What’s so bad about scientism?

In their attempt to defend philosophy from accusations of uselessness made by prominent scientists, such as Stephen Hawking, some philosophers respond with the charge of ‘scientism.’ This charge makes endorsing a scientistic stance, a mistake by definition. For this reason, it begs the question against these critics of philosophy, or anyone who is inclined to endorse a scientistic stance, and turns the scientism debate into a verbal dispute. In this paper, I propose a different definition of scientism, and thus a new way of looking at the scientism debate. Those philosophers who seek to defend philosophy against accusations of uselessness would do philosophy a much better service, I submit, if they were to engage with the definition of scientism put forth in this paper, rather than simply make it analytic that scientism is a mistake

An essay on msic-systems

A theory of many-sorted implicative conceptual systems (abbreviated msic-systems) is outlined. Examples of msic-systems include legal systems, normative systems, systems of rules and instructions, and systems expressing policies and various kinds of scientific theories. In computer science, msic-systems can be used in, for instance, legal information systems, decision support systems, and multi-agent systems. In this essay, msic-systems are approached from a logical and algebraic perspective aiming at clarifying their structure and developing effective methods for representing them. Of special interest are the most narrow links or joinings between different strata in a system, that is between subsystems of different sorts of concepts, and the intermediate concepts intervening between such strata. Special emphasis is put on normative systems, and the role that intermediate concepts play in such systems, with an eye on knowledge representation issues. In this essay, normative concepts are constructed out of descriptive concepts using operators based on the Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative positions. An abstract architecture for a norm-regulated multi-agent system is suggested, containing a scheme for how normative positions will restrict the set of actions that the agents are permitted to choose from

The many encounters of Thomas Kuhn and French epistemology

The work of Thomas Kuhn has been very influential in Anglo-American philosophy of science and it is claimed that it has initiated the historical turn. Although this might be the case for English speaking countries, in France an historical approach has always been the rule. This article aims to investigate the similarities and differences between Kuhn and French philosophy of science or ‘French epistemology’. The first part will argue that he is influenced by French epistemologists, but by lesser known authors than often thought. The second part focuses on the reactions of French epistemologists on Kuhn’s work, which were often very critical. It is argued that behind some superficial similarities there are deep disagreements between Kuhn and French epistemology. This is finally shown by a brief comparison with the reaction of more recent French philosophers of science, who distance themselves from French epistemology and are more positive about Kuhn. Based on these diverse appreciations of Kuhn, a typology of the different positions within the philosophy of science is suggested

Acts of Time: Cohen and Benjamin on Mathematics and History

This paper argues that the principle of continuity that underlies Benjamin’s understanding of what makes the reality of a thing thinkable, which in the Kantian context implies a process of “filling time” with an anticipatory structure oriented to the subject, is of a different order than that of infinitesimal calculus—and that a “discontinuity” constitutive of the continuity of experience and (merely) counterposed to the image of actuality as an infinite gradation of ultimately thetic acts cannot be the principle on which Benjamin bases the structure of becoming. Tracking the transformation of the process of “filling time” from its logical to its historical iteration, or from what Cohen called the “fundamental acts of time” in Logik der reinen Erkenntnis to Benjamin’s image of a language of language (qua language touching itself), the paper will suggest that for Benjamin, moving from 0 to 1 is anything but paradoxical, and instead relies on the possibility for a mathematical function to capture the nature of historical occurrence beyond paradoxes of language or phenomenality

Towards a new foundation for systems practice : grounding multi-method systemic interventions

My purpose with this PhD has been to provide a new foundation for systems practice in order to ground multi-method systemic interventions. The field of Critical System Thinking (CST), which was established to provide this grounding, finds itself immersed in a crisis called the “paradigm problem”. This has come about because it has sought to integrate different Western epistemologies in order to ground methodological pluralism. In particular, CST has uncritically assumed parallel worlds that speak different languages in its attempt to integrate different systems approaches informed by Western epistemologies that are not ontology-free. Hence, system practice is in need of a new ground to justify the use of different systems methodologies that avoids both a fractured universe and atheoretical pragmatism.I advance a ‘world-hypothesis’, which is essentially a world-image to explain reality. I have pursued a fascinating journey into systems philosophy and systems science to see the universe with new eyes. The result is a new world image called the One World of causally interdependent systems that competes both with the Common World of linguistic meanings constituted by society through language and with the Natural World of extended objects made of interacting parts. The One World hypothesis questions the authenticity of currently prevailing world-images and points to the possibility of a new age for systems thinking. However, controversially for systems scientists, the implication is that they need to give up on both the part-whole and the holarchy concepts.Importantly, if the One World hypothesis is to provide new grounds for systems practice and methodological pluralism, the picture of the universe has to be completed with an understanding of how conscious systems operate. Thus, I provide a scientific hypothesis and I postulate education as a future systems methodology to inform systemic interventions in conscious systems. I also encourage systems scientists and systems practitioners to work together to flesh out a multi-method skeleton to organize the field of systems practice. Finally, I propose the next phase of my own research, which will be to develop an educational systems methodology to improve conscious systems

Finding the Original Meaning of American Criminal Procedure Rights: Lessons from Reasonable Doubt’s Development

[Excerpt] “The prosecution must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt for a valid conviction. The Constitution nowhere explicitly contains this requirement, but the Supreme Court in In re Winship1 stated that due process commands it. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that the Court had often assumed that the standard existed, that it played a central role in American criminal justice by lessening the chances of mistaken convictions, and that it was essential for instilling community respect in criminal enforcement. The reasonable doubt standard is fundamental because it makes guilty verdicts more difficult. As Winship said, the requirement “protects the accused against conviction . . . .” Justice Harlan’s eloquent concurring opinion in Winship elaborated by noting that “a standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” Incorrect factual conclusions can lead either to the acquittal of a guilty person or the conviction of an innocent one. “Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each.” Society views the harm of convicting the innocent as much greater than that of acquitting the guilty. Thus, Harlan concluded, “I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal cased as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.” The reasonable doubt standard was constitutionalized because of the societal function it now serves. Winship did not find it constitutionally required because the original meaning of a constitutional provision required it. Indeed, the Court indicated that the standard had not fully crystalized until after the Constitution was adopted. Even so, the reasonable doubt standard provides a fertile field for examining the methodology of finding the original meaning of constitutional criminal procedure rights. First, its status seems secure No debate questions the constitutional requirement that an accused can only be convicted if the crime is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Its original meaning can be explored uncolored by the partisanship often engendered when present seekers of original meaning hope to define a new contour to a constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, serious scholars have studied the reasonable doubt standard’s early development and its original meaning, purposes, and intent. An examination of those scholarly sources, methods, and conclusions provides a number of valuable insights that should affect the search for finding the original meaning of other American criminal procedure guarantees. These are first that the seeker of original meaning of evolved criminal procedure rights has to go beyond traditional legal sources and explore the broader epistemological developments in religion, philosophy, and science that affected the development of the right. Second, conclusions about original meaning drawn primarily from English and other European sources can be misleading without a consideration of American developments. What might seem like a sound conclusion when English sources are examined may look suspect when viewed in the light of American developments. Finally, the reasonable doubt scholarship reveals that definitive conclusions about the original meaning of American constitutional rights will often be impossible to find both because the necessary American record is absent and because evolved rights never really had a definitive original meaning. The starting point here is with the scholars who have concluded that the original purpose of the reasonable doubt standard was not, as the Court now has it, to protect the accused, but instead emerged to make convictions easier.