An empirical learning-based validation procedure for simulation workflow

Simulation workflow is a top-level model for the design and control of simulation process. It connects multiple simulation components with time and interaction restrictions to form a complete simulation system. Before the construction and evaluation of the component models, the validation of upper-layer simulation workflow is of the most importance in a simulation system. However, the methods especially for validating simulation workflow is very limit. Many of the existing validation techniques are domain-dependent with cumbersome questionnaire design and expert scoring. Therefore, this paper present an empirical learning-based validation procedure to implement a semi-automated evaluation for simulation workflow. First, representative features of general simulation workflow and their relations with validation indices are proposed. The calculation process of workflow credibility based on Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is then introduced. In order to make full use of the historical data and implement more efficient validation, four learning algorithms, including back propagation neural network (BPNN), extreme learning machine (ELM), evolving new-neuron (eNFN) and fast incremental gaussian mixture model (FIGMN), are introduced for constructing the empirical relation between the workflow credibility and its features. A case study on a landing-process simulation workflow is established to test the feasibility of the proposed procedure. The experimental results also provide some useful overview of the state-of-the-art learning algorithms on the credibility evaluation of simulation models

Methods in Psychological Research

Psychologists collect empirical data with various methods for different reasons. These diverse methods have their strengths as well as weaknesses. Nonetheless, it is possible to rank them in terms of different critieria. For example, the experimental method is used to obtain the least ambiguous conclusion. Hence, it is the best suited to corroborate conceptual, explanatory hypotheses. The interview method, on the other hand, gives the research participants a kind of emphatic experience that may be important to them. It is for the reason the best method to use in a clinical setting. All non-experimental methods owe their origin to the interview method. Quasi-experiments are suited for answering practical questions when ecological validity is importa

Dynamic geometry, implication and abduction: a case study

In this paper we illustrate the role of dynamic geometry as an environment that propitiates the use of empirical explorations to favor learning to prove. This is possible thanks to abductive processes, related to the establishment of implications that university students of a plane geometry course carry out when, supported by a dynamic geometry program, they solve a problem in which they must discover a geometric fact, formulate a conjecture and prove it

Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?

My topic is moderate modal skepticism in the spirit of Peter van Inwagen. Here understood, this is a conservative version of modal empiricism that severely limits the extent to which an ordinary agent can reasonably believe “exotic” possibility claims. I offer a novel argument in support of this brand of skepticism: modal skepticism grounds an attractive (and novel) reply to Humean skepticism. Thus, I propose that modal skepticism be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility as a tool for dissolving philosophical paradox

Item-writing Rules: Collective Wisdom

In student assessment, teachers place the greatest weight on tests they have constructed themselves and have an equally great interest in the quality of those tests. To increase the validity of teacher-made tests, many item-writing rules-of-thumb are available in the literature, but few rules have been tested experimentally. In light of the paucity of empirical studies, the validity of any given guideline might best be established by relying on experts. This study analyzed twenty classroom assessment textbooks to identify a consensus list of item-writing rules. Forty rules for which there was agreement among textbook authors are presented. The rules address four different validity concerns-potentially confusing wording or ambiguous requirements, the problem of guessing, test-taking efficiency, and controlling for testwiseness

Forensic science expertise for international criminal proceedings: an old problem, a new context and a pragmatic resolution

Expert witness testimony provides an important source of information for international criminal proceedings, and forensic science expertise from mass graves is no exception: findings from exhumations and examinations have featured in the ad hoc tribunals’ trials and judgments. Whilst the issues surrounding the law-science relationship have been explored within the realm of national legal systems, the mixed system adopted by these tribunals presents an established discussion with a new context. Using forensic archaeology as an example, this article explores some theoretical underpinnings and practical realities surrounding the use of forensic science during international criminal investigations into mass graves before looking at how Trial Chambers aim to establish the relevance and credibility of forensic science evidence. As little guidance regarding admissibility of expert evidence is provided, it is through the case-specific legal process of cross-examination and presentation of counter-expertise that methodological issues are resolved. This, together with reliance on normative principles, is the pragmatic approach adopted to discern reliability of expert opinion

What Makes Logical Truths True?

The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control the process of deduction in inquiry, i.e., they are prescriptive for the use of language and thought in inquiry, I argue that logic may, and should, be seen as an instrument or as a way of proceeding (modus procedendi) in inquiry