Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement

In an effort to control flows of unauthorized information, the major copyright industries are pursuing a range of strategies designed to distribute copyright enforcement functions across a wide range of actors and to embed these functions within communications networks, protocols, and devices. Some of these strategies have received considerable academic and public scrutiny, but much less attention has been paid to the ways in which all of them overlap and intersect with one another. This article offers a framework for theorizing this process. The distributed extension of intellectual property enforcement into private spaces and throughout communications networks can be understood as a new, hybrid species of disciplinary regime that locates the justification for its pervasive reach in a permanent state of crisis. This hybrid regime derives its force neither primarily from centralized authority nor primarily from decentralized, internalized norms, but instead from a set of coordinated processes for authorizing flows of information. Although the success of this project is not yet assured, its odds of success are by no means remote as skeptics have suggested. Power to implement crisis management in the decentralized marketplace for digital content arises from a confluence of private and public interests and is amplified by the dynamics of technical standards processes. The emergent regime of pervasively distributed copyright enforcement has profound implications for the production of the networked information society

The Magnificence of the Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident

Late in 2005, Sony BMG released millions of Compact Discs containing digital rights management technologies that threatened the security of its customers\u27 computers and the integrity of the information infrastructure more broadly. This Article aims to identify the market, technological, and legal factors that appear to have led a presumably rational actor toward a strategy that in retrospect appears obviously and fundamentally misguided. The Article first addresses the market-based rationales that likely influenced Sony BMG\u27s deployment of these DRM systems and reveals that even the most charitable interpretation of Sony BMG\u27s internal strategizing demonstrates a failure to adequately value security and privacy. After taking stock of the then-existing technological environment that both encouraged and enabled the distribution of these protection measures, the Article examines law, the third vector of influence on Sony BMG\u27s decision to release flawed protection measures into the wild, and argues that existing doctrine in the fields of contract, intellectual property, and consumer protection law fails to adequately counter the technological and market forces that allowed a self-interested actor to inflict these harms on the public. The Article concludes with two recommendations aimed at reducing the likelihood of companies deploying protection measures with known security vulnerabilities in the consumer marketplace. First, Congress should alter the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) by creating permanent exemptions from its anti-circumvention and antitrafficking provisions that enable security research and the dissemination of tools to remove harmful protection measures. Second, the Federal Trade Commission should leverage insights from the field of human computer interaction security (HCI-Sec) to develop a stronger framework for user control over the security and privacy aspects of computers

The Magnificence of the Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident

Late in 2005, Sony BMG released millions of Compact Discs containing digital rights management technologies that threatened the security of its customers\u27 computers and the integrity of the information infrastructure more broadly. This Article aims to identify the market, technological, and legal factors that appear to have led a presumably rational actor toward a strategy that in retrospect appears obviously and fundamentally misguided. The Article first addresses the market-based rationales that likely influenced Sony BMG\u27s deployment of these DRM systems and reveals that even the most charitable interpretation of Sony BMG\u27s internal strategizing demonstrates a failure to adequately value security and privacy. After taking stock of the then-existing technological environment that both encouraged and enabled the distribution of these protection measures, the Article examines law, the third vector of influence on Sony BMG\u27s decision to release flawed protection measures into the wild, and argues that existing doctrine in the fields of contract, intellectual property, and consumer protection law fails to adequately counter the technological and market forces that allowed a self-interested actor to inflict these harms on the public. The Article concludes with two recommendations aimed at reducing the likelihood of companies deploying protection measures with known security vulnerabilities in the consumer marketplace. First, Congress should alter the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) by creating permanent exemptions from its anti-circumvention and antitrafficking provisions that enable security research and the dissemination of tools to remove harmful protection measures. Second, the Federal Trade Commission should leverage insights from the field of human computer interaction security (HCI-Sec) to develop a stronger framework for user control over the security and privacy aspects of computers

The Magnificence of the Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident

Late in 2005, Sony BMG released millions of Compact Discs containing digital rights management technologies that threatened the security of its customers\u27 computers and the integrity of the information infrastructure more broadly. This Article aims to identify the market, technological, and legal factors that appear to have led a presumably rational actor toward a strategy that in retrospect appears obviously and fundamentally misguided. The Article first addresses the market-based rationales that likely influenced Sony BMG\u27s deployment of these DRM systems and reveals that even the most charitable interpretation of Sony BMG\u27s internal strategizing demonstrates a failure to adequately value security and privacy. After taking stock of the then-existing technological environment that both encouraged and enabled the distribution of these protection measures, the Article examines law, the third vector of influence on Sony BMG\u27s decision to release flawed protection measures into the wild, and argues that existing doctrine in the fields of contract, intellectual property, and consumer protection law fails to adequately counter the technological and market forces that allowed a self-interested actor to inflict these harms on the public. The Article concludes with two recommendations aimed at reducing the likelihood of companies deploying protection measures with known security vulnerabilities in the consumer marketplace. First, Congress should alter the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) by creating permanent exemptions from its anti-circumvention and antitrafficking provisions that enable security research and the dissemination of tools to remove harmful protection measures. Second, the Federal Trade Commission should leverage insights from the field of human computer interaction security (HCI-Sec) to develop a stronger framework for user control over the security and privacy aspects of computers

Mental health treatment: Reaching more kids

Background: Nearly 70% of children who are in need of specialized mental health services do not access them. We set out to identify effective self-delivered interventions as a way to help bridge the gap between those in need and those being serviced. Methods: We used systematic review methods to identify randomized control trials (RCTs) evaluating self-delivered treatments. After applying our rigorous inclusion criteria, we accepted five RCTs evaluating five treatment interventions. Results: Three self-directed family interventions reduced anxiety diagnoses and symptoms for school age children. One self-directed parenting intervention reduced ADHD diagnoses for school age children. Additionally, one self-directed youth invention reduced depression symptoms for adolescents. Conclusions: Strong research evidence supports the use of self-directed treatments to address three common childhood mental disorders. Greater use of these interventions can expand the number of children who are reached with effective treatments

The Impunity Project of the Inter American Press Association: Final Summary Report 2003-2006

Evaluates the impact of the initiative's rapid response unit, which investigates attacks and provides legal assistance; advertising campaign to make cases visible; and training program to prevent future attacks. Includes case summaries