8,420 research outputs found
The socratic dialogue as a ritual of emotional purification
Abstract In the present paper, the role that emotions play in Socratic self-care, as it can be reconstructed from Plato's dialogues, is investigated and explored. In highlighting the fundamental role that emotions play in such a care, which is not mere repair of a fault (reparative care), but an active and constant attending to self- and others' improvement, it is emphasized how the Socratic care that is enacted in the Selected Dialogues exhibits marked religious qualities, which make Socrates a kind of priestly and demonic figure, as the reader can infer in particular from the two chapters devoted to the Critique and the Apology, respectively. The intent underlying this focus on the religious and especially initiatory aspects of Socratic care in the Platonic dialogues is, as explained at the beginning of the introduction to this work, to deepen the link between the emotional aspect of self-care, explored in depth by Professor L. Napolitano, and my personal interest in the relationship between philosophy and religion. In the present work this link has been found in the theme of 'aporia; this is interpreted in the introduction and in the following chapters as ritual death, that is, as an 'experience in which the initiate (in this case Socrates' interlocutor) witnesses his own death, that is, the disappearance of the firm attachment to his unreflective opinions. It follows that 'aporia is a positive element of self-care, since this ritual death makes it possible, if it is accepted and not rejected, to get rid of those obstacles from within that prevent one from looking forward to one's own improvement and the pursuit of happiness. Aporia is not only a logical impasse, but also an emotionally very dense moment; it therefore holds together the two fundamental components of this work, the focus on emotions in the Socratic dialogue and the focus on the initiatory aspects with which Plato cloaks this dialogue. Plato alludes to these initiatory aspects from time to time in the selected dialogues by appropriating now from Coribantism (Euthydemus), now from Orphism (Phaedo), now even from the rituals of transition from one age to another (the ephebia, as in the case of the Alcibiades); all these disparate experiences have in common the idea of a ritual death, a liminal phase between one life (the one about to leave) and the new one (about to embark on). In the Socratic dialogue enacted in Plato's works, precisely this initiatory death (the aporia) is II achieved; if the interlocutor accepts it, he or she will progress on the path of self care; if he or she is afraid or annoyed by it, he or she will derive no benefit. The introduction outlines the assumptions on which the following analysis are based: the first is the ritual and initiatory nature of refutation and the characterization of aporia as an emotionally connoted moment; the second, based on the analysis of the first book of the Republic, is the relational nature of caring and thus of the good that caring/caretaking pursues; therefore, one who cares for others necessarily also cares for himself. The intertwining of the ritual and emotional aspects, as well as the communal and relational nature of the good pursued by Socratic caring, is explored throughout the introduction and, more importantly, eight chapters, devoted to Euthydemus, Charmides, Alcibiades I, Lysis, Euthyphro, Apology, Critique, and Phaedo, respectively. In the introduction to the thesis, the reason for the choice of these dialogues is explained and what are the relationships between them in this work. In the conclusion, the scientific and especially moral reasons for the importance of emphasizing the role of emotions in Plato's Socrates and the ritual aspects of it are made clea
A Unifying Theory for Graph Transformation
The field of graph transformation studies the rule-based transformation of graphs. An important branch is the algebraic graph transformation tradition, in which approaches are defined and studied using the language of category theory. Most algebraic graph transformation approaches (such as DPO, SPO, SqPO, and AGREE) are opinionated about the local contexts that are allowed around matches for rules, and about how replacement in context should work exactly. The approaches also differ considerably in their underlying formal theories and their general expressiveness (e.g., not all frameworks allow duplication). This dissertation proposes an expressive algebraic graph transformation approach, called PBPO+, which is an adaptation of PBPO by Corradini et al. The central contribution is a proof that PBPO+ subsumes (under mild restrictions) DPO, SqPO, AGREE, and PBPO in the important categorical setting of quasitoposes. This result allows for a more unified study of graph transformation metatheory, methods, and tools. A concrete example of this is found in the second major contribution of this dissertation: a graph transformation termination method for PBPO+, based on decreasing interpretations, and defined for general categories. By applying the proposed encodings into PBPO+, this method can also be applied for DPO, SqPO, AGREE, and PBPO
A Political Theory of Engineered Systems and A Study of Engineering and Justice Workshops
Since there are good reasons to think that some engineered systems are socially undesirableāfor example, internal combustion engines that cause climate change, algorithms that are racist, and nuclear weapons that can destroy all lifeāthere is a well-established literature that attempts to identify best practices for designing and regulating engineered systems in order to prevent harm and promote justice. Most of this literature, especially the design theory and engineering justice literature meant to help guide engineers, focuses on environmental, physical, social, and mental harms such as ecosystem and bodily poisoning, racial and gender discrimination, and urban alienation. However, the literature that focuses on how engineered systems can produce political harmsāharms to how we shape the way we live in community togetherāis not well established. The first part of this thesis contributes to identifying how particular types of engineered systems can harm a democratic politics. Building on democratic theory, philosophy of collective harms, and design theory, it argues that engineered systems that extend in space and time beyond a certain threshold subvert the knowledge and empowerment necessary for a democratic politics. For example, the systems of global shipping and the internet that fundamentally shape our lives are so large that people cannot attain the knowledge necessary to regulate them well nor the empowerment necessary to shape them.
The second part of this thesis is an empirical study of a workshop designed to encourage engineering undergraduates to understand how engineered systems can subvert a democratic politics, with the ultimate goal of supporting students in incorporating that understanding into their work. 32 Dartmouth undergraduate engineering students participated in the study. Half were assigned to participate in a workshop group, half to a control group. The workshop group participants took a pretest; then participated in a 3-hour, semi-structured workshop with 4 participants per session (as well as a discussion leader and note-taker) over lunch or dinner; and then took a posttest. The control group participants took the same pre- and post- tests, but had no suggested activity in the intervening 3 hours. We find that the students who participated in workshops had a statistically significant test-score improvement as compared to the control group (Brunner-Munzel test, p \u3c .001). Using thematic analysis methods, we show the data is consistent with the hypothesis that workshops produced a score improvement because of certain structure (small size, long duration, discussion-based, over homemade food) and content (theoretically rich, challenging). Thematic analysis also reveals workshop failures and areas for improvement (too much content for the duration, not well enough organized).
The thesis concludes with a discussion of limitations and suggestions for future theoretical, empirical, and pedagogical research
Logical disagreement : an epistemological study
While the epistemic signiļ¬cance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ālogical disagreementā. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a speciļ¬c proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ālogical disagreementā. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justiļ¬cation for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of oneās background logic and the logical theory one prefers (oļ¬cially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic signiļ¬cance of central principles from the literature are at best deļ¬ated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reļ¬ections on the potential epistemic signiļ¬cance of convergence in logical theorizing
The verbal dispute about verbal disputes
Whether a dispute is verbal is important to figure out because it appears to make a huge difference for how the dispute should be resolved. To figure out whether individual disputes are verbal and to figure out how to resolve them, it is crucial to answer what it is for a dispute to be verbal. I defend a pluralistic answer to the question of what verbal disputes are: There are at least two phenomena that equally deserve to be called āverbal disputeā. The first phenomenon is the phenomenon of ātalking past each otherā, which I analyse in pragmatic terms. The second phenomenon is the phenomenon of ānot really disagreeingā, which I analyse in doxastic terms. Both notions of āverbalnessā respect certain features, but not others of how the expression āverbal disputeā is used. Furthermore, both notions are important to use since both make a difference for how best to proceed if a dispute is āverbalā in the sense in question.
In section 1, I outline why it is important to develop a good analysis of what verbal disputes are. In short, it is important because whether a dispute is verbal appears to make a difference for how to best resolve them. And resolving disputes in philosophy and academic disciplines more broadly is important to make progress. In section 2, I outline the method I use to establish my analyses of verbalness and argue for adopting this method for arguing for (and against) analyses of verbalness. In section 3, I consider a range of phrases typically used to describe what is distinctive about verbal disputes and boil them down to two central markers of verbal disputes: ātalking past each otherā and ānot really disagreeingā. In section 4, I argue that both markers come apart and one may be present without the other, so these two markers of verbalness do in effect express two independent phenomena. In section 5, I consider existing approaches to the question of what verbal disputes are, consider which of the two phenomena these existing analyses are meant to capture and how well they do indeed capture the phenomenon in question. Building on how these existing approaches can be improved, I argue in section 6 for my analyses of pragmatic verbalness (ātalking past each otherā) and doxastic verbalness (ānot really disagreeingā). In section 7, I argue that the dispute about verbal disputes is itself pragmatically and doxastically verbal. In section 8, I reply to a range of potential objections to my account of verbal disputes
Is Kant a Kantian constitutivist?
This thesis argues that Kant is too imprecise about his metaethics for it to be possible to settle whether or not he is a constitutivist. The first chapter argues for a definition of constitutivism, and distinguishes constitutivism from a position dubbed āagentialism.ā Constitutivism rejects the ontology of robust forms of metanormative realism, but still seeks to secure the objectivity and categoricity of its norms. It does so by claiming that conforming to those norms is the only or the best way of pursuing an aim which agents cannot help but have. This definition is motivated by appeals to the literature, and by an appeal specifically to an argument of Christine Korsgaardās against a rationalist conception of normative facts as knowledge to be applied. For assistance in defining agentialism, a parallel is explored between the metaethical literature and the literature on the normativity of logical laws. Agentialism is defined as a family of views which, like constitutivist ones, reject a robust realist ontology but still seek to secure the objectivity and categoricity of their norms. However, instead of the authority of those normsā being grounded in an inescapable aim, some other explanation is offered which ties together being an agent and being subject to those norms. Henry Allison, Oliver Sensen, and Jens Timmermann are suggested to be advocates of agentialist readings of Kant. The second chapter collects a range of passages from Kantās corpus which could be taken to be evidence of his constitutivism. Most of these are loaned from the work of Korsgaard, Barbara Herman, Andrews Reath, and Stephen Engstrom. The readings of those four authors are compared, so as to illustrate the ways in which one can disagree about Kantās theory while agreeing that it should be read as constitutivist. The third chapter argues that all of the passages collected in the second are equally consistent with an agentialist, and so nonconstitutivist, interpretation of Kantās metaethics. Constitutivist readings of Kant are, however, defended against objections. The conclusion is ultimately drawn that there is insufficient evidence to settle the question of whether Kant is a constitutivist or an agentialist
Formal proofs applied to system models
National audienceUsually, the description of nuclear equipment by the FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) method can be of considerable length (up to 5,000 lines); on the other hand, the number of rules used for the verification of this equipment is small. In addition, upstream, there is the question of trust in the tools that generate these descriptions for complex equipment, that is to say, made up of several thousand objects (requirements, functions, interfaces, behaviors)
LIPIcs, Volume 251, ITCS 2023, Complete Volume
LIPIcs, Volume 251, ITCS 2023, Complete Volum
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