The Dark Side of Morality: Group Polarization and Moral Epistemology

This article argues that philosophers and laypeople commonly conceptualize moral truths or justified moral beliefs as discoverable through intuition, argument, or some other purely cognitive or affective process. It then contends that three empirically well-supported theories all predict that this ‘Discovery Model’ of morality plays a substantial role in causing social polarization. The same three theories are then used to argue that an alternative ‘Negotiation Model’ of morality—according to which moral truths are not discovered but instead created by actively negotiating compromises—promises to reduce polarization by fostering a progressive willingness to ‘work across the aisle’ to settle moral issues cooperatively. This article then examines potential methods for normatively evaluating polarization, arguing there are prima facie reasons to favor the Negotiation Model over the Discovery Model based on their hypothesized effects on polarization. Finally, I outline avenues for further empirical and philosophical research

On the Enforcement of Territorial Use Rights Regulations: A Game Theoretic Approach

Territorial Use Rights (commonly known as TURFs in the literature) consists in the allocation of fishing rights to individuals and/or groups to fish in certain geographical locations. A requisite for these communities to be granted fishing rights is the formulation of a management and exploitation plan (MEP). While thus far the literature on TURFs has been centred on the biological and technical aspects of it, to our knowledge there is no work squarely dealing with the issue of enforcement of the MEP that the community, once granted the fishing use rights, have to comply with. We formally explore this issue from an economic perspective by formulating a static game of norm compliance in a regime of common property resource exploitation. The key characteristic of this game is a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism, where fishermen monitor and sanction one another. We found that in the absence of any endogenous regulation from the part of the fishing community, TURFs can not avoid the economic overexploitation of the fishery. We discuss the importance of economic incentives (and disincentives) in the formulation of endogenous regulations aimed at ensuring compliance of the MEP. Our results on the relevance of economic incentives in the context of a TURF regulation can also be used to highlight the importance of less conventional enforcement tools.Territorial Use Rights, Enforcement, Game Theory, Chile

Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation

As the 21st century unfolds, we find ourselves having to control, support, manage or otherwise cope with large-scale complex adaptive systems to an extent that is unprecedented in human history. Whether we are concerned with issues of food security, infrastructural resilience, climate change, health care, web science, security, or financial stability, we face problems that combine scale, connectivity, adaptive dynamics, and criticality. Complex systems simulation is emerging as the key scientific tool for dealing with such complex adaptive systems. Although a relatively new paradigm, it is one that has already established a track record in fields as varied as ecology (Grimm and Railsback, 2005), transport (Nagel et al., 1999), neuroscience (Markram, 2006), and ICT (Bullock and Cliff, 2004). In this report, we consider the application of simulation methodologies to financial systems, assessing the prospects for continued progress in this line of research

Modelling the effect of learning and evolving rules on the use of common-pool resources

The extend to which common-pool resources are used and managed sustainably depends highly on incentives. Incentives influence the behaviour of individuals with respect to natural resource management and are determined by institutional arrangements comprising of formal and informal rules and markets. Changes in institutional arrangements will affect individual incentives and will therefore have an impact on resource use. In order to model the connections between institutional arrangements and the sustainable use of common-pool resources we must take into consideration the behaviour of individuals. Game-theoretical models appear to be an adequate modelling technique with which to assess the behaviour of individuals as well as the development of institutions with regards to common-pool resource regimes. The implementation of a game-theoretical framework in the form of an agent-based model appears to be a particularly appropriate tool with which to assess common-pool resource use regimes as such models enable the behaviour of different agents to be modelled as strategies. Traditionally with agent-based models, the strategies that agents pursue are given, with their expression endogenously determined by the set of rules which govern their behaviour. In this paper I focus on the implementation of mechanisms that also allow for rules to adapt endogenously. Such an approach will be applied to common-pool resource use in order to analyse the effect of rule changes.Institutional arrangements, agent-based modelling, learning, evolving rules

Uniqueness Conditions for Point-Rationalizable

The unique point-rationalizable solution of a game is the unique Nash equilibrium. However, this solution has the additional advantage that it can be justified by the epistemic assumption that it is Common Knowledge of the players that only best responses are chosen. Thus, games with a unique point-rationalizable solution allow for a plausible explanation of equilibrium play in one-shot strategic situations, and it is therefore desireable to identify such games. In order to derive sufficient and necessary conditions for unique point-rationalizable solutions this paper adopts and generalizes the contraction-property approach of Moulin (1984) and of Bernheim (1984). Uniqueness results obtained in this paper are derived under fairly general assumptions such as games with arbitrary metrizable strategy sets and are especially useful for complete and bounded, for compact, as well as for finite strategy sets. As a mathematical side result existence of a unique fixed point is proved under conditions that generalize a fixed point theorem due to Edelstein (1962).

Proceedings of the 11th European Agent Systems Summer School Student Session

This volume contains the papers presented at the Student Session of the 11th European Agent Systems Summer School (EASSS) held on 2nd of September 2009 at Educatorio della Providenza, Turin, Italy. The Student Session, organised by students, is designed to encourage student interaction and feedback from the tutors. By providing the students with a conference-like setup, both in the presentation and in the review process, students have the opportunity to prepare their own submission, go through the selection process and present their work to each other and their interests to their fellow students as well as internationally leading experts in the agent field, both from the theoretical and the practical sector. Table of Contents: Andrew Koster, Jordi Sabater Mir and Marco Schorlemmer, Towards an inductive algorithm for learning trust alignment . . . 5; Angel Rolando Medellin, Katie Atkinson and Peter McBurney, A Preliminary Proposal for Model Checking Command Dialogues. . . 12; Declan Mungovan, Enda Howley and Jim Duggan, Norm Convergence in Populations of Dynamically Interacting Agents . . . 19; Akın Günay, Argumentation on Bayesian Networks for Distributed Decision Making . . 25; Michael Burkhardt, Marco Luetzenberger and Nils Masuch, Towards Toolipse 2: Tool Support for the JIAC V Agent Framework . . . 30; Joseph El Gemayel, The Tenacity of Social Actors . . . 33; Cristian Gratie, The Impact of Routing on Traffic Congestion . . . 36; Andrei-Horia Mogos and Monica Cristina Voinescu, A Rule-Based Psychologist Agent for Improving the Performances of a Sportsman . . . 39; --Autonomer Agent,Agent,Künstliche Intelligenz

“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life

The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management

This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.Cooperation, Social Norm, Ostracism, Common Pool Resource, Evolutionary Game Theory, Replicator Equation, Agent-based Simulation, Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics

Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies

In small groups norm enforcement is provided by mutual punishment and reward. In large societies we have enforcement institutions. This paper shows how such institutions can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. In a first stage, individuals invest in a public enforcement technology. This technology generates a sanctioning system whose effectiveness depends on the aggregate amount of invested resources. In a second stage, in which individuals contribute to the provision of a public good, the sanctioning system imposes penalties and rewards on deviations from the endogenous norm contribution. It is shown that even if group size goes to infinity public norm enforcement is supported in a noncooperative equilibrium. Psychological factors are not necessary but can be favorable for the emergence of effective public norm enforcement.norm enforcement, public goods, institutions, sanctioning