Beyond Language Equivalence on Visibly Pushdown Automata

We study (bi)simulation-like preorder/equivalence checking on the class of visibly pushdown automata and its natural subclasses visibly BPA (Basic Process Algebra) and visibly one-counter automata. We describe generic methods for proving complexity upper and lower bounds for a number of studied preorders and equivalences like simulation, completed simulation, ready simulation, 2-nested simulation preorders/equivalences and bisimulation equivalence. Our main results are that all the mentioned equivalences and preorders are EXPTIME-complete on visibly pushdown automata, PSPACE-complete on visibly one-counter automata and P-complete on visibly BPA. Our PSPACE lower bound for visibly one-counter automata improves also the previously known DP-hardness results for ordinary one-counter automata and one-counter nets. Finally, we study regularity checking problems for visibly pushdown automata and show that they can be decided in polynomial time.Comment: Final version of paper, accepted by LMC

A Spatial-Epistemic Logic for Reasoning about Security Protocols

Reasoning about security properties involves reasoning about where the information of a system is located, and how it evolves over time. While most security analysis techniques need to cope with some notions of information locality and knowledge propagation, usually they do not provide a general language for expressing arbitrary properties involving local knowledge and knowledge transfer. Building on this observation, we introduce a framework for security protocol analysis based on dynamic spatial logic specifications. Our computational model is a variant of existing pi-calculi, while specifications are expressed in a dynamic spatial logic extended with an epistemic operator. We present the syntax and semantics of the model and logic, and discuss the expressiveness of the approach, showing it complete for passive attackers. We also prove that generic Dolev-Yao attackers may be mechanically determined for any deterministic finite protocol, and discuss how this result may be used to reason about security properties of open systems. We also present a model-checking algorithm for our logic, which has been implemented as an extension to the SLMC system.Comment: In Proceedings SecCo 2010, arXiv:1102.516

Closed nominal rewriting and efficiently computable nominal algebra equality

We analyse the relationship between nominal algebra and nominal rewriting, giving a new and concise presentation of equational deduction in nominal theories. With some new results, we characterise a subclass of equational theories for which nominal rewriting provides a complete procedure to check nominal algebra equality. This subclass includes specifications of the lambda-calculus and first-order logic.Comment: In Proceedings LFMTP 2010, arXiv:1009.218