Implicit measures of actual versus ideal body image : relations with self-reported body dissatisfaction and dieting behaviors

Body dissatisfaction refers to a negative appreciation of one’s own body stemming from a discrepancy between how one perceives his/her body (actual body image) and how he/she wants it to be (ideal body image). To circumvent the limitations of self-report measures of body image, measures were developed that allow for a distinction between actual and ideal body image at the implicit level. The first goal of the present study was to investigate whether self-reported body dissatisfaction is related to implicit measures of actual and ideal body image as captured by the Relational Responding Task (RRT). Secondly, we examined whether these RRT measures were related to several indices of dieting behavior. Women high in body dissatisfaction (n = 30) were characterized by relatively strong implicit I-am-fat beliefs, whereas their implicit I-want-to-be-thinner beliefs were similar to individuals low in body dissatisfaction (n = 37). Implicit body image beliefs showed no added value over explicit body image beliefs in predicting body dissatisfaction and dieting behavior. These findings support the idea that the interplay between ideal and actual body image drives (self-reported) body dissatisfaction. However, strong support for the view that it would be critical to differentiate between explicit and implicit body image beliefs is missing

The effects of verbal information on children's fear beliefs about social situations

Two experiments explored the role of verbal information in changing children’s fearrelated beliefs about social situations. In Experiment 1, 118 6- to 8- and 12- to 13-year-olds heard positive, negative, or no information about individuals’ experiences of three social situations. Fear beliefs regarding each situation were assessed before and after this manipulation. Verbal information had no significant influence on children’s fear beliefs. In Experiment 2, the same paradigm was used with 80 12- to 13-year-olds, but the information took the form of multiple attitude statements about the situations expressed by groups of peers, older children, or adults. An affective priming task of implicit attitudes was used to complement the explicit questions about fear beliefs. Negative information influenced both explicit and implicit fear beliefs. The source of information and the child’s own social anxiety did not moderate these effects. Implications for our understanding of the socialisation of childhood fears are discussed

False memories, but not false beliefs, affect implicit attitudes for food preferences

Previous studies have found that false memories and false beliefs of childhood experiences can have attitudinal consequences. Previous studies have, however, focused exclusively on explicit attitude measures without exploring whether implicit attitudes are similarly affected. Using a false feedback/imagination inflation paradigm, false memories and beliefs of enjoying a certain food as a child were elicited in participants, and their effects were assessed using both explicit attitude measures (self-report questionnaires) and implicit measures (a Single-Target Implicit Association Test). Positive changes in explicit attitudes were observed both in participants with false memories and participants with false beliefs. In contrast, only participants with false memories exhibited more positive implicit attitudes. The findings are discussed in terms of theories of explicit and implicit attitudes

Physiotherapists implicitly evaluate bending and lifting with a round back as dangerous

© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. Background: Beliefs can be assessed using explicit measures (e.g. questionnaires) that rely on information of which the person is ‘aware’ and willing to disclose. Conversely, implicit measures evaluate beliefs using computer-based tasks that allow reduced time for introspection thus reflecting ‘automatic’ associations. Thus far, physiotherapists’ beliefs about back posture and safety have not been evaluated with implicit measures. Objectives: (1) Evaluate implicit associations between bending lifting back posture (straight-back vs round-back) and safety (safe vs danger); (2) Explore correlations between implicit and explicit measures of beliefs towards vulnerability of the back. Design: Exploratory cross-sectional quantitative study. Methods: 47 musculoskeletal physiotherapists completed explicit measures of fear of movement (TSK-HC), back beliefs (BackPAQDanger) and beliefs related to bending and lifting back posture and safety (BSB). An Implicit Association Test (IAT) was used to assess implicit associations between (i) images of people bending/lifting with a ‘round-back’ or with a ‘straight-back’ posture, and (ii) words representing ‘safety’ and ‘danger’. A one-sample t-test assessed the degree and direction of the sample's IAT score. Cohen's d provided an effect size of the estimated bias. Correlation between IAT and each explicit measure was assessed using Pearson's coefficient. Results: The sample displayed an implicit association between ‘round-back’ and ‘danger’ (µ = 0.213, 95% CI [0.075-0.350], p =.003), with an effect size magnitude of 0.45. There were fair to moderate correlations between IAT and BSB (r = 0.320, 95% CI [0.036-0.556], p =.029) and, IAT and BackPAQDanger (r = 0.413, 95%CI [0.143-0.626], p =.004). Conclusions: Physiotherapists displayed an implicit bias towards bending and lifting with a round-back as dangerous

Logical Omnipotence and Two notions of Implicit Belief

The most widespread models of rational reasoners (the model based on modal epistemic logic and the model based on probability theory) exhibit the problem of logical omniscience. The most common strategy for avoiding this problem is to interpret the models as describing the explicit beliefs of an ideal reasoner, but only the implicit beliefs of a real reasoner. I argue that this strategy faces serious normative issues. In this paper, I present the more fundamental problem of logical omnipotence, which highlights the normative content of the problem of logical omniscience. I introduce two developments of the notion of implicit belief (accessible and stable belief ) and use them in two versions of the most common strategy applied to the problem of logical omnipotence

Measuring mentalizing ability: a within- subject comparison between an explicit and implicit version of a ball detection task

The concept of mentalizing has been widely studied, but almost exclusively through tasks with explicit instructions. Recent studies suggest that people also mentalize on a more implicit level. However, to our knowledge, no study to date has directly contrasted the effects of implicit and explicit mentalizing processes on an implicit dependent measure within-subjects. We implemented this by using two versions of an object detection task, differing only on secondary catch questions. We hypothesized that if explicit mentalizing relies on complementary processes beyond those underlying implicit mentalizing, this would be reflected in enhanced belief effects in the explicit version. Twenty-eight healthy adults watched movies in which, during the first phase, both they themselves and another agent formed a belief about the location of a ball, and although irrelevant, these beliefs could influence their ball detection reaction times in the second phase. After this response phase, there were occasional catch questions that were different for the explicit and implicit task version. Finally, self-report measures of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) symptomatology were included, as the literature suggests that ASD is related to a specific deficit in implicit mentalizing. Both in the explicit and implicit version, belief conditions had a significant effect on reaction times, with responses being slower when neither the participant nor the other agent expected the ball to be present compared to all other conditions. Importantly, after the implicit version, participants reported no explicit mentalizing awareness. In our neurotypical sample, ASD symptoms were not found to correlate with either explicit or implicit mentalizing. In conclusion, the reaction time patterns in the explicit and implicit version of the task show strikingly similar effects of mentalizing, indicating that participants processed beliefs to the same extent regardless of whether they mentalized explicitly or implicitly, with no additional effects for explicit processing

Endorsement and embodiment of cautiousness-related age stereotypes

Endorsement of implicit age stereotypes was assessed with the propositional evaluation paradigm (PEP) in a high-powered, preregistered study, comprising samples of young ( n  = 89) and older ( n  = 125) adults. To investigate whether implicit age stereotypes shape the behavior via self-stereotyping (“embodiment”), we examined whether implicit endorsement of the belief of older (young) people being cautious (reckless) predicts older (young) individuals’ spontaneous behavior in a speeded response time task. In both age groups, we found significant implicit endorsement effects of age stereotypical beliefs. However, implicit endorsement effects of the cautiousness-related age stereotypes were unrelated to our indicators of spontaneous cautious/reckless behavior in the speeded RT task (as assessed with the parameter a of a diffusion model analysis) for both age groups. The same pattern of results (endorsement of age stereotypic beliefs but no relation with behavioral indicators) was found for explicit measures of age stereotypes. Replicating previous findings, implicit and explicit measures of cautiousness-related age stereotypes were uncorrelated. In sum, our findings provide evidence for the implicit and explicit endorsement of cautiousness-related stereotypical beliefs about old and young people; individual differences in belief endorsement, however, did not predict differences in spontaneous cautiousness-related behavior in a speeded RT task

The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a measure of implicit relative preferences: A first study

The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was designed to examine implicit beliefs or attitudes. In Experiment 1, response latencies obtained from Irish participants on the IRAP showed a strong preference for Irish over Scottish and American over African. In contrast, responses to explicit Likert measures diverged from the IRAP performance in indicating Irish equally likeable to Scottish and African more likeable than American. Using a similar IRAP, Experiment 2 showed that participants from the United States showed strong implicit preferences for American over Irish, Irish over Scottish, and Scottish over African; the explicit Likert measures again diverged from the IRAP. The findings provide preliminary support for the IRAP as a useful measure of implicit beliefs

The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a measure of implicit relative preferences: A first study

The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was designed to examine implicit beliefs or attitudes. In Experiment 1, response latencies obtained from Irish participants on the IRAP showed a strong preference for Irish over Scottish and American over African. In contrast, responses to explicit Likert measures diverged from the IRAP performance in indicating Irish equally likeable to Scottish and African more likeable than American. Using a similar IRAP, Experiment 2 showed that participants from the United States showed strong implicit preferences for American over Irish, Irish over Scottish, and Scottish over African; the explicit Likert measures again diverged from the IRAP. The findings provide preliminary support for the IRAP as a useful measure of implicit beliefs