A Modern Primer on Processing in Memory

Modern computing systems are overwhelmingly designed to move data to computation. This design choice goes directly against at least three key trends in computing that cause performance, scalability and energy bottlenecks: (1) data access is a key bottleneck as many important applications are increasingly data-intensive, and memory bandwidth and energy do not scale well, (2) energy consumption is a key limiter in almost all computing platforms, especially server and mobile systems, (3) data movement, especially off-chip to on-chip, is very expensive in terms of bandwidth, energy and latency, much more so than computation. These trends are especially severely-felt in the data-intensive server and energy-constrained mobile systems of today. At the same time, conventional memory technology is facing many technology scaling challenges in terms of reliability, energy, and performance. As a result, memory system architects are open to organizing memory in different ways and making it more intelligent, at the expense of higher cost. The emergence of 3D-stacked memory plus logic, the adoption of error correcting codes inside the latest DRAM chips, proliferation of different main memory standards and chips, specialized for different purposes (e.g., graphics, low-power, high bandwidth, low latency), and the necessity of designing new solutions to serious reliability and security issues, such as the RowHammer phenomenon, are an evidence of this trend. This chapter discusses recent research that aims to practically enable computation close to data, an approach we call processing-in-memory (PIM). PIM places computation mechanisms in or near where the data is stored (i.e., inside the memory chips, in the logic layer of 3D-stacked memory, or in the memory controllers), so that data movement between the computation units and memory is reduced or eliminated.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1903.0398

Low Power Processor Architectures and Contemporary Techniques for Power Optimization – A Review

The technological evolution has increased the number of transistors for a given die area significantly and increased the switching speed from few MHz to GHz range. Such inversely proportional decline in size and boost in performance consequently demands shrinking of supply voltage and effective power dissipation in chips with millions of transistors. This has triggered substantial amount of research in power reduction techniques into almost every aspect of the chip and particularly the processor cores contained in the chip. This paper presents an overview of techniques for achieving the power efficiency mainly at the processor core level but also visits related domains such as buses and memories. There are various processor parameters and features such as supply voltage, clock frequency, cache and pipelining which can be optimized to reduce the power consumption of the processor. This paper discusses various ways in which these parameters can be optimized. Also, emerging power efficient processor architectures are overviewed and research activities are discussed which should help reader identify how these factors in a processor contribute to power consumption. Some of these concepts have been already established whereas others are still active research areas. © 2009 ACADEMY PUBLISHER

DRAM Bender: An Extensible and Versatile FPGA-based Infrastructure to Easily Test State-of-the-art DRAM Chips

To understand and improve DRAM performance, reliability, security and energy efficiency, prior works study characteristics of commodity DRAM chips. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art open source infrastructures capable of conducting such studies are obsolete, poorly supported, or difficult to use, or their inflexibility limit the types of studies they can conduct. We propose DRAM Bender, a new FPGA-based infrastructure that enables experimental studies on state-of-the-art DRAM chips. DRAM Bender offers three key features at the same time. First, DRAM Bender enables directly interfacing with a DRAM chip through its low-level interface. This allows users to issue DRAM commands in arbitrary order and with finer-grained time intervals compared to other open source infrastructures. Second, DRAM Bender exposes easy-to-use C++ and Python programming interfaces, allowing users to quickly and easily develop different types of DRAM experiments. Third, DRAM Bender is easily extensible. The modular design of DRAM Bender allows extending it to (i) support existing and emerging DRAM interfaces, and (ii) run on new commercial or custom FPGA boards with little effort. To demonstrate that DRAM Bender is a versatile infrastructure, we conduct three case studies, two of which lead to new observations about the DRAM RowHammer vulnerability. In particular, we show that data patterns supported by DRAM Bender uncovers a larger set of bit-flips on a victim row compared to the data patterns commonly used by prior work. We demonstrate the extensibility of DRAM Bender by implementing it on five different FPGAs with DDR4 and DDR3 support. DRAM Bender is freely and openly available at https://github.com/CMU-SAFARI/DRAM-Bender.Comment: To appear in TCAD 202

Security of Electrical, Optical and Wireless On-Chip Interconnects: A Survey

The advancement of manufacturing technologies has enabled the integration of more intellectual property (IP) cores on the same system-on-chip (SoC). Scalable and high throughput on-chip communication architecture has become a vital component in today's SoCs. Diverse technologies such as electrical, wireless, optical, and hybrid are available for on-chip communication with different architectures supporting them. Security of the on-chip communication is crucial because exploiting any vulnerability would be a goldmine for an attacker. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of threat models, attacks, and countermeasures over diverse on-chip communication technologies as well as sophisticated architectures.Comment: 41 pages, 24 figures, 4 table

CYBER SECURITY IN INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS): A SURVEY OF ROWHAMMER VULNERABILITY

Increasing dependence on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and especially on the Internet in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) has made these systems the primary target of cyber-attacks. As ICS are extensively used in Critical Infrastructures (CI), this makes CI more vulnerable to cyber-attacks and their protection becomes an important issue. On the other hand, cyberattacks can exploit not only software but also physics; that is, they can target the fundamental physical aspects of computation. The newly discovered RowHammer (RH) fault injection attack is a serious vulnerability targeting hardware on reliability and security of DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory). Studies on this vulnerability issue raise serious security concerns.  The purpose of this study was to overview the RH phenomenon in DRAMs and its possible security risks on ICSs and to discuss a few possible realistic RH attack scenarios for ICSs. The results of the study revealed that RH is a serious security threat to any computer-based system having DRAMs, and this also applies to ICS