Generalized Evidence Theory

Conflict management is still an open issue in the application of Dempster Shafer evidence theory. A lot of works have been presented to address this issue. In this paper, a new theory, called as generalized evidence theory (GET), is proposed. Compared with existing methods, GET assumes that the general situation is in open world due to the uncertainty and incomplete knowledge. The conflicting evidence is handled under the framework of GET. It is shown that the new theory can explain and deal with the conflicting evidence in a more reasonable way.Comment: 39 pages, 5 figure

Use of fuzzy risk assessment in FMEA of offshore engineering systems

This paper proposes a novel framework for analysing and synthesising engineering system risks on the basis of a generic Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning (FER) approach. The approach is developed to simplify the inference process and overcome the problems of traditional fuzzy rule based methods in risk analysis and decision making. The framework, together with the FER approach has been applied to model the safety of an offshore engineering system. The benchmarking between the new model and a well-established Rule based Inference Methodology using the Evidential Reasoning (RIMER) is conducted to demonstrate its reliability and unique characteristics. It will facilitate subjective risk assessment in different engineering systems where historical failure data is not available in their safety practice

The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief

This paper is the product of an interdisciplinary, interreligious dialogue aiming to outline some of the possibilities and rational limits of supernatural religious belief, in the light of a critique of David Hume’s familiar sceptical arguments -- including a rejection of his famous Maxim on miracles -- combined with a range of striking recent empirical research. The Humean nexus leads us to the formulation of a new ”Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma’, which suggests that the contradictions between different religious belief systems, in conjunction with new understandings of the cognitive forces that shape their common features, persuasively challenge the rationality of most kinds of supernatural belief. In support of this conclusion, we survey empirical research concerning intercessory prayer, religious experience, near-death experience, and various cognitive biases. But we then go on to consider evidence that supernaturalism -- even when rationally unwarranted -- has significant beneficial individual and social effects, despite others that are far less desirable. This prompts the formulation of a ”Normal/Objective Dilemma’, identifying important trade-offs to be found in the choice between our humanly evolved ”normal’ outlook on the world, and one that is more rational and ”objective’. Can we retain the pragmatic benefits of supernatural belief while avoiding irrationality and intergroup conflict? It may well seem that rationality is incompatible with any wilful sacrifice of objectivity. But in a situation of uncertainty, an attractive compromise may be available by moving from the competing factions and mutual contradictions of ”first-order’ supernaturalism to a more abstract and tolerant ”second-order’ view, which itself can be given some distinctive intellectual support through the increasingly popular Fine Tuning Argument. We end by proposing a ”Maxim of the Moon’ to express the undogmatic spirit of this second-order religiosity, providing a cautionary metaphor to counter the pervasive bias endemic to the human condition, and offering a more cooperation- and humility-enhancing understanding of religious diversity in a tense and precarious globalised age

Information Volume of Mass Function

Given a probability distribution, its corresponding information volume is Shannon entropy. However, how to determine the information volume of a given mass function is still an open issue. Based on Deng entropy, the information volume of mass function is presented in this paper. Given a mass function, the corresponding information volume is larger than its uncertainty measured by Deng entropy. In addition, when the cardinal of the frame of discernment is identical, both the total uncertainty case and the BPA distribution of the maximum Deng entropy have the same information volume. Some numerical examples are illustrated to show the efficiency of the proposed information volume of mass function

With Language in Mind

Does language have a role to play in conceptual development, and if so, what is that role? Understanding the contents of another person’s mind parallels the development in early childhood of mental state language. Does the conceptual understanding get reflected in and drive the language development, or does the language allow the representation of propositional attitudes like belief? The paper reviews the evidence and sets up the terms of the debate, focusing on the syntax for mental states. It also asks whether syntax development could serve as a scaffold for other concepts that are described by propositions rather than labels. Finally, it reviews experimentation on the syntax of embedded clauses, where subtle phenomena are acquired for which it is impossible to imagine nonverbal counterparts: here, language is human thinking