Moore v. State Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 39523

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1556/thumbnail.jp

Companions in Guilt Arguments and Moore's Paradox

In a series of articles Christopher Cowie has provided what he calls a ‘Master Argument’ against the Companions in Guilt defence of moral objectivity. In what follows I defend the CG strategy against Cowie. I show, firstly, that epistemic judgements are relevantly similar to moral judgements, and secondly, that it is not possible coherently to deny the existence of irreducible and categorically normative epistemic reasons. My argument for the second of these claims exploits an analogy between the thesis that epistemic norms are non-categorical and G.E. Moore’s paradox concerning first personal belief ascriptions. I argue that the absurdity of the assertion “I have evidence that p but no reason to believe it” shows that the norms of belief are categorical. I then consider the counter-argument that this categoricity is a ‘conceptual’ rather than an ‘objective’ requirement. By drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis, I show that this counter-argument is unsuccessful. Putnam is one of the original proponents of the Companions in Guilt strategy. Thus, by supporting the CG argument through appeal to other Putnamian theses, I show that its insights can only fully be appreciated in the context of broader metaphysical and semantic lessons

Bulletin of Information 1913-1914

Annual bulletin lists purpose of the school, faculty, students, degrees conferred, curriculum (course of studies), course schedule (lecture hours), system of instruction, tuition costs and fees, scholarships, requirements for admission & degree, bar admission, registration statistics, Fifth Annual Commencementhttps://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/bulletins/1007/thumbnail.jp

Biotechnology and the Legal Constitution of the Self: Managing Identity in Science, the Market, and Society

This article considers how certain ideas underlying the tort of appropriation may enable use more effectively to deal with the problems presented by a case such Moore v. Regents of the University of California which dealt with property rights of Moore’s spleen cells. First, the author explores how the tort of appropriation of identity opens up new approaches to inform and perhaps supplement principles of property law as a guide to managing genetic information or other materials that seem intimately bound up with a particular human subject. Secondly, the author analyzes how the various opinions produced by the Supreme Court implicitly elaborate a powerful and problematic relation between the spheres of private life, science and the market, such that the science is granted special status and power relative to the other two – or rather, how the Supreme Court effectively exploits the social status of science to expand the reach of the market into the private sphere of control over the body. Finally, the author considers how the Appellate Court’s discussion of appropriation of identity suggests possible new avenues to pursue regarding the legal recognition and management of both individual and group identity