21,389 research outputs found
Mathematical Foundations of Consciousness
We employ the Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms that characterize sets as mathematical
primitives. The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a significant role in our
development, since among other of its features, its replacement for the Axiom
of Foundation in the Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms motivates Platonic
interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions for
sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings that we
use. A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is developed. Such
features enable construction of a theory of non-well-founded sets that we use
to frame mathematical foundations of consciousness. To do this we introduce a
supplementary axiomatic system that characterizes experience and consciousness
as primitives. The new axioms proceed through characterization of so- called
consciousness operators. The Russell operator plays a central role and is shown
to be one example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks supply striking
examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate
associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we
show how the supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the brain
enables the framing of a theory of consciousness by applying appropriate
consciousness operators to the generated sets in question
From Bounded Rationality to Behavioral Economics
The paper provides an brief overview of the âstate of the artâ in the theory of rational decision making since the 1950âs, and focuses specially on the evolutionary justification of rationality. It is claimed that this justification, and more generally the economic methodology inherited from the Chicago school, becomes untenable once taking into account Kauffmanâs Nk model, showing that if evolution it is based on trial-and-error search process, it leads generally to sub- optimal stable solutions: the âas ifâ justification of perfect rationality proves therefore to be a fallacious metaphor. The normative interpretation of decision-making theory is therefore questioned, and the two challenging views against this approach , Simonâs bounded rationality and Allaisâ criticism to expected utility theory are discussed. On this ground it is shown that the cognitive characteristics of choice processes are becoming more and more important for explanation of economic behavior and of deviations from rationality. In particular, according to Kahnemanâs Nobel Lecture, it is suggested that the distinction between two types of cognitive processes â the effortful process of deliberate reasoning on the one hand, and the automatic process of unconscious intuition on the other â can provide a different map with which to explain a broad class of deviations from pure âolympianâ rationality. This view requires re-establishing and revising connections between psychology and economics: an on-going challenge against the normative approach to economic methodology.Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, Evolution, As If
Review of 'Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy-- Neither Theory nor Therapy' by Daniel Hutto 2nd ed. (2006)(review revised 2019)
One of the leading exponents of W's ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the `Two Selves' operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc.) is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH). His approach is called `Radical Enactivism' and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers (see my review of Radicalizing Enactivism) and a new one is appearing as I write (Evolving Enactivism). It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W's 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of this).
Unfortunately, in 2006 Hutto had not yet arrived at his Radical Enactivism, so much time is wasted on McDowell and Brandom and of course none of them to this day have totally digested the later W and his prescient analysis of automatic behavior and the two systems of thought - so fully in tune with contemporary research. Nor is there any discussion of Searle's groundbreaking and completely Wittgensteinian (unwittingly) disquisitions on the Construction of Social Reality. Thus, his chapters 5 and 6 on Realism and Idealism etc., though superb for 2002, need a complete rewrite from a modern two systems viewpoint and I provide a start on that in my review. Much time is wasted on Davidson and Williams, etc. but one can endure them for Hutto's brilliant analyses and the frequent quotes from W. The last chapter gives his critic Rupert Read the counterblast he deserves and permits a slight update to 2006. Overall a lovely book and I eagerly await the third edition which I hope will ensue.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book âThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleâ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see âTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019)
Review of Radicalizing Enactivism by Hutto and Myin (2012) (review revised 2019)
Probably the leading exponent of Wittgensteinâs ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the âTwo Selvesâ operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc.) the prolific Daniel Huttoâs approach is called âRadical Enactivismâ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of Wittgensteinâs 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of this).
The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior is automated and does not involve representations (basically S2 dispositions-see Huttoâs lovely dissection of the ârepresentation rats nestâ in his online papers). To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 precedes the operation of System 2 which is a standard feature of contemporary psychology, which I have explained above and in further detail in my reviews of Wittgenstein (hereafter W-who was the first to see this and explored it in great detail) and Searle (hereafter S-who called it The Phenomenological Illusion in his superb essay of this name in his book Philosophy in a New Century, which I have also reviewed). Since these are basic incontrovertible facts of animal behavior and I have already discussed them I wonât dwell on it here.
This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing behavior which he calls CEC and CIC in favor of REC (Radical Embodied Cognition), which he characterizes as âthe strongest reading of the embodiment thesisâone that uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally constituted by, and to be understood in terms of concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or lessâ (p11). This is clear as a bell if you understand the two systems view explained above but likely opaque if you donât. Much clearer is Fodorâs characterization which he quotes as âabilities are prior to theoriesâ, that âcompetence is prior to contentâ and that âknowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing thatâ (p10). That is, the unconscious automatisms of S1 are evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of S2.
This is classic Hutto high-level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, but somewhat too dense and a tad pretentious for the rest of us. I have not before encountered his coauthor Myin, so canât say how much of this text is really due to him. It is clear from this and the rest of Huttoâs work that (like everyone else) he has not quite kept up with the latest work in psychology nor really grasped the full power of W or S, even though he is one of the top Wittgensteinians alive and as bright as anyone in the field. His discussions of the language games of âinformationâ and ârepresentationâ in his other papers and books (and much else including his deconstructions of Dennett and Fodor) should be required reading for anyone interested in behavior. So, I have the greatest respect for him, but one hopes that he will mellow with time and write descriptions of behavior (i.e., all we can really do as
philosophers according to W) in more mundane prose such as this lovely summation on p15. âHence, REC is nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the very foundations of standard approaches to cognitive science and philosophy of mind.â Yes, and what a pity that this great Wittgensteinian (and everyone else) does not realize that W laid it all out with unmatched clarity in his third period works over 60 years ago.
I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. I donât see how one can lay the burden of explaining how the âmindâ works at Searleâs door, nor how the convoluted prose about âdecoupled contentful activitiesâ etc. helps at all. Why not just say that automated unconscious prelinguistic S1 feeds deliberate, conscious linguistic S2, which is axiomatically extended by public language into the myriad wonders of culture (S3)? Beginning and end of story.
Their last chapter is about âregaining consciousness,â but I would say that if one has understood Wittgenstein and Searle, one has never lost it. And, though this is an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I suggest an even better filter for folly is mulling over my thoughts in this and other reviews, and reading Johnston and the latest from Searle, along of course with as much of 3rd period W as feasible. In sum an excellent book with various faults which I try to correct.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book âThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleâ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see âTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Doing and Showing
The persisting gap between the formal and the informal mathematics is due to
an inadequate notion of mathematical theory behind the current formalization
techniques. I mean the (informal) notion of axiomatic theory according to which
a mathematical theory consists of a set of axioms and further theorems deduced
from these axioms according to certain rules of logical inference. Thus the
usual notion of axiomatic method is inadequate and needs a replacement.Comment: 54 pages, 2 figure
Review of Wittgensteinâs Philosophical Investigations by David Stern (2004)(review revised 2019)
Overall Stern does a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is one of the top W scholars, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also), then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior.
As Stern is aware, throughout Wâs works, understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited and handwritten German notes, with âSatzâ being frequently incorrectly rendered as âpropositionâ (which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to our non-falsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct âsentenceâ, which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such as âthese are my handsâ or âTyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived about 50 million years agoâ.
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book âThe Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searleâ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see âTalking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
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