Local multiresolution order in community detection

Community detection algorithms attempt to find the best clusters of nodes in an arbitrary complex network. Multi-scale ("multiresolution") community detection extends the problem to identify the best network scale(s) for these clusters. The latter task is generally accomplished by analyzing community stability simultaneously for all clusters in the network. In the current work, we extend this general approach to define local multiresolution methods, which enable the extraction of well-defined local communities even if the global community structure is vaguely defined in an average sense. Toward this end, we propose measures analogous to variation of information and normalized mutual information that are used to quantitatively identify the best resolution(s) at the community level based on correlations between clusters in independently-solved systems. We demonstrate our method on two constructed networks as well as a real network and draw inferences about local community strength. Our approach is independent of the applied community detection algorithm save for the inherent requirement that the method be able to identify communities across different network scales, with appropriate changes to account for how different resolutions are evaluated or defined in a particular community detection method. It should, in principle, easily adapt to alternative community comparison measures.Comment: 19 pages, 11 figure

Practical Attacks Against Graph-based Clustering

Graph modeling allows numerous security problems to be tackled in a general way, however, little work has been done to understand their ability to withstand adversarial attacks. We design and evaluate two novel graph attacks against a state-of-the-art network-level, graph-based detection system. Our work highlights areas in adversarial machine learning that have not yet been addressed, specifically: graph-based clustering techniques, and a global feature space where realistic attackers without perfect knowledge must be accounted for (by the defenders) in order to be practical. Even though less informed attackers can evade graph clustering with low cost, we show that some practical defenses are possible.Comment: ACM CCS 201