Measuring Agents' Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing ‘overreactions’ to public signals. We present an experiment based on a game of Morris and Shin (2002), in which agents’ optimal actions are a weighted average of the fundamental state and their expectations of other agents’ actions. We measure the responses to public and private signals and find that, on average, subjects put a larger weight on the public signal. However, the weight is smaller than in equilibrium and closer to level-2 reasoning. Stated second order beliefs indicate that subjects underestimate the information contained in public signals about other players’ beliefs, but this can account only for a part of the observed deviation of behavior from equilibrium. In the extreme case of a pure coordination game, subjects still use their private signals, preventing full coordination. Reconsidering the welfare effects of public and private information theoretically, we find for level-2 reasoning that increasing precision of public signals always raises expected welfare, while increasing precision of private signals may reduce expected welfare if coordination is socially desirable.coordination games, strategic uncertainty, private information, public information, higher-order beliefs, levels of reasoning

Overconfidence by Bayesian Rational Agents

This paper derives two mechanisms through which Bayesian-rational individuals with differing priors will tend to be relatively overconfident about their estimates and predictions, in the sense of overestimating the precision of these estimates. The intuition behind one mechanism is slightly ironic: in trying to update optimally, Bayesian agents overweight information of which they over-estimate the precision and underweight in the opposite case. This causes overall an over-estimation of the precision of the final estimate, which tends to increase as agents get more data.

Trends in velocity and policy expectations

U.S. velocity of base money exhibits three distinct trends since 1950. After rising steadily for thirty years, it flattens out in the 1980s and falls substantially in the 1990s. This paper explores whether the observed secular movements in velocity can be accounted for exclusively by endogenous responses to changing expectations about monetary and fiscal policy. We use a model with two key features: a substitute for money in transactions and an array of assets that includes money, nominal bonds, and physical capital. The model maps policy expectations into portfolio decisions, making equilibrium velocity a function of expected future money growth, tax rates, and government spending. When expectations are estimated using Bayesian updating, simulated velocity matches the trends in actual velocity surprisingly well.Macroeconomics ; Money supply ; Monetary policy ; Velocity of money

A MEASURE OF THE VALUE OF INFORMATION FOR THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER PRICE UNCERTAINTY

This paper addresses the problem of measuring the value of information to an agent in an environment where the agent is risk averse and choices are base on the utility of income and personal beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain outcomesRisk and Uncertainty,

Expectations, Learning and Macroeconomic Persistence

This paper presents an estimated model with learning and provides evidence that learning can improve the fit of popular monetary DSGE models and endogenously generate realistic levels of persistence. The paper starts with an agnostic view, developing a model that nests learning and some of the structural sources of persistence, such as habit formation in consumption and inflation indexation, that are typically needed in monetary models with rational expectations to match the persistence of macroeconomic variables. I estimate the model by likelihood-based Bayesian methods, which allow the estimation of the learning gain coefficient jointly with the "deep" parameters of the economy. The empirical results show that when learning replaces rational expectations, the estimated degrees of habits and indexation drop near zero. This ?nding suggests that persistence arises in the model economy mainly from expectations and learning. The posterior model probabilities show that the specification with learning fits significantly better than does the specification with rational expectations. Finally, if learning rather than mechanical sources of persistence provides a more appropriate representation of the economy, the implied optimal policy will be different. The policymaker will also incur substantial costs from misspecifying private expectations formation.Persistence, Constant-gain learning, Expectations, Habit formation in consumption, Inflation inertia; Phillips curve; Bayesian econometrics; New-Keynesian model.

Expectations, Learning and Macroeconomic Persistence

This paper presents an estimated model with learning and provides evidence that learning can improve the fit of popular monetary DSGE models and endogenously generate realistic levels of persistence. The paper starts with an agnostic view, developing a model that nests learning and some of the structural sources of persistence, such as habit formation in consumption and inflation indexation, that are typically needed in monetary models with rational expectations to match the persistence of macroeconomic variables. I estimate the model by likelihood-based Bayesian methods, which allow the estimation of the learning gain coefficient jointly with the `deep' parameters of the economy. The empirical results show that when learning replaces rational expectations, the estimated degrees of habits and indexation drop near zero. This finding suggests that persistence arises in the model economy mainly from expectations and learning. The posterior model probabilities show that the specification with learning fits significantly better than does the specification with rational expectations. Finally, if learning rather than mechanical sources of persistence provides a more appropriate representation of the economy, the implied optimal policy will be different. The policymaker will also incur substantial costs from misspecifying private expectations formation.persistence, constant-gain learning, expectations, habit formation in consumption, inflation inertia, Phillips curve, Bayesian econometrics, New-Keynesian model.