Optimal Pricing Strategies and Customers’ Equilibrium Behavior in an Unobservable M/M/1 Queueing System with Negative Customers and Repair

This work investigates the optimal pricing strategies of a server and the equilibrium behavior of customers in an unobservable M/M/1 queueing system with negative customers and repair. In this work, we consider two pricing schemes. The first is termed the ex-post payment scheme, where the server charges a price that is proportional to the time spent by a customer in the system. The second scheme is the ex-ante payment scheme, where the server charges a flat rate for all services. Based on the reward-cost structure, the server (or system manager) should make optimal pricing decisions in order to maximize its expected profit per time unit in each payment scheme. This study also investigates equilibrium joining/balking behavior under the server’s optimal pricing strategies in the two pricing schemes. We show, given a customer’s equilibrium, that the two pricing schemes are perfectly identical from an economic point of view. Finally, we illustrate the effect of several system parameters on the optimal joining probabilities, the optimal price, and the equilibrium behavior via numerical examples

Sharing delay information in service systems: a literature survey

Service providers routinely share information about upcoming waiting times with their customers, through delay announcements. The need to effectively manage the provision of these announcements has led to a substantial growth in the body of literature which is devoted to that topic. In this survey paper, we systematically review the relevant literature, summarize some of its key ideas and findings, describe the main challenges that the different approaches to the problem entail, and formulate research directions that would be interesting to consider in future work

Strategic behaviour in queueing systems in alternating environment

Σε αυτήν την εργασία μελετάμε τη στρατηγική συμπεριφορά πελατών που φθάνουν σε ένα σύστημα αναμονής το οποίο εξελίσσεται σε εναλλασσόμενο περιβάλλον, δηλαδή σε ένα σύστημα που ο ρυθμός άφιξης πελατών αλλά και ο ρυθμός εξυπηρέτησης μεταβάλλεται. Εισάγοντας μια δομή αμοιβής-κόστους στο σύστημα, εξετάζουμε τη συμπεριφορά των πελατών όταν τους επιτρέπεται να αποφασίσουν για τις ενέργειές τους μέσα στο σύστημα. Χρησιμοποιώντας εργαλεία από τη θεωρία παιγνίων και τη θεωρία ουρών μελετάμε τρία συστήματα αναμονής που εξελίσσονται σε εναλλασσόμενο περιβάλλον με σκοπό την εύρεση στρατηγικών ισορροπίας και κοινωνικά βέλτιστων στρατηγικών.In this essay we study the behaviour of customers in a queueing system in alternating environment, where the arrival and the service rate are alternating between two or more states. By inserting a reward-cost structure in the system we examine the arriving customers behaviour while they are free to decide their actions in the system. Using tools from game theory an queueing theory we study three queueing systems in alternating environment in order to find equillibrium and socially optimal strategies

Containment of socially optimal policies in multiple-facility Markovian queueing systems

We consider a Markovian queueing system with N heterogeneous service facilities, each of which has multiple servers available, linear holding costs, a fixed value of service and a first-come-first-serve queue discipline. Customers arriving in the system can be either rejected or sent to one of the N facilities. Two different types of control policies are considered, which we refer to as ‘selfishly optimal’ and ‘socially optimal’. We prove the equivalence of two different Markov Decision Process formulations, and then show that classical M/M/1 queue results from the early literature on behavioural queueing theory can be generalized to multiple dimensions in an elegant way. In particular, the state space of the continuous-time Markov process induced by a socially optimal policy is contained within that of the selfishly optimal policy. We also show that this result holds when customers are divided into an arbitrary number of heterogeneous classes, provided that the service rates remain non-discriminatory

Equilibrium Customer Strategies in the Single-Server Constant Retrial Queue with Breakdowns and Repairs

We consider a single-server constant retrial queueing system with a Poisson arrival process and exponential service and retrial times, in which the server may break down when it is working. The lifetime of the server is assumed to be exponentially distributed and once the server breaks down, it will be sent for repair immediately and the repair time is also exponentially distributed. There is no waiting space in front of the server and arriving customers decide whether to enter the retrial orbit or to balk depending on the available information they get upon arrival. In the paper, Nash equilibrium analysis for customers’ joining strategies as well as the related social and profit maximization problems is investigated. We consider separately the partially observable case where an arriving customer knows the state of the server but does not observe the exact number of customers waiting for service and the fully observable case where customer gets informed not only about the state of the server but also about the exact number of customers in the orbit. Some numerical examples are presented to illustrate the effect of the information levels and several parameters on the customers’ equilibrium and optimal strategies

Non-Cooperative Spectrum Access -- The Dedicated vs. Free Spectrum Choice

We consider a dynamic spectrum access system in which Secondary Users (SUs) choose to either acquire dedicated spectrum or to use spectrum-holes (white spaces) which belong to Primary Users (PUs). The trade-off incorporated in this decision is between immediate yet costly transmission and free but delayed transmission (a consequence of both the possible appearance of PUs and sharing the spectrum holes with multiple SUs). We first consider a system with a single PU band, in which the SU decisions are fixed. Employing queueing-theoretic methods, we obtain explicit expressions for the expected delays associated with using the PU band. Based on that, we then consider self-interested SUs and study the interaction between them as a non-cooperative game. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and characterize the equilibrium behavior explicitly. Using our equilibrium results, we show how to maximize revenue from renting dedicated bands to SUs and briefly discuss the extension of our model to multiple PUs. Finally, since spectrum sensing can be resource-consuming, we characterize the gains provided by this capability.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-0915988)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-0916263)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CNS-1054856)National Science Foundation (U.S.). Engineering Research Centers Program (Center for Integrated Access Networks Grant EEC-0812072)United States. Office of Naval Research (Grant N00014-12-1-0064)United States. Army Research Office. Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (Grant W911NF-08-1-0238

Information design in service systems and online markets

In mechanism design, the firm has an advantage over its customers in its knowledge of the state of the system, which can affect the utilities of all players. This poses the question: how can the firm utilize that information (and not additional financial incentives) to persuade customers to take actions that lead to higher revenue (or other firm utility)? When the firm is constrained to ``cheap talk,'' and cannot credibly commit to a manner of signaling, the firm cannot change customer behavior in a meaningful way. Instead, we allow firm to commit to how they will signal in advance. Customers can then trust the signals they receive and act on their realization. This thesis contains the work of three papers, each of which applies information design to service systems and online markets. We begin by examining how a firm could signal a queue's length to arriving, impatient customers in a service system. We show that the choice of an optimal signaling mechanism can be written as a infinite linear program and then show an intuitive form for its optimal solution. We show that with the optimal fixed price and optimal signaling, a firm can generate the same revenue as it could with an observable queue and length-dependent variable prices. Next, we study demand and inventory signaling in online markets: customers make strategic purchasing decisions, knowing the price will decrease if an item does not sell out. The firm aims to convince customers to buy now at a higher price. We show that the optimal signaling mechanism is public, and sends all customers the same information. Finally, we consider customers whose ex ante utility is not simply their expected ex post utility, but instead a function of its distribution. We bound the number of signals needed for the firm to generate their optimal utility and provide a convex program reduction of the firm's problem

Operational Decision Making under Uncertainty: Inferential, Sequential, and Adversarial Approaches

Modern security threats are characterized by a stochastic, dynamic, partially observable, and ambiguous operational environment. This dissertation addresses such complex security threats using operations research techniques for decision making under uncertainty in operations planning, analysis, and assessment. First, this research develops a new method for robust queue inference with partially observable, stochastic arrival and departure times, motivated by cybersecurity and terrorism applications. In the dynamic setting, this work develops a new variant of Markov decision processes and an algorithm for robust information collection in dynamic, partially observable and ambiguous environments, with an application to a cybersecurity detection problem. In the adversarial setting, this work presents a new application of counterfactual regret minimization and robust optimization to a multi-domain cyber and air defense problem in a partially observable environment