Sharing Economy Last Mile Delivery: Three Essays Addressing Operational Challenges, Customer Expectations, and Supply Uncertainty

Last mile delivery has become a critical competitive dimension facing retail supply chains. At the same time, the emergence of sharing economy platforms has introduced unique operational challenges and benefits that enable and inhibit retailers’ last mile delivery goals. This dissertation investigates key challenges faced by crowdshipping platforms used in last mile delivery related to crowdsourced delivery drivers, driver-customer interaction, and customer expectations. We investigate the research questions of this dissertation through a multi-method design approach, complementing a rich archival dataset comprised of several million orders retrieved from a Fortune 100 retail crowdshipping platform, with scenario-based experiments. Specifically, the first study analyzes the impact of delivery task remuneration and operational characteristics that impact drivers’ pre-task, task, and post-task behaviors. We found that monetary incentives are not the sole factor influencing drivers’ behaviors. Drivers also consider the operational characteristics of the task when accepting, performing, and evaluating a delivery task. The second study examines a driver’s learning experience relative to a delivery task and the context where it takes place. Results show the positive impact of driver familiarity on delivery time performance, and that learning enhances the positive effect. Finally, the third study focuses on how delivery performance shape customers’ experience and future engagement with the retailer, examining important contingency factors in these relationships. Findings support the notion that consumers time-related expectations on the last mile delivery service influence their perceptions of the delivery performance, and their repurchase behaviors. Overall, this dissertation provides new insights in this emerging field that advance theory and practice

Sharing Economy Last Mile Delivery: Three Essays Addressing Operational Challenges, Customer Expectations, and Supply Uncertainty

Last mile delivery has become a critical competitive dimension facing retail supply chains. At the same time, the emergence of sharing economy platforms has introduced unique operational challenges and benefits that enable and inhibit retailers’ last mile delivery goals. This dissertation investigates key challenges faced by crowdshipping platforms used in last mile delivery related to crowdsourced delivery drivers, driver-customer interaction, and customer expectations. We investigate the research questions of this dissertation through a multi-method design approach, complementing a rich archival dataset comprised of several million orders retrieved from a Fortune 100 retail crowdshipping platform, with scenario-based experiments. Specifically, the first study analyzes the impact of delivery task remuneration and operational characteristics that impact drivers’ pre-task, task, and post-task behaviors. We found that monetary incentives are not the sole factor influencing drivers’ behaviors. Drivers also consider the operational characteristics of the task when accepting, performing, and evaluating a delivery task. The second study examines a driver’s learning experience relative to a delivery task and the context where it takes place. Results show the positive impact of driver familiarity on delivery time performance, and that learning enhances the positive effect. Finally, the third study focuses on how delivery performance shape customers’ experience and future engagement with the retailer, examining important contingency factors in these relationships. Findings support the notion that consumers time-related expectations on the last mile delivery service influence their perceptions of the delivery performance, and their repurchase behaviors. Overall, this dissertation provides new insights in this emerging field that advance theory and practice

Market-Based Scheduling in Distributed Computing Systems

In verteilten Rechensystemen (bspw. im Cluster und Grid Computing) kann eine Knappheit der zur Verfügung stehenden Ressourcen auftreten. Hier haben Marktmechanismen das Potenzial, Ressourcenbedarf und -angebot durch geeignete Anreizmechanismen zu koordinieren und somit die ökonomische Effizienz des Gesamtsystems zu steigern. Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich anhand vier spezifischer Anwendungsszenarien mit der Frage, wie Marktmechanismen für verteilte Rechensysteme ausgestaltet sein sollten

Project Managers\u27 Capacity-Planning Practices for Infrastructure Projects in Qatar

Infrastructure project delays and cost overrun are caused by ineffective use of organizational skills, processes, and resources by project managers in the construction industry. Cost overrun and schedule delay in Qatari infrastructure projects have had damaging effects on the national economy by way of claims and litigation, contractual disputes, delays in dependent projects, and project abandonment. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of project managers regarding how they utilize capacity-planning practices to mitigate project schedule delay and cost overrun in government-funded infrastructure projects in Qatar. This study was framed by three conceptual models developed by Gill to outline the capacity management needs within a construction company: (a) the time horizon model, (b) the individual-organization-industry levels model, and (c) the capacity development across components model. Date were collected from semistructured interviews with 8 participants, observational field notes, and archival data regarding Qatari infrastructure project managers\u27 experiences in capacity-planning practices. Thematic analysis of textual data and cross-case synthesis analysis yielded 5 conceptual categories that encompassed 15 themes. The conceptual categories were (a) resources to meet performance capacity, (b) knowledgeable and skillful staff, (c) short- and long-term planning strategy, (d) cost overrun issue, and (e) time management. Findings may be used to promote timely completion of infrastructure projects, which may benefit citizens, construction companies, and the economy of Qatar

Promoting Honesty in Electronic Marketplaces: Combining Trust Modeling and Incentive Mechanism Design

This thesis work is in the area of modeling trust in multi-agent systems, systems of software agents designed to act on behalf of users (buyers and sellers), in applications such as e-commerce. The focus is on developing an approach for buyers to model the trustworthiness of sellers in order to make effective decisions about which sellers to select for business. One challenge is the problem of unfair ratings, which arises when modeling the trust of sellers relies on ratings provided by other buyers (called advisors). Existing approaches for coping with this problem fail in scenarios where the majority of advisors are dishonest, buyers do not have much personal experience with sellers, advisors try to flood the trust modeling system with unfair ratings, and sellers vary their behavior widely. We propose a novel personalized approach for effectively modeling trustworthiness of advisors, allowing a buyer to 1) model the private reputation of an advisor based on their ratings for commonly rated sellers 2) model the public reputation of the advisor based on all ratings for the sellers ever rated by that agent 3) flexibly weight the private and public reputation into one combined measure of the trustworthiness of the advisor. Our approach tracks ratings provided according to their time windows and limits the ratings accepted, in order to cope with advisors flooding the system and to deal with changes in agents' behavior. Experimental evidence demonstrates that our model outperforms other models in detecting dishonest advisors and is able to assist buyers to gain the largest profit when doing business with sellers. Equipped with this richer method for modeling trustworthiness of advisors, we then embed this reasoning into a novel trust-based incentive mechanism to encourage agents to be honest. In this mechanism, buyers select the most trustworthy advisors as their neighbors from which they can ask advice about sellers, forming a social network. In contrast with other researchers, we also have sellers model the reputation of buyers. Sellers will offer better rewards to satisfy buyers that are well respected in the social network, in order to build their own reputation. We provide precise formulae used by sellers when reasoning about immediate and future profit to determine their bidding behavior and the rewards to buyers, and emphasize the importance for buyers to adopt a strategy to limit the number of sellers that are considered for each good to be purchased. We theoretically prove that our mechanism promotes honesty from buyers in reporting seller ratings, and honesty from sellers in delivering products as promised. We also provide a series of experimental results in a simulated dynamic environment where agents may be arriving and departing. This provides a stronger defense of the mechanism as one that is robust to important conditions in the marketplace. Our experiments clearly show the gains in profit enjoyed by both honest sellers and honest buyers when our mechanism is introduced and our proposed strategies are followed. In general, our research will serve to promote honesty amongst buyers and sellers in e-marketplaces. Our particular proposal of allowing sellers to model buyers opens a new direction in trust modeling research. The novel direction of designing an incentive mechanism based on trust modeling and using this mechanism to further help trust modeling by diminishing the problem of unfair ratings will hope to bridge researchers in the areas of trust modeling and mechanism design