Balance of Threat, Balance of Mind: Nuclear Rivalry and Arms Control

Under what conditions will rivals choose to accept mutual constraints, limitations, and even reductions on their capabilities for waging war? Contemporary political science lacks a strong theoretical basis for understanding this behavior, despite the fact that states in the modern era continue to negotiate and enter into arms control arrangements. This study contributes a theoretical framework and empirical analysis identifying the conditions under which nuclear-armed rivals might choose to curb their deadly arsenals. Traditional theories grounded in classical deterrence theory suggest arms control serves to preserve a deterrent status quo and prevent expensive and destabilizing arms competition; it should therefore only be expected when rivals feel secure in the strength and effectiveness of their respective retaliatory capabilities. This study suggests a more complicated (yet still predictive) causal logic in which this balance of force is dynamically interactive with militarized hostility and rivals convergence or divergence in how they think — both normatively and instrumentally — about the role of nuclear weapons in their national security. The argument is illustrated through qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of bilateral arms control interactions among nuclear-armed strategic rivals from 1949 to the present. Further analysis is provided through in-depth case studies of arms control dynamics between three pairs of contemporary nuclear rivals — the United States and Russia, India and Pakistan, and the United States and China

SDI, NATO, and the Social Composition Function

International audienceThe strategic defense initiative (SDI) intends to renew the leadership of the USA on the western alliance. The initiative takes place in a period when a summation technology prevails for the aggregation of contributions of NATO allies. We investigate if SDI induces a shift in Hirshleifer's social composition function. Panel data tests over the period 1970-1990 do not confirm any break toward a best-shot aggregator. SDI does not alter the core of deterrence. It is indeed a public good at the US level but not at the NATO level, where, it is one of the joint products of the alliance. We also investigate the lessons to be drawn for the current debates on ballistic defense

Proceedings, MSVSCC 2013

Proceedings of the 7th Annual Modeling, Simulation & Visualization Student Capstone Conference held on April 11, 2013 at VMASC in Suffolk, Virginia

Troubled Waters: China’s and Russia’s Naval Modernizations Programs, and the Causes of Offensive Naval Arms Race

Scholars, policymakers and the public alike have debated the revisionist or status quo intentions of China and Russia using metrics such as territorial and economic expansionism. However, few have tried to explain why the two states’ arms policies may or may not signal intentions. This thesis project makes the point that structural factors, not intentions, drive offensive arms races. Using open-source databases and congressional hearing transcripts, I focus on Russia’s and China’s maritime push outwards through naval technological investments, as well as the structural factors, including offense-defense balance and near-peer competition, that surround these buildups. By showcasing the inherent military and strategic values of the contested maritime space, I argue that technological and geographical factors favor conquest and strategic offensives in territorial competition. This offense dominance compels states to pursue offensive naval buildups, regardless of intentions. Therefore, in an effort to avoid the rational offensive arms race, state leaders should seek to alter the offense-dominant environment at play, as opposed to feeding into the downward spiral that is otherwise known as security dilemma

The University Defence Research Collaboration In Signal Processing

This chapter describes the development of algorithms for automatic detection of anomalies from multi-dimensional, undersampled and incomplete datasets. The challenge in this work is to identify and classify behaviours as normal or abnormal, safe or threatening, from an irregular and often heterogeneous sensor network. Many defence and civilian applications can be modelled as complex networks of interconnected nodes with unknown or uncertain spatio-temporal relations. The behavior of such heterogeneous networks can exhibit dynamic properties, reflecting evolution in both network structure (new nodes appearing and existing nodes disappearing), as well as inter-node relations. The UDRC work has addressed not only the detection of anomalies, but also the identification of their nature and their statistical characteristics. Normal patterns and changes in behavior have been incorporated to provide an acceptable balance between true positive rate, false positive rate, performance and computational cost. Data quality measures have been used to ensure the models of normality are not corrupted by unreliable and ambiguous data. The context for the activity of each node in complex networks offers an even more efficient anomaly detection mechanism. This has allowed the development of efficient approaches which not only detect anomalies but which also go on to classify their behaviour

VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF GUAM’S DEFENSE POSTURE

Since the end of the Second World War, Guam has served as a linchpin of U.S. military power in the Indo-Pacific. As the United States’ westernmost territory in the world, Guam has been lauded as the place where America’s day begins. However, with its strategic importance and abundance of military combat power, Guam may be where America’s next war begins. Following decades of reform and modernization, the People’s Liberation Army presents a significant threat to the preeminence of U.S. military power in the region. This study uses a structured vulnerability analysis based on the principles of risk analysis, reliability engineering, adversarial analysis, and safety engineering to identify Guam’s critical vulnerabilities and formulate recommendations that enhance the territory’s defense posture. This study finds that Guam’s missile defense posture constitutes the island’s most significant vulnerability and recommends that congressional budgetary initiatives must remain focused on enhancing Guam’s missile defense capability and hardening defense infrastructure throughout the Pacific territories. Should modern warfare reach the shores of Guam, the U.S. military will have to fight for Guam before it can fight from it.Outstanding ThesisLieutenant, United States NavyApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

A system theoretic safety analysis of friendly fire prevention in ground based missile systems

Thesis (S.M. in Engineering and Management)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (page 61).This thesis used Dr. Leveson's STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process) model of accident causation to analyze a friendly fire accident that occurred on 22 March 03 between a British Tornado aircraft and a US Patriot Missile battery. This causation model analyzes system constraints, control loops, and process models to identify inadequate control structures leading to hazards and preventative measures that may be taken to reduce the effect of these hazards. By using a system-based causation model like STAMP, rather than a traditional chain of events model, this thesis aimed to identify systemic factors and component interactions that may have contributed to the accident, rather than simply analyzing component failures. Additionally, care was taken to understand the rationale for decisions that were made, rather than assigning blame. The analysis identified a number of areas in which control flaws or inadequacies led to the friendly fire incident. A set of recommendations was developed that may help to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future.by Scott McCarthy.S.M.in Engineering and Managemen

Stabilizing unstable outcomes in prediction games

Assume in a 2-person game that one player, Predictor (P), does not have a dominant strategy but can predict with probability p > 1/2 the strategy choice of an opponent, Predictee (Q). Q chooses a strategy that maximizes her expected payoff, given that she knows p—but not P’s prediction—and that P will act according to his prediction. In all 2 2 strict ordinal games in which there is a unique Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium (Class I) or no pure-strategy equilibrium (Class II), and which also has a Pareto-optimal non-Nash “cooperative outcome,” P can induce this outcome if p is sufficiently high. This scenario helps to explain the observed outcomes of a Class I game modeling the 1962 Cuban missile crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a Class II game modeling the 2015 conflict between Iran and Israel over Iran’s possible development of nuclear weapons

The Frontiers of Technology in Warhead Verification

How might new technical verification capabilities enhance the prospects of success in future nuclear arms control negotiations? Both theory and evidence suggest that verification technologies can influence the dynamics of arms control negotiations by shaping and constraining the arguments and strategies that are available to the involved stakeholders. In the future, new technologies may help transcend the specific verification challenge of high-security warhead authentication, which is a verification capability needed in future disarmament scenarios that address fewer warheads, limit new categories of warheads, and involve nuclear weapons states other than the United States and Russia. Under these circumstances, the core challenge is maintaining the confidentiality of the classified information related to the warheads under inspection, while providing transparency in the verification process. This analysis focuses on a set of emerging warhead authentication approaches that rely on the cryptographic concept of zero-knowledge proofs and intend to solve the paradox between secrecy and transparency, making deeper reductions in warhead arsenals possible and thus facilitating future nuclear arms control negotiations

Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk : Volume II East Asian Perspectives.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is not only undergoing a renaissance in its technical development, but is also starting to shape deterrence relations among nucleararmed states. This is already evident in East Asia, where asymmetries of power and capability have long driven nuclear posture and weapon acquisition. Continuing this trend, integration of AI into military platforms has the potential to offer weaker nuclear-armed states the opportunity to reset imbalances in capabilities, while at the same time exacerbating concerns that stronger states may use AI to further solidify their dominance and to engage in more provocative actions. This paradox of perceptions, as it is playing out in East Asia, is fuelled by a series of national biases and assumptions that permeate decision-making. They are also likely to serve as the basis for AI algorithms that drive future conventional and nuclear platforms