20,013 research outputs found
Risk and Abnormal Returns in Markets for Congestion Revenue Rights
In organized energy markets that use locational pricing, power generators and energy suppliers procure financial transmission rights (FTRs) to hedge against grid con- gestion charges, while third-party speculators attempt to capture a return with these extremely volatile contracts. This paper develops a novel methodology for estimating the systematic risk of individual FTRs and detecting the presence of abnormal returns among these financial instruments. The prevalence of congestion paths with abnormal returns could be used by policy experts as an efficiency measure when assessing the performance of FTR markets. Being the only organized energy market in the Western Interconnection, California has implemented a version of FTRs officially known as congestion revenue rights (CRRs). This paper applies the proposed methodology to all auctioned CRRs from 2009 to 2015. Our analysis identifies the paths that exhibit persistent abnormal returns, with the majority of them being positive. We also compare the patterns of risk and abnormal returns between on-peak and off-peak CRRs, and find no significant differences
Recommended from our members
An Assessment of PIER Electric Grid Research 2003-2014 White Paper
This white paper describes the circumstances in California around the turn of the 21st century that led the California Energy Commission (CEC) to direct additional Public Interest Energy Research funds to address critical electric grid issues, especially those arising from integrating high penetrations of variable renewable generation with the electric grid. It contains an assessment of the beneficial science and technology advances of the resultant portfolio of electric grid research projects administered under the direction of the CEC by a competitively selected contractor, the University of Californiaâs California Institute for Energy and the Environment, from 2003-2014
A Review of the Monitoring of Market Power The Possible Roles of TSOs in Monitoring for Market Power Issues in Congested Transmission Systems
The paper surveys the literature and publicly available information on market power monitoring in electricity wholesale markets. After briefly reviewing definitions, strategies and methods of mitigating market power we examine the various methods of detecting market power that have been employed by academics and market monitors/regulators. These techniques include structural and behavioural indices and analysis as well as various simulation approaches. The applications of these tools range from spot market mitigation and congestion management through to long-term market design assessment and merger decisions. Various market-power monitoring units already track market behaviour and produce indices. Our survey shows that these units collect a large amount of data from various market participants and we identify the crucial role of the transmission system operators with their access to dispatch and system information. Easily accessible and comprehensive data supports effective market power monitoring and facilitates market design evaluation. The discretion required for effective market monitoring is facilitated by institutional independence.Electricity, liberalisation, market power, regulation
Learning from past bids to participate strategically in day-ahead electricity markets
We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context, where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other competing suppliers' bids. Based on the submitted bids, the market operator schedules suppliers to meet demand during each hour and determines hourly market clearing prices. Eventually, this game-theoretic process reaches a Nash equilibrium when no supplier is motivated to modify her bid. However, solving the individual profit maximization problem requires information of rivals' bids, which are typically not available. To address this issue, we develop an inverse optimization approach for estimating rivals' production cost functions given historical market clearing prices and production levels. We then use these functions to bid strategically and compute Nash equilibrium bids. We present numerical experiments illustrating our methodology, showing good agreement between bids based on the estimated production cost functions with the bids based on the true cost functions. We discuss an extension of our approach that takes into account network congestion resulting in location-dependent pricesFirst author draf
Learning from Past Bids to Participate Strategically in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets
We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead
market context where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her
generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given
other competing suppliers' bids. Based on the submitted bids, the market
operator schedules suppliers to meet demand during each hour and determines
hourly market clearing prices. Eventually, this game-theoretic process reaches
a Nash equilibrium when no supplier is motivated to modify her bid. However,
solving the individual profit maximization problem requires information of
rivals' bids, which are typically not available. To address this issue, we
develop an inverse optimization approach for estimating rivals' production cost
functions given historical market clearing prices and production levels. We
then use these functions to bid strategically and compute Nash equilibrium
bids. We present numerical experiments illustrating our methodology, showing
good agreement between bids based on the estimated production cost functions
with the bids based on the true cost functions. We discuss an extension of our
approach that takes into account network congestion resulting in
location-dependent prices
Recommended from our members
Determining Utility System Value of Demand Flexibility From Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings
This report focuses on ways current methods and practices that establish the value to electric utility systems of distributed energy resource (DER) investments can be enhanced to determine the value of demand flexibility in grid-interactive efficient buildings that can provide grid services. The report introduces key valuation concepts that are applicable to demand flexibility that these buildings can provide and links to other documents that describe these concepts and their implementation in more detail.The scope of this report is limited to the valuation of economic benefits to the utility system. These are the foundational values on which other benefits (and costs) can be built. Establishing the economic value to the grid of demand flexibility provides the information needed to design programs, market rules, and rates that align the economic interest of utility customers with building owners and occupants. By nature, DERs directly impact customers and provide societal benefits external to the utility system. Jurisdictions can use utility system benefits and costs as the foundation of their economic analysis but align their primary cost-effectiveness metric with all applicable policy objectives, which may include customer and societal (non-utility system) impacts.This report suggests enhancements to current methods and practices that state and local policymakers, public utility commissions, state energy offices, utilities, state utility consumer representatives, and other stakeholders might support. These enhancements can improve the consistency and robustness of economic valuation of demand flexibility for grid services. The report concludes with a discussion of considerations for prioritizing implementation of these improvements
Quality-Aware Broadcasting Strategies for Position Estimation in VANETs
The dissemination of vehicle position data all over the network is a
fundamental task in Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) operations, as
applications often need to know the position of other vehicles over a large
area. In such cases, inter-vehicular communications should be exploited to
satisfy application requirements, although congestion control mechanisms are
required to minimize the packet collision probability. In this work, we face
the issue of achieving accurate vehicle position estimation and prediction in a
VANET scenario. State of the art solutions to the problem try to broadcast the
positioning information periodically, so that vehicles can ensure that the
information their neighbors have about them is never older than the
inter-transmission period. However, the rate of decay of the information is not
deterministic in complex urban scenarios: the movements and maneuvers of
vehicles can often be erratic and unpredictable, making old positioning
information inaccurate or downright misleading. To address this problem, we
propose to use the Quality of Information (QoI) as the decision factor for
broadcasting. We implement a threshold-based strategy to distribute position
information whenever the positioning error passes a reference value, thereby
shifting the objective of the network to limiting the actual positioning error
and guaranteeing quality across the VANET. The threshold-based strategy can
reduce the network load by avoiding the transmission of redundant messages, as
well as improving the overall positioning accuracy by more than 20% in
realistic urban scenarios.Comment: 8 pages, 7 figures, 2 tables, accepted for presentation at European
Wireless 201
- âŠ