Ernst Schroeder and Zermelo’s Anticipation of Russell’s Paradox

Ernst Zermelo presented an argument showing that there is no set of all sets that are members of themselves in a letter to Edmund Husserl on April 16th of 1902, and so just barely anticipated the same contradiction in Betrand Russell’s letter to Frege from June 16th of that year. This paper traces the origins of Zermelo’s paradox in Husserl’s criticisms of a peculiar argument in Ernst Schroeder’s 1890 Algebra der Logik. Frege had also criticized that argument in his 1985 “A Critical Elucidation of Some Points in E. Schroeder Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik”, but did not see the paradox that Zermelo found. Alonzo Church, in “Schroeder’s Anticipation of the Simple Theory of Types” from 1939, cricized Frege’s treatment of Schroeder’s views, but did not identify the connection with Russell’s paradox

Boltzmann's H-theorem, its limitations, and the birth of (fully) statistical mechanics

A comparison is made of the traditional Loschmidt (reversibility) and Zermelo (recurrence) objections to Boltzmann's H-theorem, and its simplified variant in the Ehrenfests' 1912 wind-tree model. The little-cited 1896 (pre-recurrence) objection of Zermelo (similar to an 1889 argument due to Poincare) is also analysed. Significant differences between the objections are highlighted, and several old and modern misconceptions concerning both them and the H-theorem are clarified. We give particular emphasis to the radical nature of Poincare's and Zermelo's attack, and the importance of the shift in Boltzmann's thinking in response to the objections as a whole.Comment: 40 page

In memoriam Kurt Go¨del: His 1931 correspondence with zermelo on his incompletability theorem

SummariesShortly after publishing his now famous incompletability theorem in 1931, Kurt Go¨del and Ernst Zermelo corresponded about the nature and significance of Go¨del's result. The texts of the surviving letters are presented, preceded by an explanation of the circumstances of the correspondence and an indication of the historical significance of the points discussed

Computability and Algorithmic Complexity in Economics

This is an outline of the origins and development of the way computability theory and algorithmic complexity theory were incorporated into economic and finance theories. We try to place, in the context of the development of computable economics, some of the classics of the subject as well as those that have, from time to time, been credited with having contributed to the advancement of the field. Speculative thoughts on where the frontiers of computable economics are, and how to move towards them, conclude the paper. In a precise sense - both historically and analytically - it would not be an exaggeration to claim that both the origins of computable economics and its frontiers are defined by two classics, both by Banach and Mazur: that one page masterpiece by Banach and Mazur ([5]), built on the foundations of Turing’s own classic, and the unpublished Mazur conjecture of 1928, and its unpublished proof by Banach ([38], ch. 6 & [68], ch. 1, #6). For the undisputed original classic of computable economics is Rabinís effectivization of the Gale-Stewart game ([42];[16]); the frontiers, as I see them, are defined by recursive analysis and constructive mathematics, underpinning computability over the computable and constructive reals and providing computable foundations for the economist’s Marshallian penchant for curve-sketching ([9]; [19]; and, in general, the contents of Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. 219, Issue 1-2). The former work has its roots in the Banach-Mazur game (cf. [38], especially p.30), at least in one reading of it; the latter in ([5]), as well as other, earlier, contributions, not least by Brouwer.

Uncomputability and Undecidability in Economic Theory

Economic theory, game theory and mathematical statistics have all increasingly become algorithmic sciences. Computable Economics, Algorithmic Game Theory ([28]) and Algorithmic Statistics ([13]) are frontier research subjects. All of them, each in its own way, are underpinned by (classical) recursion theory - and its applied branches, say computational complexity theory or algorithmic information theory - and, occasionally, proof theory. These research paradigms have posed new mathematical and metamathematical questions and, inadvertently, undermined the traditional mathematical foundations of economic theory. A concise, but partial, pathway into these new frontiers is the subject matter of this paper. Interpreting the core of mathematical economic theory to be defined by General Equilibrium Theory and Game Theory, a general - but concise - analysis of the computable and decidable content of the implications of these two areas are discussed. Issues at the frontiers of macroeconomics, now dominated by Recursive Macroeconomic Theory, are also tackled, albeit ultra briefly. The point of view adopted is that of classical recursion theory and varieties of constructive mathematics.General Equilibrium Theory, Game Theory, Recursive Macro-economics, (Un)computability, (Un)decidability, Constructivity

Cantorian Infinity and Philosophical Concepts of God

It is often alleged that Cantor’s views about how the set theoretic universe as a whole should be considered are fundamentally unclear. In this article we argue that Cantor’s views on this subject, at least up until around 1896, are relatively clear, coherent, and interesting. We then go on to argue that Cantor’s views about the set theoretic universe as a whole have implications for theology that have hitherto not been sufficiently recognised. However, the theological implications in question, at least as articulated here, would not have satisfied Cantor himself