115,617 research outputs found
Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation
Rewarding cooperation is in many ways expected behaviour from social players.
However, strategies that promote antisocial behaviour are also surprisingly
common, not just in human societies, but also among eusocial insects and
bacteria. Examples include sanctioning of individuals who behave prosocially,
or rewarding of freeriders who do not contribute to collective enterprises. We
therefore study the public goods game with antisocial and prosocial pool
rewarding in order to determine the potential negative consequences on the
effectiveness of positive incentives to promote cooperation. Contrary to a
naive expectation, we show that the ability of defectors to distribute rewards
to their like does not deter public cooperation as long as cooperators are able
to do the same. Even in the presence of antisocial rewarding the spatial
selection for cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas is enhanced. Since
the administration of rewards to either strategy requires a considerable degree
of aggregation, cooperators can enjoy the benefits of their prosocial
contributions as well as the corresponding rewards. Defectors when aggregated,
on the other hand, can enjoy antisocial rewards, but due to their lack of
contributions to the public good they ultimately succumb to their inherent
inability to secure a sustainable future. Strategies that facilitate the
aggregation of akin players, even if they seek to promote antisocial behaviour,
thus always enhance the long-term benefits of cooperation.Comment: 9 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in
Proceedings of the Royal Society
Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation
In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is
often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in
a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral
strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be
stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse
neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse
neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced
with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of
their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and
establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general
local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than
emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity
in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of
cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of
cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is
even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own.
While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse
neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an
optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON
Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game,
where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat,
win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While
pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortion
regardless of game parametrization, myopic updating gives rise to the
coexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect is sufficiently
large or if the degree distribution of the interaction network is
heterogeneous. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome emerges as a result
of an unexpected chain of strategy invasions. Firstly, defectors emerge and
coarsen spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly,
extortioners and players adopting tit-for-tat emerge and spread via neutral
drift among the emerged defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners,
cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary invasions yield a
five-strategy phase that is stable irrespective of the system size and the
structure of the interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpected
mechanism that stabilizes extortion and cooperation in an evolutionary setting.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific
Reports [related work available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.8294
Social dilemmas in an online social network: the structure and evolution of cooperation
We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of
cooperation--Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship
network obtained from a social networking site. We demonstrate that such social
network has small-world property and degree distribution has a power-law tail.
Besides, it has hierarchical organizations and exhibits disassortative mixing
pattern. We study the evolutionary version of the two types of games on it. It
is found that enhancement and sustainment of cooperative behaviors are
attributable to the underlying network topological organization. It is also
shown that cooperators can survive when confronted with the invasion of
defectors throughout the entire ranges of parameters of both games. The
evolution of cooperation on empirical networks is influenced by various network
effects in a combined manner, compared with that on model networks. Our results
can help understand the cooperative behaviors in human groups and society.Comment: 14 pages, 7 figure
Collective behavior and evolutionary games - An introduction
This is an introduction to the special issue titled "Collective behavior and
evolutionary games" that is in the making at Chaos, Solitons & Fractals. The
term collective behavior covers many different phenomena in nature and society.
From bird flocks and fish swarms to social movements and herding effects, it is
the lack of a central planner that makes the spontaneous emergence of sometimes
beautifully ordered and seemingly meticulously designed behavior all the more
sensational and intriguing. The goal of the special issue is to attract
submissions that identify unifying principles that describe the essential
aspects of collective behavior, and which thus allow for a better
interpretation and foster the understanding of the complexity arising in such
systems. As the title of the special issue suggests, the later may come from
the realm of evolutionary games, but this is certainly not a necessity, neither
for this special issue, and certainly not in general. Interdisciplinary work on
all aspects of collective behavior, regardless of background and motivation,
and including synchronization and human cognition, is very welcome.Comment: 6 two-column pages, 1 figure; accepted for publication in Chaos,
Solitons & Fractals [the special issue is available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09600779/56
Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By
employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters,
we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as
well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of
the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful
players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the
preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of
game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat
on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new
friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of
cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number
limited.Comment: 14 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON
Upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous networks
Many mechanisms for the emergence and maintenance of altruistic behavior in
social dilemma situations have been proposed. Indirect reciprocity is one such
mechanism, where other-regarding actions of a player are eventually rewarded by
other players with whom the original player has not interacted. The upstream
reciprocity (also called generalized indirect reciprocity) is a type of
indirect reciprocity and represents the concept that those helped by somebody
will help other unspecified players. In spite of the evidence for the
enhancement of helping behavior by upstream reciprocity in rats and humans,
theoretical support for this mechanism is not strong. In the present study, we
numerically investigate upstream reciprocity in heterogeneous contact networks,
in which the players generally have different number of neighbors. We show that
heterogeneous networks considerably enhance cooperation in a game of upstream
reciprocity. In heterogeneous networks, the most generous strategy, by which a
player helps a neighbor on being helped and in addition initiates helping
behavior, first occupies hubs in a network and then disseminates to other
players. The scenario to achieve enhanced altruism resembles that seen in the
case of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in heterogeneous networks.Comment: 10 figures, Journal of Theoretical Biology, in press (2010
Resolution of the stochastic strategy spatial prisoner's dilemma by means of particle swarm optimization
We study the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals in the
stochastic strategy spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We equip players with the
particle swarm optimization technique, and find that it may lead to highly
cooperative states even if the temptations to defect are strong. The concept of
particle swarm optimization was originally introduced within a simple model of
social dynamics that can describe the formation of a swarm, i.e., analogous to
a swarm of bees searching for a food source. Essentially, particle swarm
optimization foresees changes in the velocity profile of each player, such that
the best locations are targeted and eventually occupied. In our case, each
player keeps track of the highest payoff attained within a local topological
neighborhood and its individual highest payoff. Thus, players make use of their
own memory that keeps score of the most profitable strategy in previous
actions, as well as use of the knowledge gained by the swarm as a whole, to
find the best available strategy for themselves and the society. Following
extensive simulations of this setup, we find a significant increase in the
level of cooperation for a wide range of parameters, and also a full resolution
of the prisoner's dilemma. We also demonstrate extreme efficiency of the
optimization algorithm when dealing with environments that strongly favor the
proliferation of defection, which in turn suggests that swarming could be an
important phenomenon by means of which cooperation can be sustained even under
highly unfavorable conditions. We thus present an alternative way of
understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior and its ubiquitous presence
in nature, and we hope that this study will be inspirational for future efforts
aimed in this direction.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON
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