29,832 research outputs found

    THE BUCKET BRIGADE PRICING AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES IN PEER-TO-PEER COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS

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    This Paper analyzes the pric ing of transit traffic in wireless peer-to-peer networks using the concepts of direct and indirect network externalities. We first establish that without any pricing mechanism, congestion externalities overwhelm other network effects in a wireless data network. We show that peering technology will mitigate the congestion and allow users to take advantage of more the positive network externalities. However, without pricing, the peering equilibrium breaks down just like a bucket brigade made up of free-riding agents. With pricing and perfect competition, a peering equilibrium is possible and allows many more users on the network at the same time. However, the congestion externality is still a problem, so peering organized through a club may be the best solution.

    Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities

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    This paper analyses a two-sided market in which two platforms compete against each other. One side, the advertisers, exerts a negative externality on the ther side, the users. It is shown that if platforms can charge advertisers only, a higher degree of competition for users can lead to higher profits because competition on the advertisers' side is reduced. If platforms can charge users as well, profits might increase or decrease, the latter because of increased competition through the additional instrument of the user fee. Nevertheless the equilibrium with user fee is more efficient

    Pricing in networks

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    This paper studies optimal pricing in networks in the presence of local consumption or price externalities. It analyzes the relation between prices and nodal centrality measures. Using an asymptotic approach, it shows that the ranking of optimal prices and strategies can be reduced to the lexicographic ranking of a specific vector of nodal characteristics. In particular, this result shows that with positive consumption externalities, prices are higher at nodes with higher degree, and with relative price externalities, prices are higher at nodes which have more neighbors of smaller degree.Social Networks, Network Externalities, Oligopolies

    Теоретические аспекты построения оптимальной системы транспортного налогообложения

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    Целью данной статьи является анализ теоретико-методологических основ построения оптимальной системы транспортного налогообложения с выделением классификационных признаков, функций и принципов построения такой системы. В работе систематизированы экономические воззрения на природу транспортных налогов и представлен генезис транспортного налогообложения. Аргументируется, что генезис исследований в области транспортного налогообложения состоял в развитии экономических обоснований величин компенсаций, развивавшихся по логике от частного к общему, т. е. от компенсации за пользование отдельными объектами дорожно-транспортной сети до обоснования компенсации совокупности всех отрицательных экстерналий и всей дорожно-транспортной сети. Систематизируются функции транспортного налогообложения, проводится анализ двух основных функций: фискальной и регулирующей. Доказывается, что регулирующая функция в транспортном налогообложении является паритетно значимой, анализируются отрицательные внешние эффекты, связанные с форсированной автомобилизацией населения. Кроме того, обосновывается, что чистые общественные блага, используемые при эксплуатации автотранспорта, в процессе массовой автомобилизации трансформируются в смешанные блага, которые в свою очередь сохраняют свойство неисключаемости, но отличаются конкурентностью в потреблении. В результате исследования разработана оригинальная классификация транспортных налогов по основным классификационным признакам, представлены классификации по видам и характеру транспортных платежей, стадиям жизненного цикла транспортного средства, способу взимания платежа, характеру влияния на интенсивность использования транспортного средства и цели его использования. Предлагается система принципов оптимального транспортного налогообложения, включающая известные и оригинальные принципы, развиваются принцип выгоды в транспортном налогообложении и принцип социального оптимума. Сформулированы оригинальные принципы: комплексности, дифференциации, приближенности платежа к услуге, принцип маркировки.The purpose of this article is to analyze the theoretical and methodological basis of building an optimal transport taxation system. That includes establishing classification criteria, functions and principles of building the system. The article systematizes economic views on the nature of transport taxes and outlines the genesis of transport taxation. The article substantiates that the genesis of studies on transport taxation involved the development of economic measures of the size of compensation which followed the special-to-general model, that is, from compensation for the use of particular road network facilities to compensation for the entirety of negative externalities and the use of the whole road network. The article systemizes functions of transport taxation and analyses its two main functions: fiscal and regulatory ones. The article rationalizes that the regulatory function in transport taxation is equally significant. The article analyzes negative external effects resulting from accelerated growth in car ownership. In addition, it substantiates that pure public benefits relating to motor vehicle use tend to transform into mixed benefits in the course of mass car ownership, which, in turn, remain non-excludable, but become rivalrous in consumption. The work presents an original classification of transport taxes based on the main classification criteria. Transport taxes are classified based on types and designation of transport payments, stages of the life cycle of a motor vehicle, the way the tax is levied, the influence it has on the intensity of car use and the purpose of revenue spending. The work offers a system of principles of optimal transport taxation consisting of well-known and new ones. The article further develops the benefit principle in transport taxation as well as the social optimum principle. In addition, it provides definitions for original principles identified by the author: the principle of comprehensiveness, the principle of differentiation, the principle of payment collection at time of service, and the principle of designation

    Modelling Transport in an Interregional General Equilibrium Model with Externalities

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    In this working paper the regional impacts of road pricing on cars are analysed taking into account externality effects from transportation on wages and productivity. In the paper the direct impacts from changes in transport costs on level of wages and productivity (=direct externality effects) have been estimated. The direct and derived impacts of road pricing have been analysed with AKF’s local economic model LINE and include the impacts on regional production, income and employment. LINE is an interregional general equilibrium model, which uses an interregional social accounting matrix (SAM-K) and a regional transport satellite account as the basis for modelling. Additionally, data from a GIS-system (Technical University of Copenhagen) on transport costs have been included to estimate the demand for transport commodities and increase in transport demand and costs due to road pricing. The direct effects on level of wages and productivity have been included into the model together with all the direct effects on commodity prices from road pricing. In the working paper the total impacts of road pricing have been subdivided into 2 components: 1) The wage effects of reducing income net of commuting of increasing transport cost by introduction of road pricing, 2) the labour contraction effect from increasing wages through increase in commuting cost and 3) the negative productivity effects of introducing road pricing. In total the impacts of road pricing are substantial. Regions with high level of average commuting cost (suburban areas in Greater Copenhagen) suffers most, whereas the centre of Copenhagen suffers least because of short commuting distances. In rural areas impacts are on or just below average because low level of road pricing.

    Platform Ownership

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    Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We develop a general theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers interact. The platform may be owned by a single large, or many small independent or vertically integrated intermediaries. We provide a positive and normative analysis of the impact of platform ownership structure on platform size. The strength of network effects is important in the ranking of ownership structures by induced platform size and welfare. While vertical integration may be welfare-enhancing if network effects are weak, monopoly platform ownership is socially preferred if they are strong. These are also the ownership structures likely to emerge

    Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities

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    This paper analyses a two-sided market in which two platforms compete against each other. One side, the advertisers, exerts a negative externality on the ther side, the users. It is shown that if platforms can charge advertisers only, a higher degree of competition for users can lead to higher profits because competition on the advertisers' side is reduced. If platforms can charge users as well, profits might increase or decrease, the latter because of increased competition through the additional instrument of the user fee. Nevertheless the equilibrium with user fee is more efficient.Negative Externalities ; Price Competition ; Two-Sided Markets
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