Monopoly Power and Optimal Taxation of Labor Income

This paper studies the Ramsey problem of optimal labor income taxation in a simple model economy which deviates from a first best representative agent economy in three important aspects, namely, flat rate second best tax, monopoly power in intermediate product market, and monopolistic wage setting. There are three key findings: (1) In order to correct for monopoly distortion the Ramsey tax prescription is to set the labor income tax rate lower than its competitive market analogue; (2) Government’s optimal tax policy is independent of its fiscal treatment of distributed pure profits; and (3) For higher levels of monopoly distortions Ramsey policy is more desirable than the first best policy. The key analytical results are verified by a calibration which fits the model to the stylized facts of the US economy.Optimal taxation, Monopoly power, Ramsey policy

Inflation and Innovation-driven Growth

This paper models the relationship between inflation and steady state growth in a model combining standard Schumpeterian growth with a standard New Keynesian specification of nominal price rigidity. Positive money growth has two clear-cut countervailing effects on the incentive to innovate. Past price rigidity causes the use of an inefficiently large quantity of cheap old intermediate goods, reducing demand for new ones and hence, the incentive to innovate. Future price rigidity erodes the new good’s relative price, increasing demand and therefore the current incentive to innovate. In numerical calibrations the negative effect of inflation on growth dominates.Inflation, endogenous growth, price rigidity

Sectorial Wages and the Real Exchange Rate

Consider a multi-sector economy subject to an exogenous demand shock that alters the equilibrium structure of relative prices. How should the structure of sectorial wages adjust in response to such a shock? This question is addressed in the context of a multi-sector model of an open-economy producing internationally tradable and non-tradable goods. In order to focus on intersectorial wage structure without abandoning the competitive neoclassical paradigm we assume that workers differ from each other in their absolute and relative skills. Such differences result in equilibrium wage differentials which are affected by the exogenous real shock. Cost of negotiations result in labor market contracts which set nominal wages in advance of the realization of the stochastic shocks. The analysis provides formulae for the optimal sectorial wage-indexation rules. The optimal rules alter both the absolute and the relative structure of sectorial nominal wages. We examine the dependence of the optimal wage adjustments on the degree of heterogeneity of the skill distribution and on the degree to which the economy is open to international trade; we also study the effects of various shocks and policies on the real exchange rate, real wages and the distribution of income.

Inflation dynamics under optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary policies

We examine the dynamic properties of inflation in a model of optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary policies. The lack of commitment and the presence of nominally risk-free debt provide the government with an incentive to implement policies which induce positive and persistent inflation rates. We show that this property obtains already in an environment with flexible prices and perfectly competitive product markets. Introducing nominal rigidities and imperfect competition has no qualitative but important quantitative implications. In particular, with a modest degree of price stickiness our model generates inflation dynamics very similar to those experienced in the U.S. since the Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s.

Externalities, Monopoly and the Objective Function of the Firm

This paper provides a theory of general equilibrium with externalities and/or monopoly. We assume that the firm's decisions are based on the preferences of shareholders and/or other stakeholders. Under these assumptions, a firm will produce fewer negative externalities than the comparable profit maximizing firm. In the absence of externalities, equilibrium with a monopoly will be Pareto efficient if the firm can price discriminate. The equilibrium can be implemented by a 2-part tariff.Externality, general equilibrium, 2-part tariff, objective function of the firm.

Debt and Conditionality under Endogenous Terms of Trade Adjustment

The purpose of this study is to identify conditions under which renewed international. lending will benefit both the developed and the developing countries. Our analysis will evaluate how the presence of terms of trade adjust-rent and distorted credit markets affect the conditions for the existence of beneficial lending. We demonstrate that in the presence of endogenous terms of trade adjustment, there are cases in which a competitive international banking system may not revitalize lending for investment purposes, even if such renewed lending is socially desirable, Renewed lending may require the appropriate conditionality, and the presence of endogenous terms of trade adjustment puts greater weight on investment conditionality.

Unions Power, Collective Bargaining and Optimal Monetary Policy

We study Ramsey policies and optimal monetary policy rules in a model with sticky prices and unionized labour markets. Collective wage bargaining and unions monopoly power dampen wage fluctuations and amplify employment fluctuations relatively to a DNK model. The optimal monetary policy must trade-off between stabilizing inflation and reducing inefficient unemployment fluctuations induced by unions' monopoly power. In this context the monetary authority uses inflation as a tax on unions' rents. The optimal monetary policy rule targets unemployment alongside inflation.

Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence

This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive. The crucial ingredient in our model is that the current employer has superior information about the worker's ability relative to other firms. This informational advantage gives the employer an ex post monopsony power over the worker which encourages the firm to provide training. We show that the model can lead to multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium quits are endogenously high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and are willing to supply only little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low and training high. We also derive predictions from our model not shared by other explanations of firm sponsored training. Using microdata from Germany, we show that the predictions of the specific human capital model are rejected, while our model receives support from the data.