentation and its dynamics
Arguing and believing are two skills that have typically played a crucial role in the analysis of human cognition. Both notions have received notable attention from a broad range of disciplines, including linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and computer science. The main goal of this dissertation consists in studying from a logical perspective (that is, focused on reasoning) some of the existing relations between beliefs and argumentation.
From a methodological point of view, we propose to combine two well-known families of formalisms for knowledge representation that have been relatively disconnected (with some salient exceptions): epistemic logic (Fagin et al., 2004; Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995) together with its dynamic extensions (van Ditmarsch et al., 2007; van Benthem, 2011), on the one hand, and formal argumentation (Baroni et al., 2018; Gabbay et al., 2021), on the other hand. This choice is arguably natural. Epistemic logic provides well-known tools for qualitatively representing epistemic attitudes (belief, among them). Formal argumentation, on its side, is the broad research field where mathematical representations of argumentative phenomena are investigated. Moreover, the notion of awareness, as treated in the epistemic logic tradition since Fagin and Halpern (1987), can be used as a theoretical bridge among both areas.
This dissertation is presented as a collection of papers [compendio de publicaciones], meaning that its main contributions are contained in the reprint of six works that have been previously published, placed in Chapter 4. In chapter 1, we pursue a general introduction to the research problem. Chapter 2 is devoted to the presentation of the technical tools employed through the thesis. Chapter 3 explains how the contributions approach the research problem. Chapter 5 provides a general discussion of results, by analysing closely related work. We conclude in Chapter 6 with some remarks and open paths for future research
Automated Reasoning
This volume, LNAI 13385, constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 11th International Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning, IJCAR 2022, held in Haifa, Israel, in August 2022. The 32 full research papers and 9 short papers presented together with two invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 85 submissions. The papers focus on the following topics: Satisfiability, SMT Solving,Arithmetic; Calculi and Orderings; Knowledge Representation and Jutsification; Choices, Invariance, Substitutions and Formalization; Modal Logics; Proofs System and Proofs Search; Evolution, Termination and Decision Prolems. This is an open access book
Planning while Believing to Know
Over the last few years, the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become essential in our daily life and in several working scenarios. Among the various branches of AI, automated planning and the study of multi-agent systems are central research fields. This thesis focuses on a combination of these two areas: that is, a specialized kind of planning known as Multi-agent Epistemic Planning. This field of research is concentrated on all those scenarios where agents, reasoning in the space of knowledge/beliefs, try to find a plan to reach a desirable state from a starting one. This requires agents able to reason about her/his and others’ knowledge/beliefs and, therefore, capable of performing epistemic reasoning. Being aware of the information flows and the others’ states of mind is, in fact, a key aspect in several planning situations. That is why developing autonomous agents, that can reason considering the perspectives of their peers, is paramount to model a variety of real-world domains.
The objective of our work is to formalize an environment where a complete characterization of the agents’ knowledge/beliefs interactions and updates are possible. In particular, we achieved such a goal by defining a new action-based language for Multi-agent Epistemic Planning and implementing epistemic planners based on it. These solvers, flexible enough to reason about various domains and different nuances of knowledge/belief update, can provide a solid base for further research on epistemic reasoning or real-base applications.
This dissertation also proposes the design of a more general epistemic planning architecture. This architecture, following famous cognitive theories, tries to emulate some characteristics of the human decision-making process. In particular, we envisioned a system composed of several solving processes, each one with its own trade-off between efficiency and correctness, which are arbitrated by a meta-cognitive module
To Be Announced
In this survey we review dynamic epistemic logics with modalities for
quantification over information change. Of such logics we present complete
axiomatizations, focussing on axioms involving the interaction between
knowledge and such quantifiers, we report on their relative expressivity, on
decidability and on the complexity of model checking and satisfiability, and on
applications. We focus on open problems and new directions for research