Knowledge-First Theories of Justification

Knowledge-first theories of justification give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this entry is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and in what follows I offer an opinionated survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in the last two decades since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits. I first trace several of the general theoretical motivations that have been offered for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification. I then go on to examine existing knowledge-first theories of justification and their standing objections. These objections are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with the extensional adequacy of knowledge-first theories of justification. There are doubtless more ways of giving knowledge priority in the theory of justification than I cover here, but the resulting survey will be instructive as it highlights potential shortcomings that would-be knowledge-first theorists of justification may wish either to avoid or else to be prepared with a suitable error theory

Assessing Infinitism

I will be examining the historical context in which infinitism emerged as a response to coherentism and foundationalism, focusing on the principle of avoiding circularity and principle of avoiding arbitrariness. Coherentism is the idea that knowledge is derived from the coherence of interconnected beliefs, while foundationalism holds that certain basic beliefs serve as the foundation for all other knowledge. Infinitism, on the other hand, suggests that there is no foundational level of knowledge, and that our beliefs can be justified by an infinite regress of reasons, i.e. of non-repeating infinite chains. I will then emphasize the key arguments for and against infinitism, delving into Peter D. Klein - Carl Ginet Debate (Possibility of Non-Inferential Justification), Turri’s notion on ‘how foundationalist can provide for the infinite chain of justifications’ and discuss Richard Fumerton’s objections against Infinitism. Finally, I will evaluate the current state of the debate surrounding infinitism and consider possible future directions for research in this area. Overall, this article aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the concept of infinitism and its role as an alternative to coherentism and foundationalism in epistemology

Fading Foundations: Probability and the Regress Problem

This Open Access book addresses the age-old problem of infinite regresses in epistemology. How can we ever come to know something if knowing requires having good reasons, and reasons can only be good if they are backed by good reasons in turn? The problem has puzzled philosophers ever since antiquity, giving rise to what is often called Agrippa's Trilemma. The current volume approaches the old problem in a provocative and thoroughly contemporary way. Taking seriously the idea that good reasons are typically probabilistic in character, it develops and defends a new solution that challenges venerable philosophical intuitions and explains why they were mistakenly held. Key to the new solution is the phenomenon of fading foundations, according to which distant reasons are less important than those that are nearby. The phenomenon takes the sting out of Agrippa's Trilemma; moreover, since the theory that describes it is general and abstract, it is readily applicable outside epistemology, notably to debates on infinite regresses in metaphysics

The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion

Siirretty Doriast

Informal Logic’s Infinite Regress: Inference Through a Looking-Glass

I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified by the Groarkes that “all theories of informal argument must face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to each of the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument content, usually premise material

Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge

A central debate in philosophy of action concerns whether agential knowledge, the knowledge agents characteristically have of their own actions, is inferential. While inferentialists like Sarah Paul hold that it is inferential, others like Lucy O’Brien and Kieran Setiya argue that it is not. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for the view that agential knowledge is non-inferential, by posing a dilemma for inferentialists: on the first horn, inferentialism is committed to holding that agents have only alienated knowledge of their own actions; on the second horn, inferentialism is caught in a vicious regress. Neither option is attractive, so inferentialism should be rejected

The justification of deductive inference and the rationality of believing for a reason

The present PhD thesis is concerned with the question whether good reasoning requires that the subject has some cognitive grip on the relation between premises and conclusion. One consideration in favor of such a requirement goes as follows: In order for my belief-formation to be an instance of reasoning, and not merely a causally related sequence of beliefs, the process must be guided by my endorsement of a rule of reasoning. Therefore I must have justified beliefs about the relation between my premises and my conclusion. The rationality of a belief often depends on whether it is rightly connected to other beliefs, or more generally to other mental states —the states capable of providing a reason to holding the belief in question. For instance, some rational beliefs are connected to other beliefs by being inferred from them. It is often accepted that the connection implies that the subject in some sense ‘takes the mental states in question to be reason-providing’. But views on how exactly this is to be understood differ widely. They range from interpretations according to which ‘taking a mental state to be reason-providing’ imposes a mere causal sustaining relation between belief and reason-providing state to interpretations according to which one ‘takes a mental state to be reason-providing’ only if one believes that the state is reason-providing. The most common worry about the latter view is that it faces a vicious regress. In this thesis a different but in some respects similar interpretation of ‘taking something as reason-providing’ is given. It is argued to consist of a disposition to react in certain ways to information that challenges the reason-providing capacity of the allegedly reason-providing state. For instance, that one has inferred A from B partly consists in being disposed to suspend judgment about A if one obtains a reason to believe that B does not render A probable. The account is defended against regress-objections and the suspicion of explanatory circularity

Circularity and arbitrariness:Responses to the epistemic regress problem

Volgens Peter Klein is infinitisme het enige adequate antwoord op het epistemische regressieprobleem. Klein betoogt dat alleen infinitisme tegemoet komt aan twee theoretische desiderata: het vermijden van circulariteit en het vermijden van willekeur. Dit proefschrift evalueert Kleins argument. Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een beschrijving van het regressieprobleem. Als opvattingen alleen gerechtvaardigd kunnen worden met andere gerechtvaardigde opvattingen, kan iemand alleen een gerechtvaardigde opvattingen hebben als zij oneindig veel gerechtvaardigde opvattingen heeft. Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 ontwikkelen concepten van circulariteit en willekeur. Hoofdstukken 5, 6 en 7 evalueren afzonderlijke antwoorden op het epistemische regressieprobleem in termen van die concepten. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt het fundamentisme. Er wordt betoogd dat het niet in staat is willekeur te vermijden. Hoofdstuk 6 bespreekt het coherentisme. Hoewel coherentisme op het eerste gezicht in staat lijkt circulariteit te vermijden, blijkt dat het alleen willekeur kan vermijden als het toch een vorm van circulariteit toelaat. Hoofdstuk 7 bestudeert infinitisme. Wat blijkt is dat geen van de bestaande versies van infinitisme, zelfs niet Kleins eigen versie, zowel circulariteit als willekeur vermijdt. Niettemin blijkt dat de enige theorie die circulariteit en willekeur vermijdt, een versie van infinitisme is. Een groot probleem voor die theorie lijkt evenwel dat geen eindig mens lijkt te kunnen voldoen aan hetgeen zij vereist. Hoofdstuk 8 besluit het proefschrift met een beschouwing van resterende theoretische mogelijkheden. Duidelijk wordt dat al die mogelijkheden ofwel serieuze nadelen, ofwel grote uitdagingen met zich meebrengen