Pentateuch Exegesis: Pericope: Leviticus 8

This exegesis will argue that the selection and consecration of the Levites followed a process of divine and human preparation. The transformation that occurs through the carrying out of the rite of ordination and through the new office, as priests for the Lord, is a notable example of God’s mercy and faithfulness to his people, to whom he offers a means of atonement for sin and the possibility of holiness for the people

The Foot Washing (John 13:1-20): An Experiment in Hermeneutics

The following paragraphs are intended not only as a valid exegesis of the dialogue between Jesus and Simon Peter during the foot washing (John 13:6-10) but also as an experiment in interpretation. This experiment, which will consist essentially in bringing a plurality of methods, both historical and non-historical, to bear upon the text, will begin with a brief statement of hermeneutical presuppositions which are drawn, primarily, from the work of H.-G. Gadamer and P. Ricoeur. In a second section these presuppositions will operate in the use of a variety of methods to interpret the J ohannine text. In the final section the interpretive process will be analyzed in retrospect in order to throw some light on certain questions of hermeneutical theory

Contracts, Constitutions, and Getting the Interpretation-Construction Distinction Right

Interpretation determines the meaning of a legal actor’s words or other significant acts, construction their legal effect. Using contract law and then two nineteenth century theories of constitutional interpretation as examples, this Article advances four claims about interpretation, construction, and the relationship between the two. First, many theorists, following Francis Lieber, assume that rules of construction apply only when interpretation runs out, such as when a text’s meaning is ambiguous or does not address an issue. In fact, a rule of construction is always necessary to determine a legal speech act’s effect, including when its meaning is clear and definite. Construction does not supplement interpretation, but compliments it. Second, there exists more than one form of interpretation, and correspondingly more than one type of meaning. The meaning a text or other speech act has depends on the questions one asks of it. Third, which type of meaning is legally relevant depends on the applicable rule of construction. Rules of construction are in this sense conceptually prior to legal rules of interpretation. This priority has important consequences for how legal rules of interpretation are justified. Finally, because there exist multiple types of meaning, when one form of interpretation runs out, another form might step in. Whether that is so again depends on the applicable rule of construction.These four claims apply to legal interpretation and construction generally. This Article supports them with a close examination of the interpretation and construction of contractual agreements. It then argues that this account of interpretation and construction illuminates the shared structure of Joseph Story’s and Thomas Cooley’s theories of constitutional interpretation, and by extension theories of constitutional interpretation generally