8,388 research outputs found
Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
We provide here an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on
the possibility correspondences. Such an analysis calls for the use of
transfinite iterations of the corresponding operators. Our approach is based on
Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem and applies both to the notions of rationalizability
and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.Comment: 8 pages Proc. of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of
Rationality and Knowledge (TARK XI), 2007. To appea
The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common
knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies
that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We
establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality notions and
arbitrary strategic games and allows to strengthen the above result to
arbitrary games, other rationality notions, and transfinite iterations of the
elimination process. We also clarify what conclusions one can draw for the
customary dominance notions that are not monotonic. The main tool is Tarski's
Fixpoint Theorem.Comment: 20 page
Proof-theoretic Analysis of Rationality for Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the
statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose
only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies. Rationality here means playing only strategies one believes to be
best responses. This involves looking at two formal languages. One is
first-order, and is used to formalise optimality conditions, like avoiding
strictly dominated strategies, or playing a best response. The other is a modal
fixpoint language with expressions for optimality, rationality and belief.
Fixpoints are used to form expressions for common belief and for iterated
elimination of non-optimal strategies.Comment: 16 pages, Proc. 11th International Workshop on Computational Logic in
Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA XI). To appea
The Complexity of Synthesizing Uniform Strategies
We investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve
sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not
\mu-calculus definable. Typically, we can state that a strategy is
observation-based. We propose a formal language to specify uniformity
properties, interpreted over two-player turn-based arenas equipped with a
binary relation between plays. This way, we capture e.g. games with winning
conditions expressible in epistemic temporal logic, whose underlying
equivalence relation between plays reflects the observational capabilities of
agents (for example, synchronous perfect recall). Our framework naturally
generalizes many other situations from the literature. We establish that the
problem of synthesizing strategies under uniformity constraints based on
regular binary relations between plays is non-elementary complete.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2013, arXiv:1303.007
Iterated Strict Dominance in General Games
We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games. We characterize IESDS by means of a "stability" criterion, and offer a sufficient and necessary epistemic condition for IESDS. We show by an example that IESDS may generate spurious Nash equilibria in the class of Reny's better-reply secure games. We provide sufficient/necessary conditions under which IESDS preserves the set of Nash equilibria. Nous donnons une définition de l’élimination itérative des stratégies qui sont strictement donimées (EISSD) pour les jeux avec un nombre fini (ou infini) de joueurs , des ensembles de stratégies compactes (ou non-compactes), et des fonctions de gains continues (ou non-continues). Le processus EISSD est bien défini et indépendant de l’ordre d’élimination. Nous donnons une caractérisation du processus EISSD en utilisant un critère de stabilité et offrons une condition épistémologique. Nous démontrons que le processus EISSD peut produire des équilibres faux dans la classe des jeux de meilleures réponses sécuritaires de Reny. Nous donnons des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes pour que le processus EISSD conserve l’ensemble des équilibre de Nash.game theory, strict dominance, iterated elimination, Nash equilibrium, Reny's better-reply secure games., théorie des jeux, dominance stricte, élimination itérative, équilibre de Nash, jeux de meilleures réponses sécuritaires de Reny
Epistemically stable strategy sets
This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.Epistemic game theory; epistemic stability; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief.
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