362,395 research outputs found
Twoâperiod supply chain coordination strategies with ambidextrous sustainable innovations
This study considers a manufacturer with ambidextrous sustainable innovation capability selling products in environmentally conscious market through an independent retailer in a twoâperiod game setting. We design a twoâperiod game theoretic and dyadic supply chain (SC) model considering exploitative and exploratory nature of environmental innovations. We study five different contract types, namely, wholesale price contract, vertical Nash game structure, cost sharing contract, revenue sharing contract and twoâpart tariff contract. We demonstrate the impact of market sensitivity towards sustainable innovation and cost parameters on optimal level of decision parameters. The equilibrium results reveal that a suitably designed twoâpart tariff contract can be used to achieve coordination in a fragmented SC. The equilibrium results assist managers to optimise the SC based on the twoâperiod contract model. The results obtained in this study can help the decisionâmakers to take decisions on investment in the ambidextrous sustainable innovation under different types of contract structures
Complementary Patents and Market Structure
Many high technology goods are based on standards that require several essential patents owned by different IP holders. This gives rise to a complements and a double mark-up problem. We compare the welfare effects of two different business strategies dealing with these problems. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always benefits from entry and innovatio
Optimal design and optimal control of structures undergoing finite rotations and elastic deformations
In this work we deal with the optimal design and optimal control of
structures undergoing large rotations. In other words, we show how to find the
corresponding initial configuration and the corresponding set of multiple load
parameters in order to recover a desired deformed configuration or some
desirable features of the deformed configuration as specified more precisely by
the objective or cost function. The model problem chosen to illustrate the
proposed optimal design and optimal control methodologies is the one of
geometrically exact beam. First, we present a non-standard formulation of the
optimal design and optimal control problems, relying on the method of Lagrange
multipliers in order to make the mechanics state variables independent from
either design or control variables and thus provide the most general basis for
developing the best possible solution procedure. Two different solution
procedures are then explored, one based on the diffuse approximation of
response function and gradient method and the other one based on genetic
algorithm. A number of numerical examples are given in order to illustrate both
the advantages and potential drawbacks of each of the presented procedures.Comment: 35 pages, 11 figure
Bailouts in a common market: a strategic approach
Governments in the EU grant Rescue and Restructure Subsidies to bail out ailing firms. In an international asymmetric Cournot duopoly we study effects of such subsidies on market structure and welfare. We adopt a common market setting, where consumers from the two countries form one market. We show that the subsidy is positive also when it fails to prevent the exit. The reason is a strategic effect, which forces the more efficient firm to make additional cost-reducing effort. When the exit is prevented, allocative and productive efficiencies are lower and the only gaining player is the rescued firm
A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition
This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while
the upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We compare the welfare effects of upstream versus downstream deregulation policies and show that the impact of deregulation may be overvalued when ignoring feedback effects from the other market. Furthermore, we analyze how different forms of vertical restraints influence the endogenous market structure and show when they are welfare enhancing
Auctions for private congestible infrastructures
This paper investigates regulation by auctions of private supply of congestible infrastructures in two networks settings: 1) two serial facilities, where the consumer has to use both in order to consume; and 2) two parallel facilities that are imperfect substitutes. There are four market structures: a monopoly and 3 duopolies that differ in how firms interact. The effects of an auction depend on what the bidders compete. With a bid auction, the bidders compete on how much money they transfer to the government. This auction leads to the same outcome as the unregulated game (for a given market structure), since this gives the maximum profit to transfer. An auction on the capacity of a facility leads to an even lower welfare than no regulation, because firms set very high capacities and usage fees. Conversely, an auction on generalised price or number of users leads to the first-best outcome. Moreover, these two auctions are robust: they attain the first-best regardless of whether the facilities are auctioned off to a single firm or to two firms, and for all market and network structures. On the contrary, the performances (relative to the first-best) of the bid and capacity auctions strongly depend on these considerations
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