Fiscal contingency planning for banking crises

There is constant demand for an estimate of the likely fiscal costs of future banking crises, but little precision can be expected in such an estimate. The author shows how information that is typically available to authorities could be used to get a general sense of the order of magnitude of the direct fiscal liability. What is required for such an estimate? 1) Information about the size and composition of the bank's balance sheets. 2) Expert assessments of the accuracy of the accounting data and of specific short-term risks to which the components are known to be subject. The author's method distinguishes between losses that have already crystallized and the changing risks for the immediate future. By including contingency planning for banking collapse in their fiscal calculations, authorities may risk destabilizing expectations or worsening the moral hazard in the system. But the risks of contingency planning generally outweigh the risks of sending confused signals. Insisting on ignorance is a poor way to protect against announcement errors that trigger panic.Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,National Governance

THE BASLE COMMITTEE’S PROPOSALS FOR REVISED CAPITAL STANDARDS: RATIONALE, DESIGN AND POSSIBLE INCIDENCE

The Basle Capital Accord of 1988 was the outcome of an initiative to develop more internationally uniform prudential standards for the capital required for banks´ credit risks. The objectives of the Accord were not only to strengthen the international banking system but also to promote convergence of national capital standards, thus removing competitive inequalities among banks resulting from differences on this front. The key features of this Accord were a common measure of qualifying capital, a common framework for the valuation of bank assets in accordance with their associated credit risks (including those classified as off-balance-sheet), and a minimum level of capital determined by a ratio of 8 per cent of qualifying capital to aggregate risk-weighted assets. The 1988 Basle Agreement was designed to apply to the internationally active banks of member countries of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision but its impact was rapidly felt more widely and by 1999 it formed part of the regime of prudential regulation not only for international but also for strictly domestic banks in more than 100 countries. From its inception the 1988 Basle Accord was the subject of criticisms directed at features such as its failure to make adequate allowance for the degree of reduction in risk exposure achievable through diversification, at the possibility that it would lead banks to restrict their lending, and at its arbitrary and undiscriminating calibration of certain credit risks. In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis other issues of special interest to developing countries also became a focus of attention: firstly, the Accord´s effectiveness in contributing to financial stability in developing countries; and, secondly, the incentives which the Accord was capable of providing to short-term interbank lending, a significant element of the volatile capital movements perceived as having contributed to the crisis.

Responding to the Eurozone Crisis - Applying the Shadow Rating Approach to Determine Economic Capital for Sovereign Exposures

The recent European sovereign-debt crisis has made it clear that exposures towards sovereigns contain credit risk. However, according to the Basel framework's standardized approach banks are not required to hold any regulatory capital for highly rated sovereigns. In response, this thesis develops a shadow rating approach model for sovereign probability of default estimation, subsequently determining economic capital for sovereign exposures within a foundation internal ratings-based framework. Furthermore, the empirical Bayes estimator is utilized for low-default portfolio probability of default calibration. The model is tested on ve homogeneous sub-segments in addition to the entire dataset at hand. Empirical ndings suggest that the full dataset performs adequately overall. Nonetheless, model performance is superior for accurately constructed sub-segments. In addition, economic, monetary and political indicators as well as banking sector health are found to best replicate S&P's sovereign long-term issuer credit ratings

Estimating Systemic Risk in the International Financial System

Using a unique and comprehensive dataset, this paper develops and uses three distinct methods to quantify the risk of a systemic failure in the global banking system. We examine a sample of 334 banks (representing 80% of global bank equity) in 28 countries around 6 global financial crises (such as the Asian and Russian crises and September 11, 2001), and show that these crises did not create large probabilities of global financial system failure. First, we show that cumulative negative abnormal returns for the subset of banks not directly exposed to a negative shock (unexposed banks) rarely exceed a few percent. Second, we use structural models to obtain more precise point estimates of the likelihood of systemic failure. These estimates suggest that systemic risk is limited even during major financial crises. For example, maximum likelihood estimation of bank failure probabilities implied by equity prices suggests the Asian crisis induced less than a 1% increase in the probability of systemic failure. Third, we also obtain estimates of systemic risk implied by equity option prices of U.S. and European banks. The largest values are obtained for the Russian crisis and September 11 and these show increases in estimated average default probabilities of only around 1-2%. Taken together our results suggest statistically significant, but economically small, increases in systemic risk around even the worst financial crises of the last 10 years. Although policy responses are endogenous, the low estimated probabilities suggest that the distress of central bankers, regulators and politicians about the events we study may be overstated, and that current policy responses to financial crises and the existing institutional framework may be adequate to handle major macroeconomic events

Foreign direct investment and country risk: what kind of interaction?

Διπλωματική εργασία--Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2012.The aim of this study is to demonstrate the characteristics of Foreign Direct Investment and Country Risk. Through a theoretical approach, I mention the basic ideas of these two terms and the type of their interaction. In addition I examine the methods, the types and the effects. We are also going to understand how we can overcome country risk, a hazardous situation, in order for the investments to be more efficient and profitable in the host country, as FDI plays an important role in the economic development. In the end, we are going to present an empirical analysis survey in order to understand the relationship between FDI and Country Risk

Complex systems in financial economics: Applications to interbank and stock markets

Complex systems are characterised by strong interaction at the micro level that can induce large changes at the macro level. This thesis applies the theory of complex systems to the interbank market (Part I) and the stock market (Part II). Evidence found in data from the Netherlands and the US makes clear in what sense these markets are complex systems. The observed phenomena are explained by modelling the adaptive behaviour of financial agents, for example how they form their trading relationships or how they choose investment strategies. The applications help to understand the mechanisms behind the emergence of the financial-economic crisis in 2007 and 2008, and relate to the debate on policy measures aiming to prevent a future crisis of this kind