19,286 research outputs found
Generating and Adapting to Diverse Ad-Hoc Cooperation Agents in Hanabi
Hanabi is a cooperative game that brings the problem of modeling other
players to the forefront. In this game, coordinated groups of players can
leverage pre-established conventions to great effect, but playing in an ad-hoc
setting requires agents to adapt to its partner's strategies with no previous
coordination. Evaluating an agent in this setting requires a diverse population
of potential partners, but so far, the behavioral diversity of agents has not
been considered in a systematic way. This paper proposes Quality Diversity
algorithms as a promising class of algorithms to generate diverse populations
for this purpose, and generates a population of diverse Hanabi agents using
MAP-Elites. We also postulate that agents can benefit from a diverse population
during training and implement a simple "meta-strategy" for adapting to an
agent's perceived behavioral niche. We show this meta-strategy can work better
than generalist strategies even outside the population it was trained with if
its partner's behavioral niche can be correctly inferred, but in practice a
partner's behavior depends and interferes with the meta-agent's own behavior,
suggesting an avenue for future research in characterizing another agent's
behavior during gameplay.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1907.0384
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life
Evolutionary Algorithms for Reinforcement Learning
There are two distinct approaches to solving reinforcement learning problems,
namely, searching in value function space and searching in policy space.
Temporal difference methods and evolutionary algorithms are well-known examples
of these approaches. Kaelbling, Littman and Moore recently provided an
informative survey of temporal difference methods. This article focuses on the
application of evolutionary algorithms to the reinforcement learning problem,
emphasizing alternative policy representations, credit assignment methods, and
problem-specific genetic operators. Strengths and weaknesses of the
evolutionary approach to reinforcement learning are presented, along with a
survey of representative applications
Evolutionary games on graphs
Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines
from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and
especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network
the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied
in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type
overview of the field for physicists. The first three sections introduce the
necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic
definitions to the most important results. The fourth section surveys the
topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network
structures in general. The last three sections discuss in detail the dynamic
behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the
Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the
review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify
and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in
evolutionary games.Comment: Review, final version, 133 pages, 65 figure
Coevolutionary games - a mini review
Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in
that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Favoring
players with higher fitness, the latter is key for understanding the challenges
faced by cooperators when competing with defectors. Evolutionary game theory
provides a competent theoretical framework for addressing the subtleties of
cooperation in such situations, which are known as social dilemmas. Recent
advances point towards the fact that the evolution of strategies alone may be
insufficient to fully exploit the benefits offered by cooperative behavior.
Indeed, while spatial structure and heterogeneity, for example, have been
recognized as potent promoters of cooperation, coevolutionary rules can extend
the potentials of such entities further, and even more importantly, lead to the
understanding of their emergence. The introduction of coevolutionary rules to
evolutionary games implies, that besides the evolution of strategies, another
property may simultaneously be subject to evolution as well. Coevolutionary
rules may affect the interaction network, the reproduction capability of
players, their reputation, mobility or age. Here we review recent works on
evolutionary games incorporating coevolutionary rules, as well as give a
didactic description of potential pitfalls and misconceptions associated with
the subject. In addition, we briefly outline directions for future research
that we feel are promising, thereby particularly focusing on dynamical effects
of coevolutionary rules on the evolution of cooperation, which are still widely
open to research and thus hold promise of exciting new discoveries.Comment: 24 two-column pages, 10 figures; accepted for publication in
BioSystem
Imitation and Efficient Contagion
In this paper we study the conditions under which efficient behavior can spread from a finite initial seed group to an infinite population living on a network. We formulate conditions on payoffs and network structure under which overall contagion occurs in arbitrary regular networks. Central in this process is the communication pattern among players who are confronted with the same decision, i.e. who are at the same distance from the initial seed group. The extent to which these agents interact among themselves (rather than with players who already have faced or subsequently will face the decision problem) is critical in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the Coordination Game the key element is the cohesion of the efficient cluster, a property which is different from the one identified in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Additional results are obtained when we distinguish the interaction and information neighborhoods. Specifically, we find that contagion tends to be favored by fast neighborhood growth if an assumption of conservative behavior is made. We discuss our findings in relation to the notions of clustering, transitivity and cohesion.imitation, contagion, regular graphs, local interaction game
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