24,922 research outputs found
A Direct Reputation Model for VO Formation
We show that reputation is a basic ingredient in the Virtual Organisation (VO) formation process. Agents can use their experiences gained in direct past interactions to model otherâs reputation and deciding on either join a VO or determining who is the most suitable set of partners. Reputation values are computed using a reinforcement learning algorithm, so agents can learn and adapt their reputation models of their partners according to their recent behaviour. Our approach is especially powerful if the agent participates in a VO in which the members can change their behaviour to exploit their partners. The reputation model presented in this paper deals with the questions of deception and fraud that have been ignored in current models of VO formation
Inside the black box of collective reputation
The literature on collective reputation is still in its infancy. Despite the existence of a (limited) number of valuable theoretical works studying the process of collective reputation building, there is still no comprehensive analysis of this concept. In addition, due to data limitation, there are no empirical studies testing the determinants of group reputation. This work intends to provide a comprehensive analysis of reputational equilibria within coalitions of agents. In order to do so, we design a static and dynamic (over 30 years) study on the universe of coalitions of companies, within the wine market, looking at the role exerted by the characteristics of the coalition itself (its age and size), the rules set and the actions put forward by the group of agents in order to reach and maintain a certain level of collective reputation, and the context in which they operate. Results shed new lights into this ubiquitous phenomenon.reputation, collective reputation, asymmetric information, quality standards, wine.
Sequential Decision Making with Untrustworthy Service Providers
In this paper, we deal with the sequential decision making problem of agents operating in computational economies, where there is uncertainty regarding the trustworthiness of service providers populating the environment. Specifically, we propose a generic Bayesian trust model, and formulate the optimal Bayesian solution to the exploration-exploitation problem facing the agents when repeatedly interacting with others in such environments. We then present a computationally tractable Bayesian reinforcement learning algorithm to approximate that solution by taking into account the expected value of perfect information of an agent's actions. Our algorithm is shown to dramatically outperform all previous finalists of the international Agent Reputation and Trust (ART) competition, including the winner from both years the competition has been run
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Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised
Economists draw important lessons for modern development from the medieval Maghribi traders who, according to Greif, enforced contracts multilaterally through a closed, private-order âcoalitionâ. We show that this view is untenable. The Maghribis used formal legal mechanisms and entered business associations with non-Maghribis. Not a single empirical example adduced by Greif shows that any âcoalitionâ actually existed. The Maghribis cannot be used to argue that the social capital of exclusive networks will facilitate exchange in developing economies. Nor do they provide any support for the cultural theories of economic development and institutional change for which they have been mobilised
International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems
This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the problem of transboundary pollution. It then argues that most actual IEAs can be considered at best as third best solutions. Therefore, three questions are raised: 1) Why is there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions? 2) Which factors determine this difference? 3) Which measures can help to narrow this difference? This article attempts to answer these questions after giving an informal introduction to coalition models.International pollution, International environmental agreements, Treaty design, Coalition theory
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Diffusion of shared goods in consumer coalitions. An agent-based model
This paper focuses on the process of coalition formation conditioning the common decision to adopt a shared good, which cannot be afforded by an average single consumer and whose use cannot be exhausted by any single consumer. An agent based model is developed to study the interplay between these two processes: coalition formation and diffusion of shared goods. Coalition formation is modelled in an evolutionary game theoretic setting, while adoption uses elements from both the Bass and the threshold models. Coalitions formation sets the conditions for adoption, while diffusion influences the consequent formation of coalitions. Results show that both coalitions and diffusion are subject to network effects and have an impact on the information flow though the population of consumers. Large coalitions are preferred over small ones since individual cost is lower, although it increases if higher quantities are purchased collectively. The paper concludes by connecting the model conceptualisation to the on-going discussion of diffusion of sustainable goods, discussing related policy implications
Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-Enforcing Range of Contracts. The Case of French Livestock Industry
Contract enforcement is acknowledged as a major issue in Law and in Economics. Contrasting substitution and complementary perspectives with respect to the role of private versus public enforcement institutions, this article analyses how contract law can support private institutions, and enhance economic efficiency. With multilateral agreements at stake, self-regulation and reputation mechanisms at the core of private ordering have limitations that collective organizations backed by the Law help to overcome. The analysis is substantiated by empirical data from the cattle industry. Our results suggest the need for a broader approach to contract regulation by legal scholars and antitrust-authorities.Contract Law, Private Enforcement, Transaction Costs, Self-Regulation, Coalitions, Cartels, Collective Organization
Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game
We consider a simple dynamic model of environmental taxation that exhibits time inconsistency. There are two categories of firms, Believers, who take the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator's decisions, albeit at a cost. The proportion of Believers and Non- Believers changes over time depending on the relative profits of both groups. We show that the Regulator can use misleading tax announcements to steer the economy to an equilibrium that is Pareto superior to the solutions usually suggested in the literature. Depending upon the initial proportion of Believers, the Regulator may prefer a fast or a low speed of reaction of the firms to differences in Believers/Non-Believers profits.Environmental policy, Emissions taxes, Time inconsistency, Heterogeneous agents, Bounded rationality, Learning, Multiple equilibria, Stackelberg games
Understanding efficiency of agrarian organisation
In this paper we incorporate achievements of interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) into analysis of agrarian organizations and suggest a framework for evaluating efficiency of different governing structures in agriculture. This new approach includes: study of farm and other agrarian organizations as a governing rather than production structure; assessment of comparative efficiency of alternative (market, contract, internal, hybrid) modes of governance; analysis of level of transaction costs and their institutional, behavioral (agents preferences, bounded rationality, tendency for opportunism), dimensional (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity, and appropriability of transactions), and technological factors; determination of effective horizontal and vertical boundaries of farms, and other agrarian organizations; the specification of the economic role of the government and the effective forms of public interventions in agrarian sector. The paper provides new effective tools for improvement of agrarian public policies, farming and business strategies, and academic analysis.agrarian governance, efficiency of farms and agrarian organizations, agrarian policies, transaction costs, new institutional and transaction costs economics
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