Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology and the Issue of Knowledge Productivity

Since Locke, empiricism has sought to deduce the knowledge of the world in one way or the other from sense experience. The aim of this episiemology has been twofold; to justify and deduce the truth of nature from sensory evidence and to define those truths in terms of observation and logico mathematical auxiliaries. The chief aim of which is to attain absolute certainly in our knowledge of the world. However, Ouine observes that this attempt of normative or traditional epistemology to provide a foundation of science has failed because all efforts of the empiricist philosophers have not been productive. Quine concludes on this basis that traditional epistemology can never produce knowledge or criterion of knowing. He therefore calls for the abandonment of traditional epistemology on the basis that it cannot produce knowledge. This paper examines his arguments for the claim that traditional epistemology is unproductive and can never produce knowledge. The paper reveals that the call is untenable as his leap from "It has not" to ' 'it cannot" is unjustifiable. The paper reveals further that it is the aim of traditional epistemology to justify science from sense experience and so far it is in the business of doing this, one can say it is productive. DOI: 10.7176/JPCR/40-0

Reflective Knowledge: Confucius and Virtue Epistemology

Most of sScholars have typically regarded Confucius as an ethical thinker broadly construed and not as an epistemological thinker. This paper seeks to overturn that view and, in doing so, has three basic goals. The first goal is to make the case that Confucian thought of the Analects is of epistemological significance. Goal two is to locate the significance of the Confucian thought within epistemology while accounting for the past overlooking of this significance. The third goal is to show that the Confucian thought is not only of epistemological significance, but that it can make a contribution to progressing contemporary epistemology

(Re)conceptualizing validity in (outcomes-based) assessment

No Abstract Available South African Journal of Education Vol.25(2) 2005: 115-11

Epistemic Function and Ontology of Analog and Digital Images

The important epistemic function of photographic images is their active role in construction and reconstruction of our beliefs concerning the world and human identity, since we often consider photographs as presenting reality or even the Real itself. Because photography can convince people of how different social and ethnic groups and even they themselves look, documentary projects and the dissemination of photographic practices supported the transition from disciplinary society to the present-day society of control. While both analog and digital images are formed from the same basic materia, the ways in which this matter appears are distinctive. In the case of analog photography, we deal with physical and chemical matter, whereas with digital images we face electronic matter. Because digital photography allows endless modification of the image, we can no longer believe in the truthfulness of digital images

Broadening the horizons of the philosophy of education :an enquiry into the social and pragmatic dimensions of human knowledge

This thesis addresses the social dimensions of human knowledge by reference to recent developments in the theory of knowledge in the Anglophone analytical tradition. What might be called social epistemology is often open to the charge of relativism. However, a detailed analysis of the most basic conditions of knowledge that enable human beings to live as not merely evolved, biological creatures but as intellectual, sentient beings reveals the sense in which human knowledge is essentially social and has no necessary connection either with relativism or with the opposing but equally tenuous ideas such as strong realism and scientific naturalism. The social and pragmatic dimensions of human knowledge shed light on its essentially educational nature. This broad sense of educational aspect of knowledge encourages us to see the prevailing outlook towards the relation between philosophy and education quite differently. This is not to suggest that the philosophy of education finds a new niche in academia but rather to suggest that it form the centrepiece of the philosophical enquiry into human knowledge. Having set the scene for the subsequent chapters in Chapter 1, this thesis goes on to analyse several issues to do with human knowledge and education. Sufficient appreciation of the significance of the fully social dimensions of human knowledge makes it possible to grasp the central thrusts of these issues without collapsing into the familiar dichotomies: theory and practice (Chapters 2 and 3); truth and rational justification (Chapter 4); conceptual norm and empirical description (Chapter 5); and cognitive pursuits and their social organisation (Chapters 6 and 7). On the basis of the foregoing analysis, Chapter 8 presents a broadened conception of the philosophy of education as a key academic discipline concerned with human knowledge specifically and human development more generally, which is to be in dialogue with scientific and empirical investigations

Social Epistemology between Revisionism and Expansionism

The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault's theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević's thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault's dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. In opposition to Miščević's dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy

Social Epistemology Between Revisionism and Expansionism: On the Use of "Continental" Philosophy and Nenad Miščević\u27s "Disappointment"

The main aim of this article is to analyze a recent text by Nenad Miščević dealing with social epistemology in the context of Foucault\u27s theory of knowledge. In the first part, we briefly note Miščević\u27s thoughts on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy and his thoughts on the latter. In the second part, we analyze both Miščević’s thesis about Foucault\u27s dual understanding of knowledge and his placement of social epistemology as a proper framework for Foucault’s concept of “new” knowledge. In opposition to Miščević\u27s dualistic view, we are more inclined to accept Goldman’s characterization of Foucault’s position as a revisionist project in the context of standard analytical epistemology that legitimately embraces even very serious expansions of epistemological themes. Finally, we propose that Miščević’s dualistic interpretation reflects his general dualistic position concerning the previously described distinction between “continental” and “analytic” philosophy