28,110 research outputs found
Aspiration Dynamics of Multi-player Games in Finite Populations
Studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory,
one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven
dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more
successful peer. In the latter case, individuals adjust their strategies based
on a comparison of their payoffs from the evolutionary game to a value they
aspire, called the level of aspiration. Unlike imitation processes of pairwise
comparison, aspiration-driven updates do not require additional information
about the strategic environment and can thus be interpreted as being more
spontaneous. Recent work has mainly focused on understanding how aspiration
dynamics alter the evolutionary outcome in structured populations. However, the
baseline case for understanding strategy selection is the well-mixed population
case, which is still lacking sufficient understanding. We explore how
aspiration-driven strategy-update dynamics under imperfect rationality
influence the average abundance of a strategy in multi-player evolutionary
games with two strategies. We analytically derive a condition under which a
strategy is more abundant than the other in the weak selection limiting case.
This approach has a long standing history in evolutionary game and is mostly
applied for its mathematical approachability. Hence, we also explore strong
selection numerically, which shows that our weak selection condition is a
robust predictor of the average abundance of a strategy. The condition turns
out to differ from that of a wide class of imitation dynamics, as long as the
game is not dyadic. Therefore a strategy favored under imitation dynamics can
be disfavored under aspiration dynamics. This does not require any population
structure thus highlights the intrinsic difference between imitation and
aspiration dynamics
Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of
a biological population affects which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary
game dynamics in structured populations is difficult. Precise results have been
absent for a long time, but have recently emerged for special structures where
all individuals have the same number of neighbors. But the problem of
determining which trait is favored by selection in the natural case where the
number of neighbors can vary, has remained open. For arbitrary selection
intensity, the problem is in a computational complexity class which suggests
there is no efficient algorithm. Whether there exists a simple solution for
weak selection was unanswered. Here we provide, surprisingly, a general formula
for weak selection that applies to any graph or social network. Our method uses
coalescent theory and relies on calculating the meeting times of random walks.
We can now evaluate large numbers of diverse and heterogeneous population
structures for their propensity to favor cooperation. We can also study how
small changes in population structure---graph surgery---affect evolutionary
outcomes. We find that cooperation flourishes most in societies that are based
on strong pairwise ties.Comment: 68 pages, 10 figure
Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games with Stochastic Opting-Out
This paper investigates the evolution of strategic play where players drawn
from a finite well-mixed population are offered the opportunity to play in a
public goods game. All players accept the offer. However, due to the
possibility of unforeseen circumstances, each player has a fixed probability of
being unable to participate in the game, unlike similar models which assume
voluntary participation. We first study how prescribed stochastic opting-out
affects cooperation in finite populations. Moreover, in the model, cooperation
is favored by natural selection over both neutral drift and defection if return
on investment exceeds a threshold value defined solely by the population size,
game size, and a player's probability of opting-out. Ultimately, increasing the
probability that each player is unable to fulfill her promise of participating
in the public goods game facilitates natural selection of cooperators. We also
use adaptive dynamics to study the coevolution of cooperation and opting-out
behavior. However, given rare mutations minutely different from the original
population, an analysis based on adaptive dynamics suggests that the over time
the population will tend towards complete defection and non-participation, and
subsequently, from there, participating cooperators will stand a chance to
emerge by neutral drift. Nevertheless, increasing the probability of
non-participation decreases the rate at which the population tends towards
defection when participating. Our work sheds light on understanding how
stochastic opting-out emerges in the first place and its role in the evolution
of cooperation.Comment: 30 pages, 4 figures. This is one of the student project papers arsing
from the Mathematics REU program at Dartmouth 2017 Summer. See
https://math.dartmouth.edu/~reu/ for more info. Comments are always welcom
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Chris Cannings: A Life in Games
Chris Cannings was one of the pioneers of evolutionary game theory. His early work was inspired by the formulations of John Maynard Smith, Geoff Parker and Geoff Price; Chris recognized the need for a strong mathematical foundation both to validate stated results and to give a basis for extensions of the models. He was responsible for fundamental results on matrix games, as well as much of the theory of the important war of attrition game, patterns of evolutionarily stable strategies, multiplayer games and games on networks. In this paper we describe his work, key insights and their influence on research by others in this increasingly important field. Chris made substantial contributions to other areas such as population genetics and segregation analysis, but it was to games that he always returned. This review is written by three of his students from different stages of his career
The edge of neutral evolution in social dilemmas
The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies on
cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and
social dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals' fitness, usually the basic
driving force of evolution, quickly eliminates cooperators. However, evolution
is also governed by fluctuations that can be of greater importance than fitness
differences, and can render evolution effectively neutral. Here, we investigate
the effects of selection versus fluctuations in social dilemmas. By studying
the mean extinction times of cooperators and defectors, a variable sensitive to
fluctuations, we are able to identify and quantify an emerging 'edge of neutral
evolution' that delineates regimes of neutral and Darwinian evolution. Our
results reveal that cooperation is significantly maintained in the neutral
regimes. In contrast, the classical predictions of evolutionary game theory,
where defectors beat cooperators, are recovered in the Darwinian regimes. Our
studies demonstrate that fluctuations can provide a surprisingly simple way to
partly resolve social dilemmas. Our methods are generally applicable to
estimate the role of random drift in evolutionary dynamics.Comment: 17 pages, 4 figure
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