1,951 research outputs found
Refinement Modal Logic
In this paper we present {\em refinement modal logic}. A refinement is like a
bisimulation, except that from the three relational requirements only `atoms'
and `back' need to be satisfied. Our logic contains a new operator 'all' in
addition to the standard modalities 'box' for each agent. The operator 'all'
acts as a quantifier over the set of all refinements of a given model. As a
variation on a bisimulation quantifier, this refinement operator or refinement
quantifier 'all' can be seen as quantifying over a variable not occurring in
the formula bound by it. The logic combines the simplicity of multi-agent modal
logic with some powers of monadic second-order quantification. We present a
sound and complete axiomatization of multi-agent refinement modal logic. We
also present an extension of the logic to the modal mu-calculus, and an
axiomatization for the single-agent version of this logic. Examples and
applications are also discussed: to software verification and design (the set
of agents can also be seen as a set of actions), and to dynamic epistemic
logic. We further give detailed results on the complexity of satisfiability,
and on succinctness
Binding bound variables in epistemic contexts
ABSTRACT Quine insisted that the satisfaction of an open modalised formula by an object depends on how that object is described. Kripke's âobjectualâ interpretation of quantified modal logic, whereby variables are rigid, is commonly thought to avoid these Quinean worries. Yet there remain residual Quinean worries for epistemic modality. Theorists have recently been toying with assignment-shifting treatments of epistemic contexts. On such views an epistemic operator ends up binding all the variables in its scope. One might worry that this yields the undesirable result that any attempt to âquantify inâ to an epistemic environment is blocked. If quantifying into the relevant constructions is vacuous, then such views would seem hopelessly misguided and empirically inadequate. But a famous alternative to Kripke's semantics, namely Lewis' counterpart semantics, also faces this worry since it also treats the boxes and diamonds as assignment-shifting devices. As I'll demonstrate, the mere fact that a variable is bound is no obstacle to binding it. This provides a helpful lesson for those modelling de re epistemic contexts with assignment sensitivity, and perhaps leads the way toward the proper treatment of binding in both metaphysical and epistemic contexts: Kripke for metaphysical modality, Lewis for epistemic modality
Counterpart semantics for a second-order mu-calculus
We propose a novel approach to the semantics of quantified Ό-calculi, considering models where states are algebras; the evolution relation is given by a counterpart relation (a family of partial homomorphisms), allowing for the creation, deletion, and merging of components; and formulas are interpreted over sets of state assignments (families of substitutions, associating formula variables to state components). Our proposal avoids the limitations of existing approaches, usually enforcing restrictions of the evolution relation: the resulting semantics is a streamlined and intuitively appealing one, yet it is general enough to cover most of the alternative proposals we are aware of
Questions and Answers about Oppositions
A general characterization of logical opposition is given in the present paper, where oppositions are defined by specific answers in an algebraic question-answer game. It is shown that opposition is essentially a semantic relation of truth values between syntactic opposites, before generalizing the theory of opposition from the initial Apuleian square to a variety of alter- native geometrical representations.
In the light of this generalization, the famous problem of existential import is traced back to an ambiguous interpretation of assertoric sentences in Aristotle's traditional logic. Following Abelardâs distinction between two alternative readings of the O-vertex: Non omnis and Quidam non, a logical difference is made between negation and denial by means of a more fine- grained modal analysis.
A consistent treatment of assertoric oppositions is thus made possible by an underlying abstract theory of logical opposition, where the central concept is negation. A parallel is finally drawn between opposition and consequence, laying the ground for future works on an abstract operator of opposition that would characterize logical negation just as does Tarskiâs operator of consequence for logical truth
The many-property problem is your problem, too
The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted views concerning the nature of perception---including both representational and non-representational views---likewise face the many-property problem. It then presents a solution to the many-property problem for these views, but goes on to show how this solution can be adapted to provide a novel, fully compositional solution to the many-property problem for adverbialism. Thus, with respect to the many-property problem, adverbialism and several widely accepted views in the philosophy of perception are on a par, and the problem is solved
Constant Domain Quantified Modal Logics Without Boolean Negation
his paper provides a sound and complete axiomatisation for constant domain modal logics without Boolean negation. This is a simpler case of the difficult problem of providing a sound and complete axiomatisation for constant-domain quantified relevant logics, which can be seen as a kind of modal logic with a two-place modal operator, the relevant conditional. The completeness proof is adapted from a proof for classical modal predicate logic (I follow James Garsonâs 1984 presentation of the completeness proof quite closely), but with an important twist, to do with the absence of Boolean negation
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