DHARMAKIRTI, DAVIDSON, AND KNOWING REALITY

If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former being our conceptual(ized) experiences, the latter their grounds or causes in reality as it is independent of our experience, then two contradictory positions with regards to the relationship between these two can be distinguished: either phenomena are identical with their noumenal causes, or they are not. Davidson is among the most influential modern defenders of the former position, metaphysical non-dualism. Dharmakirti\u27 strict distinction between ultimate and conventional reality, on the other hand, may be one of the most rigorously elaborated theories of the opposite position, metaphysical dualism. Despite this fundamental difference, their theories about the connection between phenomena and their noumenal causes are surprisingly similar in important respects. Both Dharmakirti in his theory of apoha and Davidson in his theory of triangulation argued that the content of words or concepts depends on a process involving at least two communicating beings and shared noumenal stimuli. The main point of divergence is the nature of classification, but ultimately Dharmakirti\u27s and Davidson\u27s conclusions on the noumenal-phenomenal relationship turn out to be complementary more than contradictory, and an integrative reconstruction suggests a middle path between dualism and non-dualism

Living as if God exists: Looking for Common Ground in Times of Radical Pluralism

This paper offers some comments on some metaphysical and epistemological claims of theological realism from the perspective of continental philosophy of religion, thereby taking the work of Soskice and Hick as paradigmatic for this kind of philosophical theology. The first comment regards the fact that theological realism considers religious and theological propositions as ways to depict or represent reality, and hence aims to bring them as much as possible in line with scientific ones. Some contemporary French philosophers criticize such a representing, depicting knowledge of God, because it encapsulates the divine reality in mundane, specifically scientific categories. eventually, theological realism runs the risk of annihilating God’s radical transcendence and reducing religion to an alternative scientific theory. The second comment tries to explore whether one can affirm God’s reality from a practical perspective, as a postulate of reason, and whether such an approach could serve as a common ground for religious and secular ways of life in times of radical pluralism. This comment begins by investigating the regulative character of Kant’s idea of God as the highest idea of reason, which not only orientates our theoretical enquiries, but also our moral actions. Although this idea is only a heuristic fiction for theoretical reason, God’s existence has to be affirmed on practical grounds, as a symbolic reality that gives orientation to people’s lives

The Epistemology of Anger in Argumentation

While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of related inferences. For these reasons, we claim that anger can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation

Algebraic symbolism as a conceptual barrier in learning mathematics

The use of symbolism in mathematics is probably the mostly quoted reason people use for explaining their lack of understanding and difficulties in learning mathematics. We will consider symbolism as a conceptual barrier drawing on some recent findings in historical epistemology and cognitive psychology. Instead of relying on the narrow psychological interpretation of epistemic obstacles we use the barrier for situating symbolism in the ‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’-debate. Drawing on a recent study within historical epistemology we show how early symbolism functioned in a way similar to concrete operational schemes. Furthermore we will discuss several studies from cognitive psychology which come to the conclusion that symbolism is not as abstract and arbitrary as one considers but often relies on perceptually organized grouping and concrete spatial relations. We will use operations on fractions to show that the reliance on concrete spatial operations also provides opportunities for teaching. We will conclude arguing that a better conceptual understanding of symbolism by teachers will prepare them for possible difficulties that students will be confronted with in the classroom

The Constitution of Social Practices

Practices – specific, recurrent types of human action and activity – are perhaps the most fundamental "building blocks" of social reality. This book argues that the detailed empirical study of practices is essential to effective social-scientific inquiry. It develops a philosophical infrastructure for understanding human practices, and argues that practice theory should be the analytical centrepiece of social theory and the philosophy of the social sciences. What would social scientists’ research look like if they took these insights seriously? To answer this question, the book offers an analytical framework to guide empirical research on practices in different times and places. The author explores how practices can be identified, characterised and explained, how they function in concrete contexts and how they might change over time and space. The Constitution of Social Practices lies at the intersection of philosophy, social theory, cultural theory and the social sciences. It is essential reading for scholars in social theory and the philosophy of social science, as well as the broad range of researchers and students across the social sciences and humanities whose work stands to benefit from serious consideration of practices

The epistemology of Schelling's philosophy of nature

The philosophy of nature operates as one complete and systematic aspect of Schelling’s philosophy in the years 1797-1801 and as complement to Schelling’s transcendental philosophy at this time. The philosophy of nature comes with its own, naturalistic epistemology, according to which human natural productivity provides the basis for human access to nature’s own productive laws. On the basis of one’s natural productivity, one can consciously formulate principles which match nature’s own lawful principles. One refines these principles through a process of experimentation, which relies on the human being’s naturalness in productivity. By making natural activity central to knowledge, Schelling takes seriously the naturalness of humans, without denying the dramatic shift that occurs when consciousness and rationality factor into experience. This epistemology can thus be fruitfully put in conversation with current philosophical discussions of mind and nature, in that it offers a naturalized account of mind which does not suffer from the typical weaknesses of a contemporary Kantian or Hegelian account. The paper thus concludes with a discussion of John McDowell’s Mind and World, and shows how Schelling’s philosophy can resolve some tensions in that work

In the Beginning Was the Verb: The Emergence and Evolution of Language Problem in the Light of the Big Bang Epistemological Paradigm.

The enigma of the Emergence of Natural Languages, coupled or not with the closely related problem of their Evolution is perceived today as one of the most important scientific problems. \ud The purpose of the present study is actually to outline such a solution to our problem which is epistemologically consonant with the Big Bang solution of the problem of the Emergence of the Universe}. Such an outline, however, becomes articulable, understandable, and workable only in a drastically extended epistemic and scientific oecumene, where known and habitual approaches to the problem, both theoretical and experimental, become distant, isolated, even if to some degree still hospitable conceptual and methodological islands. \ud The guiding light of our inquiry will be Eugene Paul Wigner's metaphor of ``the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in natural sciences'', i.e., the steadily evolving before our eyes, since at least XVIIth century, \ud ``the miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics''. Kurt Goedel's incompleteness and undecidability theory will be our guardian discerner against logical fallacies of otherwise apparently plausible explanations. \ud John Bell's ``unspeakableness'' and the commonplace counterintuitive character of quantum phenomena will be our encouragers. And the radical novelty of the introduced here and adapted to our purposes Big Bang epistemological paradigm will be an appropriate, even if probably shocking response to our equally shocking discovery in the oldest among well preserved linguistic fossils of perfect mathematical structures outdoing the best artifactual Assemblers

Semantics and Ontology:\ud On the Modal Structure of an Epistemic Theory of Meaning

In this paper I shall confront three basic questions.\ud First, the relevance of epistemic structures, as formalized\ud and dealt with by current epistemic logics, for a\ud general Theory of meaning. Here I acknowledge M. Dummett"s\ud idea that a systematic account of what is meaning of\ud an arbitrary language subsystem must especially take into\ud account the inferential components of meaning itself. That\ud is, an analysis of meaning comprehension processes,\ud given in terms of epistemic logics and semantics for epistemic\ud notions.\ud The second and third questions relate to the ontological\ud and epistemological framework for this approach.\ud Concerning the epistemological aspects of an epistemic\ud theory of meaning, the question is: how epistemic logics\ud can eventually account for the informative character of\ud meaning comprehension processes. "Information� seems\ud to be built in the very formal structure of epistemic processes,\ud and should be exhibited in modal and possibleworld\ud semantics for propositional knowledge and belief.\ud However, it is not yet clear what is e.g. a possible world.\ud That is: how it can be defined semantically, other than by\ud accessibility rules which merely define it by considering its\ud set-theoretic relations with other sets-possible worlds.\ud Therefore, it is not clear which is the epistemological status\ud of propositional information contained in the structural\ud aspects of possible world semantics. The problem here\ud seems to be what kind of meaning one attributes to the\ud modal notion of possibility, thus allowing semantical and\ud synctactical selectors for possibilities. This is a typically\ud Dummett-style problem.\ud The third question is linked with this epistemological\ud problem, since it is its ontological counterpart. It concerns\ud the limits of the logical space and of logical semantics for a\ud of meaning. That is, it is concerned with the kind of\ud structure described by inferential processes, thought, in a\ud fregean perspective, as pre-conditions of estentional\ud treatment of meaning itself. The second and third questions\ud relate to some observations in Wittgenstein"s Tractatus.\ud I shall also try to show how their behaviour limits the\ud explicative power of some semantics for epistemic logics\ud (Konolige"s and Levesque"s for knowledge and belief)

Legal theory and epistemic values: against authoritarian interpretivism

In his new book, R. Dworkin advocates the unity of values thesis. He wants to circumscribe morality as a proper epistemological domain which is methodologically different from scientific inquiry. The epistemological independence of morality is supposed to be a consequence of the irreducible fact/value dichotomy. This paper sustains that unity of values thesis is methodologically correct; all moral reasoning must be a constructive interpretation of its meaning. However, that author fails to recognize that not every axiological interpretation implies moral consequences. From H. Putnam’s pragmatic realism, this paper intends to demonstrate that much of scientific inquiry relies on values interpretation, and that this kind of reasoning is morally neutral. Finally, it should be clear that epistemological choices in legal positivism – e.g. the decision on which aspects of social interaction are theoretically relevant – should not disturb the soundness of its argument nor should it be read as if it had moral implications. This paper concludes that positivist theories cannot be ruled out. Since the choice between descriptive and interpretative models requires a circular justification, legal theory is itself an activity governed by epistemic values interpretation. Likewise natural sciences, it can only be understood from an internal perspective. Accordingly, inclusive positivism holds the advantage of being more consilient than interpretivism, which is arguably parochial