Peer-to-peer and community-based markets: A comprehensive review

The advent of more proactive consumers, the so-called "prosumers", with production and storage capabilities, is empowering the consumers and bringing new opportunities and challenges to the operation of power systems in a market environment. Recently, a novel proposal for the design and operation of electricity markets has emerged: these so-called peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity markets conceptually allow the prosumers to directly share their electrical energy and investment. Such P2P markets rely on a consumer-centric and bottom-up perspective by giving the opportunity to consumers to freely choose the way they are to source their electric energy. A community can also be formed by prosumers who want to collaborate, or in terms of operational energy management. This paper contributes with an overview of these new P2P markets that starts with the motivation, challenges, market designs moving to the potential future developments in this field, providing recommendations while considering a test-case

Reciprocity-driven Sparse Network Formation

A resource exchange network is considered, where exchanges among nodes are based on reciprocity. Peers receive from the network an amount of resources commensurate with their contribution. We assume the network is fully connected, and impose sparsity constraints on peer interactions. Finding the sparsest exchanges that achieve a desired level of reciprocity is in general NP-hard. To capture near-optimal allocations, we introduce variants of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program with sparsity penalties. We derive decentralized algorithms, whereby peers approximately compute the sparsest allocations, by reweighted l1 minimization. The algorithms implement new proportional-response dynamics, with nonlinear pricing. The trade-off between sparsity and reciprocity and the properties of graphs induced by sparse exchanges are examined.Comment: 19 page

Stay by thy neighbor? Social organization determines the efficiency of biodiversity markets with spatial incentives

Market-based conservation instruments, such as payments, auctions or tradable permits, are environmental policies that create financial incentives for landowners to engage in voluntary conservation on their land. But what if ecological processes operate across property boundaries and land use decisions on one property influence ecosystem functions on neighboring sites? This paper examines how to account for such spatial externalities when designing market-based conservation instruments. We use an agent-based model to analyze different spatial metrics and their implications on land use decisions in a dynamic cost environment. The model contains a number of alternative submodels which differ in incentive design and social interactions of agents, the latter including coordinating as well as cooperating behavior of agents. We find that incentive design and social interactions have a strong influence on the spatial allocation and the costs of the conservation market.Comment: 11 pages, 6 figure