Sociobiology, universal Darwinism and their transcendence: An investigation of the history, philosophy and critique of Darwinian paradigms, especially gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism, and their types of reductionism towards a theory of the evolution of evolutionary processes, evolutionary freedom and ecological idealism

Based on a review of different Darwinian paradigms, particularly sociobiology, this work, both, historically and philosophically, develops a metaphysic of gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism, and then criticises and transcends these Darwinian paradigms in order to achieve a truly evolutionary theory of evolution. Part I introduces essential aspects of current sociobiology as the original challenge to this investigation. The claim of some sociobiologists that ethics should become biologized in a gene-egoistic way, is shown to be tied to certain biological views, which ethically lead to problematic results. In part II a historical investigation into sociobiology and Darwinism in general provides us, as historical epistemology', with a deeper understanding of the structure and background of these approaches. Gene-Darwinism, which presently dominates sociobiology and is linked to Dawkins' selfish gene view of evolution, is compared to Darwin's Darwinism and the evolutionary' synthesis and becomes defined more strictly. An account of the external history of Darwinism and its subparadigms shows how cultural intellectual presuppositions, like Malthusianism or the Newtonian concept of the unchangeable laws of nature, also influenced biological theory' construction. In part III universal 'process-Darwinism' is elaborated based on the historical interaction of Darwinism with non-biological subject areas. Building blocks for this are found in psychology, the theory of science and economics. Additionally, a metaphysical argument for the universality of process- Darwinism, linked to Hume's and Popper's problem of induction, is proposed. In part IV gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism are criticised. Gene-Darwinism—despite its merits—is challenged as being one-sided in advocating 'gene-atomism', 'germ-line reductionism' and 'process-monism'. My alternative proposals develop and try to unify different criticisms often found. In respect of gene-atomism I advocate a many-level approach, opposing the necessary radical selfishness of single genes. I develop the concept of higher-level genes, propose a concept of systemic selection, which may stabilise group properties, without relying on permanent group selection and extend the applicability of a certain group selectionist model generally to small open groups. Proposals of mine linked to the critique of germ-line reductionism are: 'exformation', phenotypes as evolutionary factors and a field theoretic understanding of causa formalis (resembling Aristotelian hylemorphism). Finally the process-monism of gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and, if defined strictly, Darwinism in general is criticised. 1 argue that our ontology and ethics would be improved by replacing the Newtoman-Paleyian deist metaphor of an eternal and unchangeable law of nature, which lies at tire very heart of Darwinism, by a truly evolutionary understanding of evolution where new processes may gain a certain autonomy. All this results in a view that I call 'ecological idealism', which, although still very much based on Darwinism, clearly transcends a Darwinian world view

Doing evolution in economic geography

Evolutionary approaches in economic geography face questions about the relationships between their concepts, theories, methods, politics, and policy implications. Amidst the growing but unsettled consensus that evolutionary approaches should employ plural methodologies, the aims here are, first, to identify some of the difficult issues confronting those working with different frameworks. The concerns comprise specifying and connecting research objects, subjects, and levels; handling agency and context; engaging and integrating the quantitative and the qualitative; comparing cases; and, considering politics, policy, and praxis. Second, the purpose is to articulate a distinctive geographical political economy approach, methods, and illustrative examples in addressing these issues. Bringing different views of evolution in economic geography into dialogue and disagreement renders methodological pluralism a means toward improved understanding and explanation rather than an end in itself. Confronting such thorny matters needs to be embedded in our research practices and supported by greater openness; more and better substantiation of our conceptual, theoretical, and empirical claims; enhanced critical reflection; and deeper engagement with politics, policy, and praxis

Artificial life meets computational creativity?

I review the history of work in Artificial Life on the problem of the open-ended evolutionary growth of complexity in computational worlds. This is then put into the context of evolutionary epistemology and human creativity

Atheism and Agatheism in the Global Ethical Discourse: Reply to Millican and Thornhill-Miller

Peter Millican and Branden Thornhill-Miller have recently argued that contradictions between different religious belief systems, in conjunction with the host of defeaters based on empirical research concerning alleged sources of evidence for ‘perceived supernatural agency’, render all ‘first-order’, that is actual, religious traditions positively irrational, and a source of discord on a global scale. However, since the authors recognise that the ‘secularisation thesis’ appears to be incorrect, and that empirical research provides evidence that religious belief also has beneficial individual and social effects, they put forward a hypothesis of a ‘second-order religious belief ’, with Universalist overtones and thus free of intergroup conflict, and free of irrationality, since supported (solely) by the Fine-Tuning Argument. While granting most of their arguments based on empirical research and embracing the new paradigm of the atheism/religion debate implicit in their paper, I contend that Millican’s and Thornhill-Miller’s proposal is unlikely to appeal to religious believers, because it misconstrues the nature and grounds of religious belief. I suggest that their hypothesis may be refined by taking into account a view of axiologically grounded religious belief that I refer to as ‘agatheism’, since it identifies God or the Ultimate Reality with the ultimate good (to agathon)