137,040 research outputs found
Framing as Path-Dependence
A “framing” effect occurs when an agent’s choices are not invariant under changes in the way a choice problem is formulated, e.g. changes in the way the options are described (violation of description invariance) or in the way preferences are elicited (violation of procedure invariance). In this paper we examine precisely which classical conditions of rationality it is whose non-satisfaction may lead to framing effects. We show that (under certain conditions), if (and only if) an agent's initial dispositions on a set of propositions are “implicitly inconsistent”, her decisions may be “path-dependent”, i.e. dependent on the order in which the propositions are considered. We suggest that different ways of framing a choice problem may induce the order in which relevant propositions are considered and hence affect the decision made. This theoretical explanation suggests some observations about human psychology which are consistent with those made by psychologists and provides a unified framework for explaining violations of description and procedure invariance.framing, preference reversal, path-dependence, rationality, deductive closure
Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation
This book is primarily about checking and only derivatively about knowing. Checking is a very common concept for describing a subject’s epistemic goals and actions. Surprisingly, there has been no philosophical attention paid to the notion of checking. In Part I, I develop a sensitivity account of checking. To be more explicit, I analyze the internalist and externalist components of the epistemic action of checking which include the intentions of the checking subject and the necessary externalist features of the method used. Crucially, successfully checking whether p is true requires using a method that is sensitive with respect to p, i.e. a method that would not indicate that p, if p were false. In Part II, I use the distinction between knowing and checking to explain central puzzles about knowledge, particularly puzzles centering on knowledge closure, puzzles concerning bootstrapping and the skeptical puzzle. Moreover, the book clarifies a dispute about modal epistemology, concerning the application of the sensitivity principle. By arguing that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not knowing, I explain where our persisting intuitions about sensitivity have their place in epistemology
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A Note on Krugman\u27s Liquidity Trap
The 1998 stylized model of Krugman constituted a ground-breaking contribution explaining the long lasting Japanese stagnation as the consequence of a ‘liquidity trap’ situation featuring a negative natural interest rate. Our critique to such a proposal will focus on three aspects. First, we will question the logical structure of the model, providing an alternative interpretation of its closure. Second, we will argue that aggregate demand has no role in the explanation, as the cause for the persistent excess of savings over desired investment is the result of a supply side shock plus a financial rigidity on the nominal interest rate. Finally, we will discuss the restrictive assumptions needed to get a negative natural interest rate, the concept that lies at the foundation of the entire theoretical apparatus. Our conclusion is that the explanation offered within the 1998 contribution does not provide a satisfying rationale for the Japanese stagnation
Knowledge-based Transfer Learning Explanation
Machine learning explanation can significantly boost machine learning's
application in decision making, but the usability of current methods is limited
in human-centric explanation, especially for transfer learning, an important
machine learning branch that aims at utilizing knowledge from one learning
domain (i.e., a pair of dataset and prediction task) to enhance prediction
model training in another learning domain. In this paper, we propose an
ontology-based approach for human-centric explanation of transfer learning.
Three kinds of knowledge-based explanatory evidence, with different
granularities, including general factors, particular narrators and core
contexts are first proposed and then inferred with both local ontologies and
external knowledge bases. The evaluation with US flight data and DBpedia has
presented their confidence and availability in explaining the transferability
of feature representation in flight departure delay forecasting.Comment: Accepted by International Conference on Principles of Knowledge
Representation and Reasoning, 201
Is there a reliability challenge for logic?
There are many domains about which we think we are reliable. When there is prima facie reason to believe that there is no satisfying explanation of our reliability about a domain given our background views about the world, this generates a challenge to our reliability about the domain or to our background views. This is what is often called the reliability challenge for the domain. In previous work, I discussed the reliability challenges for logic and for deductive inference. I argued for four main claims: First, there are reliability challenges for logic and for deduction. Second, these reliability challenges cannot be answered merely by providing an explanation of how it is that we have the logical beliefs and employ the deductive rules that we do. Third, we can explain our reliability about logic by appealing to our reliability about deduction. Fourth, there is a good prospect for providing an evolutionary explanation of the reliability of our deductive reasoning. In recent years, a number of arguments have appeared in the literature that can be applied against one or more of these four theses. In this paper, I respond to some of these arguments. In particular, I discuss arguments by Paul Horwich, Jack Woods, Dan Baras, Justin Clarke-Doane, and Hartry Field
Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism
Intermodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are fully determined by their contents. In contrast, intramodal representationalists hold that the phenomenal characters of experiences are determined by their contents together with their intentional modes or manners of representation, which are nonrepresentational features corresponding roughly to the sensory modalities. This paper discusses a kind of experience that provides evidence for an intermodal representationalist view: intermodal experiences, experiences that unify experiences in different modalities. I argue that such experiences are much easier to explain on the intermodal view
Demystifying Emergence
Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that’s no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist worldview require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it’s natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to bestow genuinely new causal powers, we must reject physical realization and embrace a form of emergentism, in which such properties arise from the physical by mysterious brute determination. In this paper, I argue that contrary to this orthodoxy, there are physically realized properties that bestow new causal powers in relation to their realizers. The key to my proposal is to reject causal-functional accounts of realization and embrace a broader account that allows for the realization of shapes and patterns. Unlike functional properties, such properties are defined by qualitative, non-causal specifications, so realizing them does not consist in bestowing causal powers. This, I argue, allows for causal novelty of the strongest kind. I argue that the molecular geometry of H2O—a qualitative, multiply realizable property—plays an irreducible role in explaining its dipole moment, and thereby bestows novel powers. On my proposal, special science properties can have the kind of causal novelty traditionally associated with strong emergence, without any of the mystery
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