The neural representation of mental beliefs held by two agents

Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that mentalizing about false beliefs held by other people recruits the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). However, earlier work was limited to a single agent that held a false belief. We investigated the effect of two agents that held similar or mixed false and/or true beliefs. Participants saw animated stories with two smurfs holding true or false beliefs (Story phase). At the end of each trial, they were requested to take the perspective of the self or one of the smurfs (Question phase). We predicted that an increasing number of smurfs holding a false belief would increase activation in the TPJ when participants have to report the belief of the smurf, because the incongruent belief should have a stronger influence if it is held by two compared with one agent. This prediction was confirmed as activation in the TPJ during the Story and Question phase increased when more smurfs held a false belief. Taking the perspective of the self led to stronger activation of the TPJ in the two conditions that involved a true belief and weakest activation in the condition of two false beliefs. These data suggest that activation in TPJ depends on the perspective participants take, and that the number of agents holding a false belief influences activation in the TPJ only when taking the agent's perspective

Commitment to “Forbidden Questions” in Quantum Phenomena Requires a Philosophical Stand

The theory of quantum mechanics, as formulated by the Copenhagen school, has been controversial since its inception. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle asserts that certain aspects of reality are not simultaneously defined, forbidding certain questions. Recognition has recently been given to experimentalists who have asked these “forbidden questions”. Aephraim Steinberg at the University of Toronto conducted the double slit experiment using weak measurements to construct average trajectories of particles traveling through both slits. To an adherent of the Copenhagen view of reality, however, these average trajectories will constitute nothing more than a mathematical contrivance. Experiments like these will only prove fruitful if we are willing to reject quantum mechanics’ restrictive philosophical approach. This paper will isolate the controversial physical postulate of quantum mechanics (the postulate of wave collapse) and the philosophical approach that gave rise to it. This approach reflects an instrumentalist philosophy which claims that science must only account for the results of measurements, and has nothing to say about their underlying causes. Such an approach has put an epistemic moratorium on discovering the causes underlying quantum phenomena. Notable progress has been made by those who reject this moratorium. Steinberg et al. found the average particle trajectories by rejecting the idea that there is no underlying reality to our measurements. Bell, more notably, was able to discover details of quantum entanglement by using his concept of “beables” to question the built-in epistemology of quantum mechanics. Because quantum mechanics does not explicitly define wave collapse and prescribe what causes it and when it is supposed to happen, the theory cannot give explicit solutions to a certain class of experiments. This so called measurement problem is assuaged by Zurek’s theory of decoherence, which has had great success in predicting the results of recent experiments. Despite this, decoherence contains the same philosophical oversights as the original theory; it does not propose, or even address, the issue of the underlying causes for quantum phenomena. While most scientists try to steer clear of such philosophical controversies, underlying causes cannot be discovered without the conviction that it is the job of science to discover them

Reality-monitoring characteristics in confirmed and doubtful allegations of abuse

According to reality-monitoring theory, memories of experienced and imagined events are qualitatively different, and can be distinguished by children from the age of 3. Across three studies, a total of 119 allegations of sexual abuse by younger (aged 3-8) and older (aged 9-16) children were analyzed for developmental differences in the presence of reality-monitoring criteria, which should characterise descriptions of experienced events. Statements were deemed likely or unlikely to be descriptions of actual incidents using independent case information (e.g., medical evidence). Accounts by older children consistently contained more reality-monitoring criteria than those provided by younger children, and age differences were particularly strong when the cases were deemed doubtful (Studies 1 and 2)